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Abstract 
The over-arching aim of the research conducted for this thesis was to examine 
underlying issues in memory and decision-making that impact eyewitness 
identification procedures in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes. In one survey 
and five experiments, we (i) explored key concerns in multiple perpetrator 
identifications in police practice in three EU countries (Police Survey), (ii) tested the 
independence of multiple identification decisions made successively (Experiments 1, 
2 and 3) and (iii) examined the purported utility of using other faces as contextual 
cues for recognizing the faces of multiple perpetrators (Experiments 4 and 5). In the 
survey we asked police officers (from Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands) to 
describe how agencies in various countries conduct and regulate identification 
procedures with multiple perpetrators. Results demonstrated sizeable differences in 
police practice between countries and highlighted the importance of determining 
whether there are consequences of testing memory on multiple lineups presented in 
succession. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants watched a mock-crime film 
involving three perpetrators and later made three showup identification decisions, one 
showup for each perpetrator. Experiments 1 and 2 used similar procedures, with the 
exception of varied patterns of target-presence. Across both experiments, evidence for 
sequential dependencies for choosing behavior was inconsistent. In Experiment 1, 
responses on the second, target-present showup assimilated towards previous 
choosing. However, in Experiment 2, responses on the second showup contrasted 
previous choosing regardless of target-presence. Experiment 3 examined whether 
methodological differences between the recognition and eyewitness paradigms used 
in previous research on sequential dependencies might account for the inconsistent 
findings in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants studied pairs of words, landscapes, or 
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faces, and were later tested for recognition. Sequential dependencies were detected in 
recognition decisions over many trials, including recognition for faces: the probability 
of a yes response on the current trial increased if the previous response was also yes 
(vs. no). However, choosing behavior on previous trials did not predict individual 
recognition decisions on the current trial. In Experiments 4 and 5, we sought 
replicate facilitative effects in cued face recognition, to (i) investigate the mechanisms 
underlying those effects, and (ii) determine whether such effects would extend to 
more than two faces. Participants encoded sets of individual, paired, or groups of four 
faces and were tested with no cues, correct cues (a face previously studied with the 
target test face), or incorrect cues (a never-before-seen face). Hit rates were not 
affected by either cue type or face encoding condition, but cuing of any kind (correct 
or incorrect) appeared to provide a protective buffer to reduce false-alarm rates in the 
two- and four-face conditions through increased sensitivity, but mostly reduced 
response bias. The present research on sequential dependencies for identification 
decisions suggests that the integrity of identification and recognition decisions is not 
likely to be impacted by making multiple decisions in a row.  However, our findings 
suggest that cued face recognition may be a useful technique to use for reducing false 
recognition rates in contexts with multiple faces. Throughout the thesis, we argue for 
the systematic examination of influential factors that are both unique and inherent to 
practice, memory, and decision-making for multiple perpetrator identification and 
recognition.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the thesis 
A case of identity: Misidentification and multiple perpetrator crimes 
 
In July of 1981, three men broke into a Florida home, threatened the five 
victims with a shotgun, and robbed the residence. Three of the victims were tied up 
and left in the house. Two victims, 12-year-old Isabelle
1
 and 36-year-old Michelle
1
, 
were forced into the trunk of the car, driven to a dark, wooded area, and were raped. 
They were left tied to trees as the perpetrators drove away. The victims in the house 
untied themselves in time to record the license plate number of the perpetrators’ car 
for police. Isabelle and Michelle also eventually managed to untie themselves from 
the trees and sought help from a nearby home. Soon after the crime, the police 
showed the victims photographic lineups for two suspects. Michelle identified both 
Douglas James and Alan Crotzer, while one of the other victims also identified 
Douglas. The next day, police showed the victims more photos, and three of them 
identified Corlenzo James, the brother of Douglas, as the third perpetrator. During 
their subsequent trials, Corlenzo pled guilty to robbery and assault, Douglas defended 
himself by claiming the rape was permitted by the adult victim (i.e., consent defense), 
but Alan maintained his innocence and claimed he had no knowledge of the crime. 
All three were convicted, with Alan Crotzer given a prison sentence of 130 years. 
(Innocence Project, 2017) 
Unfortunately, the victims in this case were only correct about two of the three 
perpetrators. In 2003, new analyses of the DNA found on the rape victim’s clothing 
definitively excluded Alan Crotzer as a rapist. Despite the fact that all five 
eyewitnesses made in-court identifications of him, Alan was an innocent man 
convicted of a crime he did not commit. Douglas eventually revealed the third 
                                                 
1
 Not their real names 
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perpetrator to be a childhood friend and admitted that they had never met Alan before 
he was accused of their crime. In 2006, after 24 years in jail, Alan was finally 
released. 
While we know a lot about eyewitness memory in general— four decades of 
research provides a number of insights as to what might have produced a faulty 
memory of Alan Crotzer — it is fair to say that we do not know much specifically 
about eyewitness memory for multiple perpetrator crimes. We do know that multiple 
perpetrator crimes are prevalent around the world and that such crimes are among the 
most difficult to solve (Dauvergne & Li, 2006; Liem et al., 2013). We also know that 
nearly two-thirds of surveyed U.K. police report issues and confusion in conducting 
multiple suspect identification procedures, that eyewitness identification accuracy 
tends to decrease as the number of perpetrators increase, and that attempts to address 
this multiple perpetrator identification disadvantage through adapted lineup 
procedures have had limited success (Hobson, Wilcock, & Valentine, 2012; Horry, 
Halford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2014).  
However, research has done little to uncover or explore those factors that are 
unique to eyewitness memory in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes. This 
leaves us with an incomplete picture when trying to understand eyewitness memory 
and decision-making in multiple suspect lineups like for the crime depicted above. 
Furthermore, there is a paucity of information regarding how police construct 
identification procedures for a multiple perpetrator crime, to what extent those 
procedures are similar or different for a single perpetrator crime, and what, if any, 
issues police or eyewitnesses face in this applied context (cf. U.K. police; Hobson et 
al., 2012). Thus, while there have been some attempts to create novel identification 
procedures adapted specifically to the context of multiple perpetrator crimes, it is 
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unclear which theories in memory and decision-making should drive such attempts, 
whether the theories used for previous attempts are relevant to multiple perpetrator 
crime identification, and to what extent the traditional practice-as-usual comparison 
groups (i.e., control groups) reflect actual police methods.  
This thesis specifically aims to address this gap in the literature concerned 
with eyewitness memory for multiple perpetrator crimes. Across five empirical 
studies and one exploratory survey, this thesis reviews police practice in three 
European countries in the context of multiple suspect identification (Chapter 1: 
Police Survey), tests the independence of multiple identification decisions made 
successively (Chapter 2: Experiments 1, 2 and 3), and examines the purported 
utility of face context cues for recognizing the faces of multiple perpetrators (Chapter 
3: Experiments 4 and 5). This thesis seeks to extend a small, but growing, field in 
eyewitness memory for multiple faces and eyewitness identification for multiple 
perpetrators so that compiled evidence may someday be used to support identification 
procedures adapted specifically to the context of multiple perpetrator crimes.  
The purpose of this chapter is to place this thesis in context by (1) establishing 
applied questions for research in multiple perpetrator identification, (2) reviewing the 
extant literature that has thus far adapted traditional lineups techniques for multiple 
perpetrator crimes, and (3) exploring the theoretical background for two factors in 
memory and decision-making that are both unique to multiple perpetrator crimes and 
have yet to be empirically tested. These two factors— the associations between 
multiple decisions and the associations between memories for multiple faces— are the 
focus of the thesis.  
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Identification in practice 
The applied eyewitness experiment: Identification of multiple 
perpetrators. The case described at the outset of this thesis is just one example of the 
many crimes that are committed by multiple perpetrators— crimes that are often 
violent, premeditated and goal-driven. Gang violence (Juodis, Woodworth, Porter, & 
Ten Brinke, 2009), hate crimes (Sandholtz, Langton, & Planty, 2013), rapes (Horvath 
& Kelley, 2009), and assaults (Hobson, et al., 2012) are often committed by strangers 
working as a group. In fact, the rising rate of such crimes appears to be a global 
phenomenon. For example, in Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 13-17% of 
homicides between 2003 and 2006 involved two or more perpetrators (Liem et al., 
2013), while the proportion of homicides with multiple perpetrators in the U.S. 
reached 20% in 2008 (nearly double that reported in 1980; Cooper & Smith, 2011). In 
Canada, one third of recorded homicides are committed by two or more perpetrators, 
gang-related homicides tripled between 1995 and 2000 (Fedorowyckz, 2001), and 
doubled again between 2001 and 2008 to 0.42 gang-related homicides per 100,000 
people (Statistics Canada, 2016).  
Such crimes often involve victims or bystanders as eyewitnesses who may be 
asked to identify multiple suspects related to the multiple perpetrators. A lineup, with 
one suspect and at least five known-to-be-innocent look-alikes (called fillers), can be 
constructed using photographs or videos of the lineup members to show the 
eyewitness, or by having lineup members physically present (i.e., behind a one-way 
mirror). This lineup can be seen as an applied scientific experiment with tangible and 
immediate consequences for the livelihoods of the suspect, the victim(s), and the 
wider community in which they live. In this ‘experiment’, police test the hypothesis 
that the suspect is the actual perpetrator of the crime and the eyewitness can either 
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confirm the police hypothesis by choosing the suspect, or they can falsify the police 
hypothesis by rejecting the lineup (i.e., saying the perpetrator is not there) or by 
mistakenly identifying the known-innocent filler. It is critical to understand how 
factors within the control of the justice system (i.e., instructions to witnesses; lineup 
construction) and factors outside of the control of the justice system (i.e., encoding 
conditions of the witnessed event; mechanics of memory) might influence an 
eyewitness’s memory and decisions in eyewitness identification procedures because 
we can use this knowledge to improve identification procedures or to make informed 
decisions about the reliability of the evidence after the fact.  
There is an extensive history of police practice inspiring empirical tests for 
eyewitness memory (e.g., witness instructions; Malpass & Devine, 1981; post-
identification feedback effect; Wells & Bradfield, 1989), but only one such 
experiment specifically in the case of multiple perpetrator identification procedures 
(Hobson, & Wilcock, 2011). One source of information on current practice is surveys 
of police practitioners, such as the most recent National Institute of Justice survey of 
police practice across the United States (Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). 
However, there is only one police survey of law enforcement agencies that asked 
about police procedures specifically in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes, 
which is reviewed below (Hobson et al., 2012). Also presented are the recent results 
of a new survey conducted for this thesis, which extends the scope of Hobson and 
colleague’s survey for three additional countries within the European Union (EU).  
Police practice in the U.K.  Despite being the only region in the world that 
addresses lineups for multiple perpetrator crimes in legislation (PACE 1984), 
guidelines for law enforcement officials in the U.K. are sparse, non-specific, and not 
empirically vetted. On multiple suspect showings (i.e., there are multiple suspects for 
19 
 
a single perpetrator crime), PACE procedures instruct, “When all members of a 
similar group are possible suspects, separate identification parades shall be held for 
each,” (PACE Code D, 2011, p. 181). This might apply to a situation where a single 
member of a gang committed a crime, but the police do not know which one of the 
members is the perpetrator. In this case, the eyewitness would view one lineup for the 
first suspect and make a decision about that lineup before viewing the next one. This 
is a logical extension of the PACE rules for single suspect showings, where the 
established procedures are simply replicated separately for each one of the multiple 
suspects. For crimes with multiple perpetrators, an adaption was added, instructing, 
“Only one suspect shall be included in an identification parade unless there are two 
suspects of roughly similar appearance,” (PACE Code D 2011, Annex A, p. 47). In 
other words, while PACE rules forbid multiple suspects to appear in the same lineup 
for a single perpetrator crime, they make an exception for multiple perpetrator crimes.    
According to the results of a survey of U.K. police by Hobson and colleagues 
(2012), all 29 law enforcement agencies from England, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
report creating individual lineups for each suspect and requiring the witness to make a 
decision about the first before moving on to the next. However, officers also report 
frequently running into difficulty implementing such lineups, including having to 
adapt instructions, being unsure of how to handle out-of-ordinary requests from 
eyewitnesses, and receiving complaints of “blindness” from witnesses having to view 
too many faces. For example, one officer reported that although they normally follow 
PACE procedure, they would allow the witness to see all lineups before making 
identification decisions if the witness specifically requested to do so. Officers also 
reported that witnesses would sometimes try to pick multiple suspects from the same 
lineup, even when there was only one suspect in each lineup. When this happens, 
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some officers insisted that the eyewitness could no longer see the following lineups, 
but most reported that they would show the other lineups anyway.  In such a case, it is 
unclear how officers should proceed, and neither current police protocol nor 
psychological research have addressed this concern. 
While the 2012 survey was an important first step to understand police 
practice for multiple perpetrator identifications, the results are limited to one region 
that specifically addresses multiple perpetrator identifications in mandated police 
procedures. Therefore we do not know what officers would do in the absence of such 
instructions. Furthermore, the original survey failed to address some of the concerns 
that are unique to multiple perpetrator identification procedures, including if and 
when multiple identifications are administered (i.e., witnesses view lineups for 
perpetrators as suspects become available, or all at the same time), who is responsible 
for constructing the multiple lineups (i.e., does the same person construct all lineups 
for a multiple perpetrator crime?), and how officers perceive witnesses that can 
identify some, but not all, of the presented suspects.  
Police practice in Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. To address this 
gap, a new survey was developed to extend this previous survey. The original 
questions from Hobson and colleagues (2012) were adapted and translated into two 
languages (Swedish and Dutch) along with new questions to address the concerns 
above. This new survey was distributed online to police agencies in three EU 
countries: Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Tupper, Sauerland, Sauer, & Hope, 
in prep). In this survey, we aimed to (a) understand the prevalence and characteristics 
of multiple perpetrator crimes from the perspective of law enforcement agencies, (b) 
discern how agencies in various countries conduct identification procedures (e.g., 
lineups, photo-arrays, showups) with multiple perpetrators, and (c) gain insight into 
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how law enforcement agents and eyewitnesses experience the identification process in 
the context of such crimes.  
Participants and recruitment. In total, we received responses from 72 law 
enforcement officials from Sweden (n = 25), Belgium (n = 27), and the Netherlands 
(n = 20) who had experience administering identification procedures to eyewitnesses. 
However, attrition occurred throughout the study, such that the final questions 
received 39 participant responses. Participants from Sweden completed the Swedish-
translated version of the survey and participants from Belgium and the Netherlands 
completed the Dutch-translated version of the survey
2
. We used the snowball 
sampling method of recruitment, meaning that we used initial police contacts in each 
country to recruit colleagues and distribute the online survey link in a way that best 
suited the structure of the police in that particular country. Participants received the 
survey link via an e-mail, which also included a short explanation of the purpose and 
contents of the survey. Participants could access the survey through Qualtrics (Provo, 
Utah), where they read a more detailed information sheet, provided informed consent, 
and completed the survey questions (survey in appendices). 
Table 1.1  
Police Survey: Range of Age and Job Experience (Mean) and Status of Certification 
Requirement for Police Respondents on Multiple Perpetrator Identification Survey 
 Age Job Experience Certification Required? 
Sweden 27-61 (M = 40.44) 0-25  (M = 7.67) No 
Belgium 27-55 (M = 43.15) 1-30 (M = 14.00) No 
Netherlands 33-68 (M = 47.40)  1-30 (M = 10.89) Yes 
Note. Age and job experience express range of years reported by all police respondents 
from each country.  
 
                                                 
2
 The survey was not translated to French. Therefore we did not target recruitment from 
Belgian regions that are primarily French speaking (i.e., Brussels).  
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Method. We received the original version of the police survey (Hobson, et al., 
2012) with permission to adapt it. Ten of the 11 original survey questions were used, 
and 11 questions were added (see Table 1.2 for a list of questions). Given that the 
survey would be distributed to multiple countries with different procedure regulations 
and varying levels of institutional or legal obligation to those regulations, two of the 
original 10 questions were adapted to allow officers to indicate which procedures they 
used in their own job and one was dropped. Original questions, adapted questions, and 
novel questions are marked in Appendix B. The survey included multiple choice 
responses and open-ended questions throughout five main sections: (1) general 
information about the officer (e.g., police jurisdiction, years of experience; 5 
questions), (2) estimation of the proportion of crimes and the type of crimes officers 
had handled that involved multiple perpetrators (3 questions), (3) current procedures 
for multiple identifications (13 questions), (4) problems experienced while 
administering multiple identification procedures (2 questions) and (5) officer’s 
experiences in their interactions with eyewitnesses viewing lineups for multiple 
perpetrator crimes (2 questions). There was also space at the end for their suggestions 
regarding if/how to adjust or change current procedures (1). For the purpose of this 
thesis, we focus only on sections 3-5. However, Table 1.1 provides descriptive 
statistics of general information, including age, job roles, job experience, and whether 
certification is required to administer identification lineups.  
As part of the development of the survey, police contacts in each of the three 
countries to be surveyed received both the English and the appropriate translated 
version of the survey. They were asked to provide feedback on the survey, including 
ease of understanding, the accuracy of terminology used in translation, the 
appropriateness and relevance of the procedures described, and whether they felt there  
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Table 1.2 Questions for Police on Multiple Perpetrator Crimes and Eyewitness 
Identification Procedures 
1. General Information* 
1. Gender (male/female/other) 
2. Age? 
3. How many years of experience in conducting eyewitness identification procedures do you have? 
4. What is your job role? 
5. Jurisdiction? 
2. The Criminal Offences* 
1. Of the crimes have you dealt in the last 12 months, what proportion involved multiple suspect showings? (0-
100%) 
2. How many suspects are typically involved in the multiple perpetrator cases you have dealt with? (Please select 
the box for the category that applies most often)  (2-10) 
3. In the past 12 months, what types of crimes have you dealt with that typically involve multiple 
perpetrators?  (robbery / burglary/ assault/ sexual assault/ homicide/ other) 
3. Current Procedures 
Scenario 1** 
4a. Choose the option that resembles what you would do in this case (A1 or A2/ A1 and A2 separately/ A1 
and A2 together) 
4b. In your work with multiple perpetrator crimes, Scenario 1 occurs: (never/ sometimes/ often/ always) 
Scenario 2**  
5a. Choose the option that resembles what you would do in this case (A or B/ A and B separately/ A and B 
together) 
5b. In your work with multiple perpetrator crimes, Scenario 2 occurs: (never/ sometimes/ often/ always) 
6. In what manner do you present the parades to witnesses in a multiple suspect identification? Select all the 
options that apply: (Lineups: live/ photo/ video; Format: simultaneous/ sequential/ other; Show-ups: live/ photo/ video) 
7. Are there any procedural requirements or guidelines in place for multiple suspect identifications?  
8. How do you organize the identification presentations for eyewitnesses in the case of a multiple-perpetrator 
crime? (witness views when: all lineups available/ as lineups become available/ other) 
9*. What instructions do you give to a witness for multiple perpetrator identifications?  
10*. Do you ask the witness to look for a specific suspect? 
11*. Do you ask the witness to describe the role of the suspect they are identifying? 
12. Do you record all eyewitness identification decisions in a crime with multiple perpetrators?  
13. Do you record confidence for all suspect identifications for multiple suspect identifications? 
14. Who is responsible for constructing the lineups? Is the same person responsible for all suspect lineups in a given case 
involving multiple perpetrators?  
4. Issues with Current Practice* 
15. Do you, as someone who administers identifications, experience any problems with multiple suspect identifications?  
16. Do you think witnesses experience any problems with multiple suspect identifications? 
5. Perceptions of Eyewitnesses  
17. How do you think eyewitnesses of a multiple perpetrator crime perform in identifications compared to eyewitnesses 
of a single perpetrator crime? Generally eyewitnesses to crimes committed by multiple perpetrators are _____ 
compared with eyewitnesses to crimes committed by a single perpetrator: (worse/ as good as/ better)  
18. In your opinion, how useful is a witness for you if they identify one, but not all of the suspects presented? 
Your suggestions* 
19. Do you have any ideas about how multiple suspect identifications could be improved from the point of view of the 
police? 
 * indicates original survey question from Hobson, Wilcock, and Valentine (2012) 
** see Figure 1.1 for graphic illustration of scenarios  
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was anything in particular missing from the survey. Adaptations were made for each 
country accordingly.  
Officers answered in their native language, but their responses were translated 
to English by native Dutch and Swedish speakers for the purpose of analysis. The full 
English version of the survey can be found in Appendix B of this thesis, and 
recruitment materials (i.e., recruitment e-mail, information form, and debriefing form) 
can be found in Appendices B, C, and D.  
Results. Given the exploratory nature of this study, we did not conduct 
statistical comparisons between countries or procedures, but rather sought to describe 
the pattern of practice across countries. Due to attrition, not all questions have the 
same number of respondents. The number of respondents still in the survey are 
reported following the percentage, and the percentage represents the number of 
respondents out of the remaining respondents (cf. all respondents).This thesis will 
first cover the procedures that are common to all three countries and then focus on 
reported practices specific to each country.  
Current procedures: Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. To begin, we 
focus on procedures that the three countries report having in common. Officers in all 
countries expressed knowledge of national and/or local guidelines for police protocol, 
none of which were legally binding. Thus, it was important for police to understand 
what the courts required to admit evidence. A majority of responses (96%; n = 47) 
showed that police officers in all countries most often use photographic, sequential 
lineup procedures. When given an open question to provide instructions given to 
witnesses, 40% (n = 40) of officers reported providing unbiased witness instructions 
(i.e., telling the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup 
and that they should only choose someone if they are certain) and 15% provided hair-
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specific appearance-change instructions (i.e., encouraging witnesses to focus on 
features like eyes and lips because hair may change). In the Netherlands, instructions 
are provided to eyewitnesses as written instructions sheets, and all but two officers 
either reported unbiased and appearance-change instructions, or directed us to the 
eyewitness information sheet on which the instructions are printed.  A majority of all 
officers (77%; n = 39) reported that they record confidence only if it is spontaneously 
provided by the eyewitness.  
One question that appeared to confuse officers was the question, “Do you ask 
the witness to look for a specific suspect (e.g., identify the one who was driving the 
car)?” This was intended to determine whether officers inform the eyewitness which 
lineup is for which perpetrator before any identification decision is made. However, 
most officers that reported “yes” subsequently explained that they only did this 
following a positive identification. Although it is clear that this question did not elicit 
the responses expected, qualitative responses suggest officers do not generally instruct 
eyewitnesses to look for specific suspects. At least 90% (n = 40) of officers in some 
form indicated that role in the crime was only elicited after the identification 
procedure.  
Current procedures in Sweden. National guidelines are available in Sweden, 
but one officer complained that these guidelines are updated frequently and it 
becomes difficult to know which rules to follow. Officers conducting identification 
procedures in Sweden sometimes use video or live lineups and require eyewitnesses 
to view the entire sequential lineup first. Afterwards witnesses are allowed to make an 
identification decision in the second viewing. A majority of officers (92%; n = 12)  
reported that they record all identification decisions, whether those are positive or 
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negative responses, and one officer wrote that they would consider it wrong, if not 
criminal, to not report all decisions.  
Current procedures in Belgium. While most officers expressed that they 
record all identification decisions (i.e., including if the eyewitness identifies a filler or 
does not make an identification)82% (n = 17), others reported they would only record 
positive decisions (i.e., eyewitness identifies the suspect only). 
Current procedures in the Netherlands. Police procedures in The Netherlands, 
unlike Sweden and Belgium, require officers to be trained and certified in order to 
administer identification procedures. Therefore, responses from Dutch police officers 
were the most consistent, always referring to the national guidelines (van Amelsvoort, 
2013). These guidelines are considered by the courts when admitting eyewitness 
evidence. Eyewitnesses are only allowed to view the lineup once and can make their 
decision during or after the lineup is presented. Officers conducting identification 
procedures in the Netherlands sometimes use video lineups, sometimes live lineups 
(called Oslo confrontations), and sometimes a unique procedure called the Chroma-
key technique, which aims to reinstate the context of a witnessed event by 
superimposing the typical static video lineup over the image of the environment in 
which the perpetrator was seen (e.g., the crime scene). The identification procedures 
are administered on a computer, meaning that each lineup conducted is automatically 
recorded in a national database along with the eyewitness decisions. All instructions 
are standardized and presented via the computer. The identifications must be 
presented double-blind, so the officer who created the lineup must find another 
colleague who does not know the suspect in order to administer to the eyewitness.  
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of multiple suspects for single perpetrators vs. 
multiple perpetrators.  
Lineups for multiple suspects. In this survey, we were particularly keen to 
understand how police construct lineups when there are multiple suspects. However, 
it was important to distinguish between situations in which there are multiple suspects 
for a single perpetrator vs. situations in which there are multiple suspects related to 
multiple perpetrators. Therefore, the survey included two scenarios to distinguish 
between these two instances (see Appendix B). In both cases, officers were asked how 
they would construct lineups for multiple perpetrators with respect to three options:  
Option A: The eyewitness sees one line up, only for Suspect 1 or only for 
Suspect 2, not both. 
Option B: The eyewitness sees two line ups, one for Suspect 1 and one for 
Suspect 2.  
Option C: The eyewitness sees one lineup, with both Suspects 1 and 2 in the 
same lineup.  
As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, a majority of officers chose Option B for both scenarios 
(Sweden = 53-71%; Belgium = 65-78%; Netherlands = 46- 38%), but many also 
chose C (Sweden = 18-29%; Belgium = 22-39% Netherlands = 54-62%)
3
. This 
demonstrates that when confronted with multiple suspects for different perpetrators, 
without specific recommendations, officers most often choose to conduct separate 
multiple lineups, but may also conduct a single lineup for both suspects. 
                                                 
3
 nSweden = 17; nBelgium = 18; nNetherlands = 13 
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Figure 1.2 Police Survey: Frequency of responses by country regarding multiple 
suspect lineups for single vs. multiple perpetrator crimes. The horizontal access 
represents multiple-choice options A, B and C when police were asked how they 
would construct identification lineups in each scenario (see Appendix B).  
Police perceptions of eyewitnesses of multiple perpetrator crimes. We also 
asked officers for their perceptions of how eyewitnesses of multiple perpetrator 
crimes perform on identification procedures compared to those of single perpetrator 
crimes. Most officers felt that eyewitnesses of multiple perpetrator crimes perform 
“worse than” (Sweden = 90%; Belgium = 39%; Netherlands = 45%) or “as good as” 
(Sweden = 10%; Belgium = 61%; Netherlands = 54%) eyewitnesses of single 
perpetrator crimes, but never “better”4. They were also asked to comment on the 
investigative and/or probative value of an eyewitness that identified one suspect, but 
not the other(s). Most officers (89%;  n = 38) reported that any identification is 
valuable, even if they do not identify all suspects; justifications for this included that 
one identification could provide more leads in the case, that one identification was 
better than none, and that this evidence was perfectly usable in court. Some officers in 
Sweden and Belgium noted that failure to identify all perpetrators did not undermine 
the probative value of the identification as long as there was a sufficient explanation 
(e.g., the eyewitness had longer exposure to the perpetrator they identified, or that 
                                                 
4
 nSweden = 10; nBelgium = 18; nNetherlands = 11 
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perpetrator was more distinctive, etc.). In the Netherlands, one officer reported that 
they felt this made the eyewitness seem reliable because it demonstrated that they had 
followed instructions to only identify someone if with absolute certainty. 
Eyewitness perceptions of lineups in multiple perpetrator lineups. Police were 
also asked to provide their subjective impression of the eyewitness experience. 
Swedish police (80%; n = 10) asserted that eyewitnesses of multiple perpetrator 
crimes often mixed up the roles and clothing of the perpetrators when linking suspects 
to perpetrators. Belgian police (50%, n = 12) generally asserted that lineups in general 
were difficult because they rely on memory; the other 50% reported no problems. 
Meanwhile Dutch police generally did not consider these lineups to be particularly 
problematic because of good organization (80%; n  = 10). The two Dutch officers that 
did mention problems discussed general memory issues not specific to multiple 
perpetrator crimes. 
Discussion. This survey demonstrates the differences in police practice 
between countries that have various degrees of regulation for identification 
procedures. For example, the Netherlands, where training and certification is 
mandatory to administer identification procedures, has little variance between the 
responses of law enforcement officials when discussing the details and order of those 
procedures. This is also reflected in their perceptions of the identification experience 
where they express little difficulty in administering lineups and little difficulty for 
eyewitnesses to understand the procedure and follow directions. Meanwhile, there is 
less regulation in Sweden and Belgium, which appears to be associated with greater 
difficulties for the officers and greater confusion f or the eyewitnesses in the context 
of eyewitness identification. However, there are also many similarities shared by the 
countries, such as using primarily sequential, photographic lineups, and, for the most 
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part, concluding that it is better not to inform the eyewitness which lineup represents 
which perpetrator. 
Perhaps the most interesting results of this survey were derived from the 
scenarios of creating a lineup for multiple suspects in the context of a single 
perpetrator vs. multiple perpetrator crime. Across the three countries in which the 
survey was conducted, officers generally treated the two cases the same; most often, 
officers reported separating the two suspects into separate lineups, but many 
alternatively chose to present them in the same lineup while increasing the number of 
fillers. In the absence of regulations specifically and separately targeting these two 
situations (cf. PACE rules), it is not unreasonable that the two scenarios should be 
treated the same. Nevertheless, there is clearly confusion over whether to keep the 
suspects together or apart for the purpose of formal identification procedures. The 
eyewitness identification literature has considered whether suspects should be 
presented in the same lineup in the context of a single perpetrator crime; the general 
consensus is that placing multiple suspects of a single perpetrator crime in the same 
lineup violates the capacity to falsify the police hypothesis that the suspect is a 
perpetrator by providing what is akin to a multiple choice test (e.g., Wells et al., 
1998). This option increases the probability of identifying an innocent suspect and it 
is recommended to be avoided. However, no research to date addresses the applied 
format of multiple-perpetrator multiple-suspect lineups reported here
5
. The reported 
police practice of placing multiple suspects in the same lineup serves to highlight the 
importance of understanding how memory for multiple perpetrators is stored and how 
the presence of the multiple suspects may enhance or undermine memory for the 
actual perpetrators. Furthermore, given that the alternative is to separate multiple 
                                                 
5
 One experiment by Wells and Pozzulo (2006) has tested a novel lineup format including 
multiple suspects related to multiple perpetrators 
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suspects into separate lineups, and that some officers specifically reported presenting 
these multiple identification procedures successively on the same day, it is likewise 
important to determine whether there are consequences of making multiple 
identification decisions on multiple lineups presented in succession.  
The independence or non-independence of memory and decision-making for 
eyewitness identifications in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes is a critical 
topic for future research. The survey results reported here highlight the two over-
arching research questions that are the focus of the current thesis: (1) are multiple 
identification decisions independent (i.e., does a previous identification decision 
impact following ones)? and (2) are memories for multiple faces linked and, if so, can 
this link be used to enhance recognition performance? In order to contextualise these 
questions and the methods used to answer them in this thesis, it is first necessary to 
review the literature on multiple perpetrator identification, on the links between 
multiple decisions, and the associative nature of memory for multiple items (i.e., 
faces).  
Eyewitness identification for multiple perpetrators: Experiments in 
context. Clifford and Hollin (1981) were the first to experimentally test for the 
difficulty of eyewitness identification in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes 
compared to single perpetrator crimes. In one condition, participants viewed a non-
violent event with one, three, or five perpetrators. Despite only having to select the 
main perpetrator from a target-present lineup immediately following the crime, only 
30% of participants in the three-perpetrator condition and 20% in the five-perpetrator 
condition made accurate identifications (compared to 40% in the one-perpetrator 
condition). Shepherd (1983) subsequently demonstrated the poor accuracy of 
eyewitnesses with as few as two perpetrators when there was a delay of at least one 
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month between the witnessed event and the attempted identifications. Out of 41 
participants, only 20% could identify one of the two men shown in the video, and 
only one person accurately identified both. 
Three published studies and one unpublished thesis to date have attempted to 
address the multiple perpetrator identification disadvantage demonstrated above, with 
limited and varying success, through adapted identification procedures (see Table 1.3 
for results as a function of target presence and perpetrator). First, Wells and Pozzulo 
(2006) introduced what they called a two-person serial lineup for a crime involving 
two perpetrators. After watching a video of a theft, participants viewed a series of 
suspect photographs two at a time – one photo  (filler or suspect) for the assailant 
lineup was always paired with one photo (filler or suspect) for the accomplice lineup. 
Participants viewed a series of these coupled photographs until they had seen six 
photos for the assailant and six for the accomplice. While the lineups for each are 
flashed side-by-side on the screen, the two suspects are never shown simultaneously; 
each suspect is always paired with a filler. In theory, the context of one face should 
aid our ability to recognize or reject the other face. While this novel procedure did not 
produce significantly more correct identifications when a target was present, it did 
produce significantly more correct rejections when the target was absent.  
Implications for these results, and the ones to follow, will be discussed later.  
Another novel identification procedure which adapted current PACE 
procedures in the U.K. was proposed by Hobson and Wilcock (2011) for a three-
perpetrator crime. Participants viewed sequential video lineups for the perpetrators, 
each one after the other (i.e., perpetrator 1- 2 - 3), but were not allowed to make any 
identification decisions. Then, they viewed the sequential lineups in reverse order 
(i.e., perpetrator 3 - 2 - 1) and were asked to make an identification decision before 
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moving on to the next lineup. The authors hypothesized that this technique would 
allow the participants to anchor their memories of the event with the appropriate 
lineup before making any decisions, thus avoiding source monitoring errors in 
confusing which perpetrator performed which action during the crime. Meanwhile, 
the order in which the perpetrators were presented was intended to reduce the high 
cognitive load participants experience as a result of viewing all lineups. This novel 
presentation style produced an increase in correct identifications in target-present 
lineups for two out of the three perpetrators, but had no effect on correct rejections for 
target-absent lineups for any of the innocent suspects.  
Next, Dempsey and Pozzulo introduced the elimination lineup for use with 
adults (2008) and children (2013) making identification decisions after witnessing a 
two-perpetrator crime. An elimination lineup is a two-step decision process whereby 
witnesses are initially asked to look at a simultaneous lineup with six photos and 
choose the person that looks most like the perpetrator. All other photos are then 
removed, and the witness is asked to compare his/her memory of the perpetrator to the 
chosen photo and determine if this person is the actual perpetrator. In this study, when 
the thief was absent from the lineup, the elimination lineup procedure produced 
significantly more correct rejections compared to a standard simultaneous lineup. 
When the accomplice was present in the lineup, the sequential lineup produced more 
correct identifications compared to the elimination lineup.  
Lastly, Dempsey (2012) conducted two experiments for two-perpetrator 
crimes, attempting to use the face of one perpetrator to cue the identification of the 
other. In both experiments, participants viewed a two-perpetrator crime and 5-10 days 
later were asked to identify one of the perpetrators. As a cue, they were provided 
either with the correct face of the second perpetrator (correct cue), a second face that 
34 
 
they had never actually seen before (incorrect cue), or no face (no cue). In 
Experiment 1, accurate cues and no cues led to more correct identifications of the 
actual perpetrator compared to incorrect cues. However, there was no difference in 
performance between participants who received an accurate cue and those who 
received no cue at all. Correct rejection rates of innocent suspect lineups did not vary 
based on the cues. In Experiment 2, participants were given the same types of cues, 
but were also given either biased or neutral instructions. There were no differences 
between groups based on cue veracity.  
In summary, the adapted sequential lineup (Hobson & Wilcock, 2011) 
increased correct identifications for two out of three perpetrators, the elimination 
lineup  (Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2008; 2013) increased adult’s correct rejections for both 
innocent suspects of both perpetrators, but only increased children’s correct rejections 
for one perpetrator and decreased children’s accurate identifications for the other 
perpetrator. All other methods had no significant effect on correct identifications of 
actual perpetrators or correct rejections of innocent suspects. Although Dempsey’s 
(2014) cued lineup experiments demonstrated that correct cues were associated with 
higher rates of correct identification, there was no meaningful difference between 
providing a correct cue and providing no cue. These results suggest that incorrect cues 
may have undermined identification performance, but that providing a correct cue did 
not enhance identification performance and therefore does not represent a benefit to 
the novel procedure. More importantly, these findings are difficult to explain and 
provide limited insight to apply to future research on multiple perpetrator 
identifications. This is because when these new methods produce null or inconsistent 
findings, it is unclear if it is because (1) the proposed adaptations did not address the 
mechanisms they were intended to, or (2) the theories used to justify these adaptations
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Table 1.3 Procedure and results for eyewitness identification experiments that test identification procedures created or adapted for multiple perpetrator crime 
Note. This chapter references comparisons between tested lineup procedures as they affect correct answers only (i.e., hits for target-present lineups and correct rejections for target-
absent lineups). No lineup procedure improved hits for all perpetrators, but the Dempsey and Pozzulo (2008) elimination lineup improved correct rejections for all perpetrators for adult 
witnesses, but not child witnesses. Note that, with the exception of Hobson and Wilcock (2011), all studies designated a central perpetrator and accomplice. In this table, the central 
perpetrator is under Perpetrator 1 and the accomplice is Perpetrator 2. FR stands for false-rejection and CR stands for correct-rejection. 
+ comparisons where significant differences favored the adapted lineup procedure  
* comparisons where significant differences favored the old procedure or control group 
                                                 
6
 Experiment b is an extension of Experiment a, but with the addition of biased vs. neutral witness instructions. Experiment b is not included in this table 
because the data was reported collapsed across variables that do not allow for appropriate comparison here. However, results are similar to Experiment a. 
 Lineup Perpetrator 1 Perpetrator 2 Perpetrator 3 
  Target-present Target-absent Target-present Target-absent Target-present Target-absent 
  Hit Foil FR CR Foil Hit Foil FR CR Foil Hit Foil FR CR Foil 
Wells & Pozzulo, 2006 
N  = 150;  Delay = 25 min 
 
Hobson & Wilcock, 2011 
N  = 72; Delay = 30 min 
Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2008 
N  = 132;  Delay N/A 
Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2013 
N  = 90; Delay = 25 min 
 
Dempsey, 2012a
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N  = 221; Delay = 5-10 days 
Two-person serial .12 (3) .44 (11) .44 (33) .76 (19) .24 (6) .24 (6) .28 (7) .48 (12) .72 (18) .28 (7)      
Sequential .12 (3) .36 (09) .52 (13) .44 (11) .56 (14) .20 (5) .44 (11) .36 (9) .60 (15) .40 (10)      
Simultaneous .24 (6) .40 (10) .36 (9) .56 (14) .44 (11) .40 (10) .24 (6) .36 (9) .44 (11) .56 (14)      
Adapted sequential .72 (13)
+ .06 (1) .22 (4) .33 (6) .67 (12) .61 (11)
+
 .06 (1) .33 (6) .56 (10) .44 (8) .72 (13) .11 (2) .39 (3) .44 (8) .56 (10) 
Sequential .22 (4) .50 (9) .28 (5) .33 (6) .67 (12) .33 (6) .33 (6) .33 (6) .39 (7) .61 (11) .44 (8) .11 (2) .44 (8) .39 (7) .61 (11) 
Elimination .65 (20) .03 (1) .32 (10) .80 (28)
+
 .20 (7) .36 (12) .06 (2) .58 (19) .94 (31)
+ .06 (2)      
Simultaneous .56 (19) .12 (4) .32 (11) .53 (17) .47 (15) .38 (13) .09 (3) .53 (18) .75 (24) .25 (8)      
Elimination .42 (8) .26 (5) .32 (6) .75 (18)
+
 .25 (6) .16 (3) .05 (1) .79 (15) .50 (12) .50 (12)      
Simultaneous .28 (8) .38 (11) .34 (10) .44 (8) .56 (10) .52 (14)
*
 .15 (4) .33 (9) .60 (12) .40 (8)      
Accurate cue  .47 (8) .24 (4) .29 (5) .71 (12) .29 (5) .36 (5) .21 (3) .43 (6) .47 (8) .53 (9)      
Inaccurate cue .19 (3) .19 (3) .63 (10) .38 (6) .63 (10) .21 (3) .29 (4) .50 (7) .69 (11) .31 (5)      
No cue .50 (8) .44 (7) .06 (1) .33 (5) .67 (10) .53 (8) .13 (2) .33 (5) .56 (9) .44 (7)      
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are not relevant to the multiple perpetrator identification disadvantage. For example, 
in the two-person serial lineup (Wells & Pozzulo, 2006), the context of one face 
should theoretically aid our ability to recognize or reject the other face. But when this 
lineup does not improve identification accuracy, it is unclear if it is because 
contextual cuing is not useful for faces in a lineup context or because the suspects are 
never shown together, and thus are not cuing memory. Ultimately, it is difficult to 
interpret these results because research to date on identification lineup solutions 
reflects a premature attempt to fix problems that are still not well understood, 
meaning the adapted lineups amount to trial-by-error solutions. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 
take a step back to consider underlying issues in memory and decision-making that 
may impact on the performance of these adapted lineup procedures. 
Decision-making in recognition and identification tasks 
An identification decision is composed of two overlapping, but distinct, 
processes for the eyewitness: memory and decision-making. Memory is the 
representation of the perpetrator, like a picture in the mind’s eye of the person to be 
remembered. Because memory is not a tape-recorder, it is likely for this 
representation to be degraded over time, and it is possible for it to be eventually 
forgotten, distorted by external information, or even replaced (Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, McGorty, & Penrod, 2008; Loftus, 2005). Decision-making here refers to 
the choice made at the time of the identification. Ideally, the decision to identify a 
suspect or reject a lineup is based on the actual memory of the perpetrator, even 
though that memory may have been degraded or distorted over time. However, it is 
entirely possible to make a decision in the absence of memory; an eyewitness may 
reject a lineup because they do not remember the perpetrator, or they may choose a 
suspect in spite of the fact that they do not clearly remember the perpetrator (e.g., 
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Horry, Halford, Brewer, Milne, & Bull, 2014; Innocence Project, 2017). It is also 
possible to make a decision based on a wrong memory; an eyewitness may, for 
example, use an inaccurate memory to misidentify the innocent suspect as the 
perpetrator.  
To date, eyewitness researchers and practitioners have assumed that an 
eyewitness is making a decision based solely on the information related to that 
particular identification procedure, meaning that it is presumed that an eyewitness 
making multiple identification decisions is making a series of independent decisions. 
The dearth of research and discussion on the relationship between multiple 
identification decisions suggests that researchers and practitioners have not 
considered otherwise. However, research in perception and memory demonstrates that 
a current decision (i) can be influenced by a previous one (i – j), so that a current 
response may favor (assimilation) or disfavor (contrast) the preceding responses 
(Treisman & Williams, 1984). In other words, in a series of trials presented one-after-
another, the responses, although separate, are not independent. These sequential 
dependencies appear in perception, classification, and recognition tasks where 
participants make multiple, sequential decisions (see Malmberg & Annis, 2012)—
tasks which present a theoretical overlap with making multiple eyewitness 
identification decisions. 
Sequential dependencies: The link between multiple decisions. Sequential 
dependency can be demonstrated in its simplest form in a traditional detection 
experiment. Howarth and Bulmer (1956) seated participants in a dark room with a 
flash-bulb set at a 50% detection rate at a given intensity, meaning that the light was 
bright enough to be detected, but dim enough that participants only reported seeing it 
half of the time. The momentary flashes were accompanied by the sound of a bell, so 
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that when participants heard the bell ring, they indicated whether or not they had seen 
the flash of light (yes vs. no). At 50% detection, participants made errors half of the 
time; errors that should theoretically display natural fluctuations and therefore appear 
randomly throughout the hundreds of trials. However, participants demonstrated a 
tendency to assimilate responses towards previous ones, meaning that a no response 
was more likely to be followed by another no response than a yes response. At some 
points, the light signal was omitted so that the bell rang without the accompanying 
light flash. When the experimenters forced a sequence of three of these blank trials 
(no-no-no), they found the same degree of assimilation for the subsequent fourth 
response as for three natural occurring negative responses (i.e. participants were more 
likely to respond no’s after a sequence of no’s). Such sequential dependencies are 
found in a variety of tasks, including absolute judgments of sound (Holland & 
Lockhead, 1968), and the perceptual classification of facial expressions (Hsu & Yang, 
2013).  
The mechanism underlying sequential dependencies remains an ongoing 
debate (see Malmberg & Annis, 2012), with attempts to model sequential 
dependencies favoring one of the two systems involved in a perception task: the 
cognitive system and the decisional processes. Some models consider sequential 
dependencies to arise from biased decision-making (e.g., Treisman & Williams, 
1984). According to these models, assimilation results from the observer’s short-term 
assumption that the most recent stimulus is also the most likely to occur again. 
However, patterns of contrasting answers are the result of the observer attempting to 
correct decisional criteria to a desirable level in the long-term. Proponents of these 
models argue that fluctuations in response bias explain why judgments show 
assimilation immediately following trial i, but revert to contrast after a few trials 
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(Treisman & Williams, 1984; Treisman, 1985). On the other side of the debate are 
models arguing that sequential dependencies arise either entirely, or at least in part, 
from the cognitive system (Brown, Marley, Donkin, & Heathcote, 2008; Matthews & 
Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005). In these models, sequential 
dependencies arise as a result of inappropriate information being carried forward from 
the previous trial, affecting the perception of the current stimulus.   
 Malmberg and Annis (2012) were the first to demonstrate sequential 
dependencies in recognition memory. They presented a series of experiments using 
traditional recognition paradigms and judgments of frequency recognition tasks to 
approximate the perception and categorization tasks that routinely demonstrate 
sequential dependencies. For example, in one experiment, participants studied 40 
word pairs and were later tested on their recognition for those words among never-
studied words. As with Howarth and Bulmer’s (1956) light-detection experiment, 
participants were more likely to respond old if they had responded old (rather than 
new) on the previous trial, regardless of whether the previous response was correct 
(hit) or incorrect (false-alarm). The appearance of sequential dependencies was 
consistent across several replications with different stimuli, including landscape 
images, and picture-word pairs. Interestingly, although sequential dependencies arose 
as expected, the patterns for these effects across four follow-up experiments were 
different from those previously found in perception experiments. For example, 
assimilation was not impacted by varying time between trials (cf. the strength of 
assimilation decaying over time), assimilation was present in judgment of frequency 
tasks regardless of whether feedback was provided, and did not reverse to contrast 
with increased trials between responses (cf. assimilation after the first trial, but 
reversed to contrast at later trials when feedback is provided).  For the purpose of this 
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dissertation, further details of differences are not relevant, but rather the fact that the 
differences exist. Because perception tasks and recognition tasks share equivalent 
decisional processes, these discrepant patterns suggest that sequential dependencies 
arise from the different cognitive systems supporting perceptual vs. mnemonic tasks 
(Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Therefore, their results reinforce perception models that 
posit response interference from the previous trials as the root of sequential 
dependencies.  
Sequential dependencies and eyewitness identification decisions. Multiple 
perpetrator crimes present a framework in which relatively few sequential decisions 
are made, and in which these decisions have serious consequences. Sequential 
dependencies measured in the recognition paradigm have no substantial effect on 
overall recognition accuracy because the beneficial and detrimental sequences of 
dependencies will typically balance out over the many trials, reducing its impact on 
the overall accuracy for recognition (e.g., Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Given that 
identification paradigms lack the many trials needed to balance out recognition 
accuracy, the appearance of sequential dependencies in the multiple perpetrator 
identification context would be a matter of substantial impact and cause for concern. 
Despite the clear theoretical relevance of sequential dependencies to witnesses 
making identification decisions for multiple perpetrators (Hobson et al., 2012), it is 
surprising that the phenomenon remains untested in the eyewitness identification 
context. 
In summary, when people are asked to make multiple decisions in a row, a 
previous decision can influence the decisions that follow. In other words, these 
multiple decisions are connected.  Critically, this pattern of connection appears to 
hold true for successive tests of recognition— decisions which we otherwise assume 
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to rely exclusively on the memory for the previously-studied word, object, or 
landscape. Furthermore, these decisions are similar to the identification decisions that 
eyewitnesses are asked to make during an investigation involving multiple 
perpetrators, and are therefore a critical avenue of research within the field of multiple 
perpetrator identifications. One of the aims of this thesis is to test for the 
independence of making multiple identification decisions for the multiple suspects of 
a multiple perpetrator crime. 
Memory in recognition and identification tasks 
The multiple face recognition disadvantage. Memory is the other integral 
portion of the identification process, and it is desirable to preserve eyewitness 
memory as much as possible in order to use memory evidence within an investigation. 
In particular, researchers seek to identify and therefore protect eyewitnesses from 
external influences on memory (i.e., post-event information; Frenda & Loftus, 2011) 
and to provide tools to reliably elicit as much memorial information as possible from 
eyewitnesses (i.e., self-administered interviews; Hope, Gabbert & Fisher, 2011). This 
is not dissimilar from the same way that forensic scientists seek to safeguard DNA 
evidence from contamination, degradation over time, and develop new technologies to 
collect and test the available evidence. 
However, the preservation of memory evidence is dependent upon the strength 
of that initial memory strength to begin with. The recognition and identification of an 
unfamiliar face from memory is a difficult task, and it becomes even more 
challenging as the number of unfamiliar faces to be remembered increases 
(Bindemann, Sanford, Gillatt, Avetisyan, & Megreya, 2012; Clifford & Hollin, 1981; 
Megreya & Bindemann, 2012; Nortje, Tredeoux, & Vredeveldt, 2017). Indeed, 
Megreya and Burton (2006) found that eyewitness accuracy dropped between one and 
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two unfamiliar faces to be encoded. Participants saw either one face or two faces 
simultaneously and were instructed to study them until they felt confident they could 
recognize the faces in a subsequent test. When participants were immediately tested 
with a simultaneous suspect lineup, accuracy for identifying the culprit dropped from 
70% in the single face condition to 54% in the two face condition. Megreya and 
Bindemann (2012) extended the above findings by systematically varying the gender 
of the perpetrator and accomplice, a personal feature that should be easily 
distinguisable for eyewitnesses (Bruce & Young, 1986). Results again showed that 
participants who viewed a single perpetrator had more correct identifications in 
target-present lineups (48-60%) and more correct rejections in target-absent lineups 
(61-68%) compared to participants who viewed a double perpetrator crime (20-38% 
and  58-68%, respectively). Critically, results showed that the two-face disadvantage 
persisted across conditions of gender combinations, meaning that it did not matter if 
the two perpetrators were the same gender (highly similar) or different genders 
(highly dissimilar).  
If the so-called two-face disadvantage had disappeared in conditions with the 
perpetrator and accomplice of different genders, the authors could have reasonably 
argued that the disadvantage was a result of transference of details between encoded 
faces during memory retrieval, because eyewitnesses would be mixing up details of 
faces only when those faces were of the same gender. However, the persistence of the 
two-face disadvantage indicates that the effect may be a result of divided attention 
during the event that limits the richness of details encoded in the first place. Some 
evidence suggests that people are only able to process one face at a time; specifically, 
it is proposed that we suppress the processing of features of one face in order to 
accurately encode the features of the other (Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, 2005; 
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Bindemann, Jenkins, & Burton, 2007; Boutet & Chaudhuri, 2001; Palermo & Rhodes, 
2002). This impediment could explain the mixed results for which targets are most-
accurately identified in the eyewitness context: in some cases, the central role (i.e., 
perpetrator) is best recognized (Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2008), while other times the 
peripheral role (i.e., accomplice) is best recognized (Wells and Pozzulo, 2006). It is 
possible that the circumstances of the mock-crimes used in different experiments 
somehow direct the attention towards one particular target over the other, but that 
conditions forcing participants to split these resources lead to poor accuracy for both. 
In any case, it appears that attempting to divide these facial-processing resources 
between perpetrators interferes with proper encoding of perpetrator features. This 
poor initial memory strength would make make subsequent identifications much more 
difficult (Clifford & Hollin, 1981). 
While it is clear that divided attention plays a role, it does not entirely account 
for the multiple-face recognition disadvantage. For example, Bindemann and 
colleagues (2012) asked participants to study either one face alone or two faces 
simultaneously and then immediately showed them a lineup for only one of those 
faces. Participants were much more likely to be accurate when they were shown only 
one face (67% hits), than if they were shown two (48% hits). Tracking participant 
eye-movements during encoding demonstrated that while participants tended to split 
their concentration evenly between the pair of face, the duration spent looking at the 
target while studying the faces correlated with identification accuracy (Bindemann et 
al., 2012). This again clearly demonstrates that this drop in accuracy is, in part, 
because the presence of multiple targets exacerbates the difficulty in encoding 
unfamiliar faces through divided attention (e.g., Bindemann, Jenkins, & Burton, 
2007). 
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 However, the participants in two out of three of Bindemann et al.’s 
experiments (2012, Experiments 1 and 2) had unlimited time to encode the presented 
faces: they were instructed to move on to the identification only once they felt 
confident they would remember the face(s) later. So while it was true that participants 
had divided attention, they were compensated with unlimited time in which to 
sufficiently encode each face. Furthermore, a follow-up experiment controlled for 
divided attention: participants either saw two faces presented sequentially for a fixed 
amount of time (e.g., 2250 ms) or were shown one face for the same fixed amount of 
time (2250 ms) followed by an equivalent delay. When participants were shown only 
one face, their subsequent identifications were significantly more accurate (55% hits) 
than when they were shown two faces (39% hits). The persistence of the two-face 
disadvantage led Bindemann and colleagues to conclude that the drop in accuracy also 
reflects an increase in memorial demand when people attempt to hold two faces in 
their memory for any period of time. This conclusion is supported by the finding that 
the only condition that produced similar accuracy rates to the single-face condition 
was when researchers told participants which of two faces would be tested, ostensibly 
allowing participants to hold only one face in memory instead of two.  
 In summary, it appears that the capacity to recognize multiple faces is 
impacted by factors at encoding, such as divided attention, but also factors at storage, 
such as memorial demand of holding more faces in memory. Interestingly, the factor 
that makes multiple-face recognition so challenging— the presence of multiple 
faces— may actually provide a solution to support memory for multiple faces, and 
thus provide a tool to better access the memory evidence. 
Enhanced recognition with contextual cues. Memory researchers have long 
known that context matters for retrieval. Contextual cues are often implemented to 
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help individuals recall seemingly-forgotten details in episodic memory (encoding 
specificity principle; Thomson & Tulving 1970), including to facilitate eyewitness 
recall during investigative interviews (context reinstatement; Geiselman, Fisher, 
MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986). It has been hypothesized that these cues work because 
the retrieval of a memory is dependent upon the way it was stored, and an item of 
episodic memory is, by nature, nested within our experience of the relevant event 
(Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009). Thus, episodic 
memory is not only tied to temporal markers (when an event occurred), but can also 
be integrated with the other memory traces of that event. For example, according to 
the Context Maintenance Retrieval Model, we naturally recall items in semantic 
clusters (i.e., book is semantically related to paperback, hardcover, nonfiction, 
bestseller) as a result of our long-standing associations between items in our 
experience. However, we also have a tendency to recall items in temporal clusters 
(i.e., the order in which the items appeared) and source clusters (i.e., information from 
experimenter vs. confederate vs. own knowledge) as a result of the associations we 
form during study phase between items (Polyn et al., 2009). These patterns represent 
associations between memories. A contextual cue is used at retrieval to take 
advantage of the associative nature of memory whereby, for example, peripheral 
details of the environment can be used to cue retrieval of the critical details. 
Thomson and Tulving (1970) demonstrated this experimentally when they had 
participants memorize pairs of words: a target word and a word that was semantically 
unrelated (e.g., ocean and piano). During the testing phase, the semantically-unrelated 
pair word (weak cue) or a semantically-related, but previously-unstudied word (strong 
cue) was presented in order to elicit the target word. If the target word is “ocean”, a 
strong cue might be “land”, while the weak cue might be “piano”. Results showed that 
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participants were better able to recall the target word if it was presented along with 
the weak cue (i.e., the cue with which it was originally encoded), compared to the 
strong cue, suggesting that the context of encoding the target word mattered more 
than the strength of the semantic association.  
Contextual cues also benefit recognition memory, including when recognizing 
pictures (Palmer, 1975) and faces (e.g., Watkins, et al., 1976). Just within the field of 
face recognition, a variety of external contexts have been tested as a means to enhance 
recognition for the target faces, including using backgrounds, descriptions, clothing, 
and other faces (see Davies, 1988 for a review). Winograd and Rivers-Bulkeley 
(1977) asked participants to memorize pairs of faces during the study-phase—one of 
which served as the target-face while the other served as the cue. During the test-
phase, participants were presented with a target face alongside either a face they had 
previously studied (correct cue), a face that had not been previously studied 
(incorrect cue), or no cue at all. In this forced-choice paradigm, recognition 
performance for target faces was enhanced by the presentation of correct cue faces 
and impaired by incorrect cue faces, while performance with no cues fell in-between. 
Similarly, Watkins and colleagues (1976) demonstrated reduced hit rates for face 
recognition when the incorrect cues were previously-studied faces that had been 
paired with another face during study. In other words, simply swapping context, as 
opposed to introducing new context, also affected face recognition performance.  
However, although the above experiments found an enhancing effect of using 
correct cues, other research has not (e.g. Bower & Karlin, 1974) and while Kan, 
Giovanello, Schnyer, Makris, and Verfaellie
 
(2007) found that incorrect cuing 
undermined hit rates, they found no benefit for correct cues (cf. no cues). Issues in 
encoding and recognition likely underpin these discrepant results. For example, the 
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context must be strongly encoded in association with the target for recognition. In 
other words, if the participant did not pay attention to the contextual information, or 
did not link it with the target information, then the cue will not help to recognize the 
target (Peris, 1985, as cited in Davies, 1988). Additionally, it appears that context is 
useful as a recognition memory cue only when other, stronger cues are lacking 
(Davies, 1988). To explain this, it is first important to understand that some theories 
of recognition hold that recognition is comprised of two mechanisms (e.g., Mandler, 
1980; Peris & Tiberghien, 1984): The first is the perceptual system that is 
automatically activated and produces fast answers that hinge on the feeling of 
familiarity and the second is the cognitive system, which is activated when the first 
does not immediately provide an answer. The second system is slower and searches 
for other, external information, like context, which will aid its response. Context cues 
would thus only be used when this second system is activated and there is not a 
stronger source of information. This process is also captured in the rationale of the 
outshining hypothesis, which contends that we use the most relevant cues available to 
recognize faces. When our memory trace is strong, that memory outshines the utility 
of environmental context (Smith & Vela, 2001). However, for weak memory traces, 
such as when there was suboptimal encoding or longer retention intervals, context 
may support memory to improve recognition performance (Mandler, Pearlstone, & 
Koopmans, 1969). 
Cued recognition for faces. Cued recognition presents an interesting means of 
enhancing face recognition, a concept that may prove useful to the applied fields of 
eyewitness identification or wanted-persons recognition. The second face in a two-
perpetrator crime provides a naturally-occurring contextual cue for the eyewitness. A 
second face is also a particularly relevant cue for humans, given that it is our natural 
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tendency to orient and focus attention towards other human faces, thus increasing the 
chance of incidental associative encoding (Di Giorgio, Turati, Altoè, & Simion, 2012; 
Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008). Perhaps face cues, then, could be 
used to support eyewitnesses of a multiple perpetrator crime while viewing a suspect 
lineup. This is not an entirely novel idea. Indeed, at least two published experiments 
(Hobson & Wilcock, 2011; Wells & Pozzulo, 2006) and one unpublished thesis 
(Dempsey, 2014) have attempted to apply face cuing to support eyewitness memory 
and adapt identification procedures in the context of multiple-perpetrator crimes. In 
neither case did results provide convincing evidence that this method of cuing 
memory could aid lineup identification decisions, and it is of interest to understand 
why this might be.  
Existing research also exposes questions regarding the limit of such an effect, 
specifically the number of additional faces to be encoded. Research on cued face 
recognition to date has held encoding conditions constant while manipulating the 
conditions at retrieval (e.g. Watkins, Ho, & Tulving, 1976; Winograd & Rivers-
Bulkeley, 1977). However, pairing faces at encoding represents the minimum number 
of faces we might encode when attempting to implement cued face recognition. 
Limiting our consideration to pairs of faces fails to reflect the variability in group 
sizes that we encounter every day, and it is unclear if the benefits identified in 
previous work extend to conditions in which participants need to encode more stimuli. 
In other words, if these effects replicate, can they also be useful in situations with 
more than just two faces? Although encoding additional faces may provide contextual 
cues to aid subsequent recognition, cognitive load is likely to increase with each 
additional face requiring encoding. As this load increases, the resources needed to 
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successfully encode the target face and to develop the associations required to support 
subsequent cued-recognition may be reduced.  
In summary, memory for multiple faces (and thus multiple perpetrators) is 
impacted by encoding (i.e., divided attention), but also separately by the increased 
difficulty of storing those multiple faces (i.e., memorial demand). One way to support 
memory under suboptimal conditions is to use context to enhance the memory trace 
that exists. In the context of multiple faces, some research suggests that memory for 
one face of a studied pair can be enhanced using the context of the other face to cue 
that memory. Such contextual cuing could be useful in the context of multiple 
perpetrator recognition and identification; however we do not fully understand these 
effects for pairs of faces, nor whether such effects are also present when more than 
two faces are present. This thesis aims to examine the effect of cued face recognition 
and tests this effect with more than two faces. 
Overview of the current thesis 
The current thesis comprises four chapters, including the survey discussed 
earlier in this chapter and, additionally, five experiments to examine underlying issues 
in memory and decision-making that impact eyewitness identification in the context 
of multiple perpetrator crimes. Chapter 2 will present research testing the 
independence of multiple identification decisions made successively (Experiments 1, 
2 and 3). Chapter 3 will present experiments examining the purported utility of 
associative memory for recognizing the faces of multiple perpetrators (Experiments 4 
and 5). In the discussion, an overview of the key findings are presented, followed by 
theoretical implications for memory and decision-making, practical implications for 
researchers and police involved with multiple perpetrator identification. These 
chapters are summarized in further detail below. 
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Police Survey on Multiple Perpetrator Identifications: Sweden, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands. A new, exploratory survey was developed to extend previous 
work by Hobson et al. (2012), which was translated into two languages (Swedish and 
Dutch) to be distribute to other European countries (Tupper, Sauerland, Sauer, & 
Hope, in prep). This survey aimed to (a) inform our understanding of the prevalence 
and characteristics of multiple perpetrator crimes from the perspective of law 
enforcement agencies, (b) discern how agencies in various countries conduct 
identification procedures (e.g., lineups, photo-arrays, showups) with multiple 
perpetrators, and (c) gain insight into how law enforcement agents and eyewitnesses 
experience the identification process in the context of such crimes.  Results 
demonstrated the differences in police practice between countries that have various 
degrees of regulation for identification procedures. The reported police practice of 
placing multiple suspects in the same lineup serves to highlight the importance of 
understanding how memory for multiple perpetrators is stored and how the presence 
of the multiple suspects may enhance or undermine memory for the perpetrators. 
Furthermore, the more commonly-reported practice of separating multiple suspects 
into separate lineups similarly highlights the important to examine the consequence of 
testing memory on multiple lineups presented in succession.  
Experiments 1 and 2: Testing for sequential dependencies in eyewitness 
showup identifications. Research in perception and recognition demonstrates that a 
current decision (i) can be influenced by previous ones (i - j), meaning that 
subsequent responses are not always independent. In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
examined the relation of previous identification decisions to subsequent choosing 
behavior in the context of the multiple showup identification decisions for a multiple 
perpetrator crime. That is, if it is possible to predict current choosing on a showup 
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identification decision from previous choosing, it would provide initial evidence that 
sequential effects may be present in multiple showup identification decisions. In both 
experiments, participants watched a mock-crime film involving three perpetrators and 
later made three showup identification decisions, one showup for each perpetrator. 
Given that research has previously demonstrated that sequential dependencies in 
recognition are a result of interference from previous trials (Malmberg & Annis, 
2012), Experiments 1 and 2 considered both previous signal (target-presence: present 
vs. absent) and previous response (Choosing: yes vs. no) as predictors of current 
choosing behavior (Matthews & Stewart, 2009). Experiments 1 and 2 were similar in 
procedure, with the exception that Experiment 1 used four trials conditions of target-
presence such that the first two trials were consistent in target-presence of the 
stimulus (i.e., target-absent/ target-absent or target-present/ target-present) and the 
third was either consistent or similar. However, in retrospect, we could not observe 
the separate effects of previous target-presence and previous response between the 
first two trials. Therefore, Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by using all patterns 
of target-presence. We expected that initial showup responses would predict choosing 
for subsequent showup responses. In other words, choosing on a previous showup 
identification would lead to choosing on subsequent ones, and rejecting on a previous 
showup identification would lead to rejecting on subsequent ones. We also expected 
previous target-presence to exert a separate influence on the current identification 
decision, such that when the previous target being present would predict current 
choosing and the previous target being absent would predict current rejecting (e.g., 
Matthews & Stewart, 2009).  
Experiment 3: Testing for sequential dependencies in faces as a function 
of number of trials. While consecutive recognition decisions have been shown to 
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produce sequential dependencies, such effects were found to be inconsistent within 
the eyewitness identification context. Experiment 3 examined whether 
methodological differences between the recognition and eyewitness paradigms used 
in previous research on sequential dependencies could account for the inconsistent 
findings presented in Experiments 1 and 2.  This experiment therefore sought to 
replicate previous recognition research in sequential dependencies using word and 
landscape stimuli, and extend these effects to face stimuli. This experiment also 
examined whether the strength of these sequential dependencies changed as a result of 
the number of test trials (i.e., beginning vs. middle of experiment). Participants 
studied pairs of words, landscapes, or faces, and were later tested for recognition. We 
expected that sequential dependencies would arise in all categories of stimuli, but that 
the strength of this effect would be weaker in the beginning compared to the middle 
of the experiment.  
Experiments 4 and 5: Cued face recognition: Testing a tool to enhance 
eyewitness performance.  In contrast to the previous experiments, Experiments 4 and 
5 focused on the association between memories for multiple faces. The presence of 
multiple faces increases memorial demand, but also provides a naturally-occurring 
contextual cue that may promote recognition. Early experiments demonstrated the 
benefits of cues on face recognition when faces were studied as pairs (e.g., Watkins, 
Ho, & Tulving, 1976), and some more recent experiments have tried to apply such 
techniques to the context of eyewitness identification when multiple perpetrators are 
involved in the crime (e.g., Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). However, there is a paucity of 
contemporary research systematically examining cued face recognition effects in 
applied contexts. Experiments 4 and 5 sought replicate previously-reported enhancing 
effects in cued face recognition, to investigate the mechanisms underlying those 
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effects, and to determine whether such effects could include more than two faces, as 
many crimes involve more than two perpetrators. To do this, we included the 
traditional condition in which participants study paired faces, and added both a 
control condition in which participants studied single faces and another experimental 
condition in which participants studied groups of four faces. At test, participants in 
the single-face condition were tested only on those individual faces without cues. 
Participants in the two and four-face conditions were tested using no cues, correct 
cues (a face previously studied with the target test face), or incorrect cues (a never-
before-seen face). We hypothesized that correct cuing would enhance recognition 
accuracy for target faces compared to no cue and incorrect cues, but that this effect 
would be stronger for participants studying two faces compared to participants 
studying four faces at a time.  
Overview of chapters. Initial analyses from the Police Survey were presented 
in the Introduction (Chapter 1). Experiments 1, 2 and 3 are presented together in 
Chapter 2, while Experiments 4 and 5 are presented together in Chapter 3. In Chapter 
4, the results of the survey and five experiments, theoretical implications for the field 
of eyewitness memory and identification, as well as implications for current and 
future police practice are discussed. 
. 
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Chapter 2: Showup identification decisions for multiple perpetrator crimes: 
Testing for sequential dependencies 
Abstract 
Research in perception and recognition demonstrates that a current decision (i) can be 
influenced by previous ones (i - j), meaning that subsequent responses are not always 
independent. Experiments 1 and 2 tested whether initial showup identification 
decisions impact choosing behavior for subsequent showup identification responses. 
Participants watched a mock-crime film involving three perpetrators and later made 
three showup identification decisions, one showup for each perpetrator. Across both 
experiments, evidence for sequential dependencies for choosing behavior was 
inconsistent. In Experiment 1, responses on the second, target-present showup 
assimilated towards previous choosing. Yet, in Experiment 2, responses on the second 
showup contrasted previous choosing regardless of target-presence. Experiment 3 
examined whether differences in stimuli and number of test trials in the eyewitness 
(vs. basic recognition) paradigm could account for the absence of hypothesized 
patterns of sequential dependencies in Experiments 1 and 2. Sequential dependencies 
were detected in recognition decisions over many trials, including recognition for 
faces: the probability of a yes response on the current trial increased if the previous 
response was also yes (vs. no). However, choosing behavior on previous trials did not 
predict individual recognition decisions on the current trial. That sequential 
dependencies did not impact observed choosing behavior on identification decisions 
suggests that the integrity of identification and recognition decisions is not likely to be 
impacted by making the multiple decisions in a row 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are presented together in Chapter 2 because these experiments 
are being prepared for publication together. 
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Introduction 
In October 2015, news outlets (e.g., “Frontière belge”, 2015) featured security footage 
of an unresolved case: the attempted abduction of a truck driver on the French-
Belgian border. As the truck driver walked around the rear of his truck, two men 
appeared and attacked him. While the two perpetrators struggled to force the driver 
into the back of a waiting car, an elderly passerby intervened, pulling at the 
perpetrators’ jackets and trying to place himself between them and the truck driver. 
Following the failed abduction and a hurried, but equally unfruitful search for the 
truck driver’s keys, the two men fled the scene by car.  
This case is just one example of the many violent crimes that are committed 
by multiple perpetrators. Gang violence (Juodis et al., 2009), hate crimes (Sandholtz, 
Langton, & Planty, 2013), rapes (Horvath & Kelley, 2009), and assaults (Hobson, et 
al., 2012) are often committed by perpetrators working as a group. In fact, the rising 
rate of such crimes appears to be a global phenomenon. For example, in Finland, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands, 13-17% of homicides between 2003 and 2006 involved 
two or more perpetrators (Liem et al., 2013), while the proportion of homicides with 
multiple perpetrators in the U.S. reached 20% in 2008 (nearly double that reported in 
1980; Cooper & Smith, 2011). These crimes often involve victims or bystanders as 
eyewitnesses—like the driver and the passerby above—who may be asked to identify 
multiple suspects related to the multiple perpetrators. Yet, the decades of research 
focused on uncovering and understanding factors that affect accuracy for eyewitness 
identification procedures typically considers only identifications of a single 
perpetrator, providing little empirical evidence to support or oppose recommendations 
in protocols specific to the context of multiple perpetrator crime. Should police 
departments, for instance, follow the example of the U.K. and multiply “best practice” 
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by creating a new lineup for each suspect of a different perpetrator (Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1984)? If so, does the order of presentation of identification 
tests affect the reliability of the evidence obtained? Or does the act of making multiple 
identification decisions affect the decisions themselves? 
In this paper, we address this last question, examining the consequences of 
testing memory for multiple perpetrators (e.g., Malmberg, Lehman, Annis, Criss, & 
Shriffin, 2014). We present three experiments examining whether initial showup 
identification decisions affect witness choosing behavior and accuracy on subsequent 
showup decisions. We aimed to determine whether sequential dependencies (i.e., 
where choosing behavior on previous tests influences choosing on a current test) 
should be considered in cases when eyewitnesses are asked to make multiple 
identification decisions, specifically when those decisions pertain to the different 
suspects in a multiple perpetrator crime.  
Identification of multiple perpetrators 
Clifford and Hollin (1981) first revealed the difficulty of eyewitness 
identification in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes when they had participants 
view a non-violent event with one, three, or five perpetrators. Despite only having to 
select the main perpetrator from a target-present lineup immediately following the 
crime, only 30% of participants in the three-perpetrator condition and 20% in the five-
perpetrator condition made accurate identifications (compared to 40% in the one-
perpetrator condition). More recently, Megreya and Bindemann (2012) demonstrated 
a similar drop in accuracy with as few as two unfamiliar faces to be encoded. 
Participants viewed a mock crime with one perpetrator alone or with an accomplice 
and were subsequently asked to identify the perpetrator. The presence of a second 
person at encoding was associated with decreased identification accuracy in target-
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present lineups (lower hit rates and higher miss rates). Approximately 54% of 
participants who saw the perpetrator alone were able to accurately identify him/her, 
compared to only 29% of participants who saw the perpetrator with an accomplice.  
To date, three procedures have been proposed to address the applied issue of 
the multiple perpetrator identification disadvantage. The two-person serial lineup 
(Wells & Pozzulo, 2006), the elimination lineup (Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2008, 2013), 
and an adapted sequential identification procedure (Hobson & Wilcock, 2011) were 
each tested against traditional simultaneous lineups, sequential lineups, or both. The 
results were mixed, and any improvements associated with these methods depended 
upon which target identity was being presented (i.e., accomplice vs. perpetrator), the 
presence or absence of the target in the lineups, or both. Unfortunately, when these 
new methods fall short, we do not know if it is because the proposed adaptations did 
not address the mechanisms they intended to, or if the theories used to justify these 
adaptations are ultimately not relevant to the multiple perpetrator identification 
disadvantage. For example, the two-person serial lineup is intended to provide context 
to aid memory by presenting the sequential lineups of the culprit and of the 
accomplice at the same time (Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). While the lineups for each are 
flashed side-by-side on the screen, the two suspects are never shown simultaneously, 
but always paired with a filler. In theory, the context of one face should aid our ability 
to recognize or reject the other face. But when this lineup does not improve 
identification accuracy, is it because contextual cuing is not useful for faces in a 
lineup context? Or is it because the suspects are never shown together, and thus are 
not cuing memory?  Perhaps it is difficult to interpret their results because they are 
premature attempts to fix problems that are still not well understood, meaning the 
adapted lineups amount to trial-by-error solutions.  
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Other research has aimed to test the theoretical causes of the multiple 
perpetrator identification disadvantage. Shallow encoding (Megreya & Burton, 2006) 
or increased memorial demand (Bindemann, Sanford, Gillatt, Avetisyan & Megreya, 
2012) have more recently been explored as reasons for the decreased identification 
performance for multiple perpetrator crimes, and both appear to play a role. However, 
there is another independent factor that is unique to multiple perpetrator identification 
that has yet to be considered: the decisional structure of making multiple 
identifications. Below, we explore how the act of making multiple identifications may 
undermine the integrity of those decisions. 
Sequential dependencies in perception and recognition 
 An individual police lineup has been likened by researchers to a real-world 
signal detection decision, but with the modification to include filler (i.e., non-suspect) 
misidentifications (Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010, 2012). The signal detection 
model, however, mathematically assumes independence of trials, for which a decision 
is based solely on the evidence present in that trial. In contrast, research in perception 
and memory demonstrates that a current decision (i) can be influenced by a previous 
one (i – j), so that a current response may favor (assimilation) or disfavor (contrast) 
the preceding responses (Treisman & Williams, 1984). In other words, in a series of 
trials presented one-after-another, the responses, although separate, are not 
independent. These sequential dependencies appear in perception, classification, and 
recognition tasks where participants make multiple, sequential decisions—tasks 
which present a theoretical overlap with making multiple eyewitness identification 
decisions.  
Sequential dependency can be demonstrated in its simplest form in a 
traditional detection experiment. Howarth and Bulmer (1956) seated participants in a 
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dark room with a flash-bulb set at a 50% detection rate at a given intensity, meaning 
that the light was bright enough to be detected, but dim enough that participants only 
reported seeing it half of the time. The momentary flashes were accompanied by the 
sound of a bell, so that when participants heard the bell ring, they indicated whether 
or not they had seen the flash of light (yes vs. no). At 50% detection, participants will 
make errors half of the time; errors that should theoretically display natural 
fluctuations and therefore appear randomly throughout the hundreds of trials. 
However, participants demonstrated a tendency to assimilate responses towards 
previous ones, meaning that a no response was more likely to be followed by another 
no response than a yes response. Further still, at some points, the light signal was 
omitted so that the bell rang without the accompanying light flash. When the 
experimenters forced a sequence of three of these blank trials (no-no-no), they found 
the same degree of assimilation for the subsequent fourth response as for three natural 
occurring negative responses. Such sequential dependencies are found in a variety of 
tasks, including absolute judgments of sound (Holland & Lockhead, 1968), and the 
perceptual classification of facial expressions (Hsu & Yang, 2013).  
The mechanism underlying sequential dependencies remains an ongoing 
debate, with attempts to model sequential dependencies favoring one of the two 
systems involved in a perception task: the cognitive system and the decisional 
processes. Some models consider sequential dependencies to arise from biased 
decision-making (e.g., Treisman & Williams, 1984). According to these models, 
assimilation results from the observer’s short-term assumption that the most recent 
stimulus is also the most likely to occur again. However, patterns of contrasting 
answers are the result of the observer attempting to correct decisional criteria to a 
desirable level in the long-term. These fluctuations in response bias purport to explain 
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why judgments show assimilation immediately following trial i, but revert to contrast 
after a few trials. On the other side of the debate are models arguing that sequential 
dependencies arise either entirely, or at least in part, from the cognitive system 
(Brown, Marley, Donkin, & Heathcote, 2008; Matthews & Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 
Brown, & Chater, 2005). In these models, sequential dependencies arise as a result of 
inappropriate information being carried forward from the previous trial, affecting the 
perception of the current stimulus.   
 Malmberg and Annis (2012) were the first to demonstrate sequential 
dependencies in recognition memory. They presented a series of experiments using 
traditional recognition paradigms and judgments of frequency recognition tasks to 
approximate the perception and categorization tasks that routinely demonstrate 
sequential dependencies. For example, in one experiment, participants studied 40 
word pairs and were later tested on their recognition for those words among never-
studied words. As with Howarth and Bulmer’s (1956) light-detection experiment, 
participants were more likely to respond old if they had responded old (rather than 
new) on the previous trial, regardless of whether the previous response was correct 
(hit) or incorrect (false-alarm). The appearance of sequential dependencies was 
consistent across several replications with different stimuli, including landscape 
images, and picture-word pairs. Interestingly, the patterns for sequential dependencies 
were different from those found in perception experiments. Because perception tasks 
and recognition tasks share equivalent decisional processes, these discrepant patterns 
suggest that sequential dependencies arise from the different cognitive systems 
supporting perceptual vs. mnemonic tasks (Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Therefore, 
their results reinforce perception models that posit response interference from the 
previous trials as the root of sequential dependencies.  
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The current research 
Studies investigating the cause of the multi-face recognition disadvantage 
(e.g., Bindemann et al., 2012; Megreya & Burton, 2006) tend to focus on the encoding 
conditions: how factors that affect perception and attention interfere with encoding, 
and thus damage chances of identification from the outset. Consequently, studies 
adapting lineups that were originally designed for single-perpetrator crimes so far 
considered these encoding difficulties and adjusted methodology in attempts to 
compensate for the resulting impoverished memory (e.g., Hobson & Wilcock, 2011; 
Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). While this is a reasonable starting point to investigate 
multiple perpetrator identifications, it is also important to explore other factors that 
may affect identification decisions. In this vein, we investigated the possibility of 
sequential dependencies within the eyewitness paradigm. Specifically, how does the 
act of making multiple identification decisions for unique perpetrators affect the 
reliability of those decisions? Despite the clear theoretical relevance of sequential 
dependencies to witnesses making identification decisions for multiple perpetrators, 
the phenomenon remains untested in the eyewitness identification context.  
Multiple perpetrator crimes present a framework in which relatively few 
sequential decisions are made, and in which these decisions have serious 
consequences. Sequential dependencies measured in the recognition paradigm have 
little substantial effect on overall recognition accuracy because the beneficial and 
detrimental sequences of dependencies will typically balance out over the many trials, 
reducing its impact on the overall accuracy for recognition (e.g., Malmberg & Annis, 
2012). Considering identification paradigms lack the many trials needed to balance 
out recognition accuracy, the appearance of sequential dependencies in this context 
would be a matter of substantial impact and cause for concern. Therefore, we tested 
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for sequential dependency effects within the eyewitness identification context by 
having participants make multiple, consecutive showup decisions.  
Show ups are particularly well-suited for an initial test for sequential 
dependencies within the eyewitness context for three reasons. First, showups (live or 
photographic) are a common identification procedure around the world (e.g., Davis, 
Valentine, Memon, & Roberts, 2015; Police Executive Research Forum, 2013). 
Second, forced-report showup decisions (Is this the perpetrator? Yes vs. no) emulate 
the binary-decision tasks in which sequential dependencies have been consistently 
observed. Third, showups permit a controlled investigation of sequential 
dependencies on identification decision-making free from the influence of lineup 
construction variables (e.g., filler similarity, lineup presentation method). If sequential 
dependencies are found to affect showup decision-making, subsequent investigations 
can determine how these effects interact with lineup composition and presentation 
variables.  
Across two initial experiments, we examined the relation of previous 
identification decisions to subsequent choosing behavior in the context of the multiple 
showup identification decisions for a multiple perpetrator crime. That is, if it is 
possible to predict current choosing on a showup identification decision from 
previous choosing, it provides initial evidence that sequential effects may be present 
in multiple showup identification decisions. Given that research has previously 
demonstrated that sequential dependencies in recognition are a result of interference 
from previous trials (Malmberg & Annis, 2012), Experiments 1 and 2 consider both 
previous signal (target-presence: present vs. absent) and previous response (Choosing: 
yes vs. no) as predictors of current choosing behavior (Matthews & Stewart, 2009). 
We expected that initial showup responses would predict choosing for subsequent 
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showup responses. In other words, choosing on a previous showup identification 
would be associated with choosing on subsequent ones, and rejecting on a previous 
showup identification would be associated with rejecting on subsequent ones. We also 
expected previous target-presence to be separately associated with the current 
identification decision, such that when the previous target being present would predict 
current choosing and the previous target being absent would predict current rejecting 
(e.g., Matthews & Stewart, 2009). 
We also consider the possibility of an interaction between current target-
presence and previous choosing on the current choosing, such that participants 
confronted with a target-absent trial would be influenced more by the previous target-
presence and choosing compared to a target-present trial. Non-memorial factors tend 
to exert stronger effects on recognition memory tasks when the target stimulus is 
absent and there is no opportunity for genuine recognition (Palmer, Sauer, & Holt, 
2017). In other words, if memory is not able to provide the answer, people look for 
other cues to influence that decision. In this way, sequential dependencies might 
represent an attempt to use imperfect cues to guide decision-making under conditions 
of uncertainty (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinboelting, 1991). Although straight-
forward sequential dependencies should arise regardless of target presence, it is 
possible that the strength of the effect will vary depending on whether the target is 
present or not.  
Although Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted separately, they used similar 
methodologies and analyses to answer the same question. Thus, although the data is 
not collapsed across experiments, the methods and results are presented together. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 
Participants and Design 
A total of 411 participants were tested, 404 of which were included in 
analyses. Participants either completed the experiment in the lab (Experiment 1, N = 
120) or online (Experiment 2, N = 291). The average age of participants was 21 years 
(M = 20.77, SD = 3.64). They were compensated with a €5 gift voucher (Experiment 
1) or participation credit (Experiments 1 and 2).  
Participants viewed a three-person mock crime video and were subsequently 
presented with three photographic showups, one for each of the three perpetrators. 
This number of showups was chosen in order to create a minimum sequence of 
responses within which sequential dependencies could be tested. In Experiment 1, we 
aimed to provide an initial test of sequential dependency in facial identification. Four 
conditions were chosen to optimize conditions for sequential dependencies through an 
established pattern of target-present and target-absent showup photographs (Howarth 
& Bulmer, 1956). The first and second showups were always consistent in target-
presence; they were either both target-absent (TA) or both target-present (TP), while 
the third showup was either consistent or different, leading to four conditions with 
targets: (1) TA/TA/TP, (2) TA/TA/TA, (3) TP/TP/TA, and (4) TP/TP/TP. In 
retrospect, we realized this also meant that we were not able to disentangle the effect 
of target-presence between showups 1 and 2 on showup 2. Thus, Experiment 2 
implemented all combinations of target presence by adding four additional conditions 
with targets: (5) TA/TP/TA, (6) TA/TP/TA, (7) TP/TA/TP, and (8) TP/TA/TA. 
Presentation order of targets (i.e., 123, 132, 231, 213, 312, 321) was counterbalanced 
for both experiments.  
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General Method for Experiments 1 and 2 
Materials. 
 Crime video. In the 2:45 min mock-crime video, the male victim arrives by 
bike and locks it against a railing with other bikes. Three target people, one woman 
and two men, are shown in the background gesturing towards the victim. When the 
victim walks into a nearby building, the thieves use a hand-saw to break the locks of 
two bikes, including the victim’s, and walk away with the bikes. Each target actor in 
the video has approximately 15-20 s of close-up shots in which their faces are clearly 
visible.  
 Targets. All three targets were Caucasian university students. The female 
target had an average build, long, straight, blond hair and was judged by pilot 
participants to be approximately 22 years old. The first male target had an average 
build with short, dark-blond hair, and beard-scruff, and was judged to be 
approximately 25 years old. The second male target was comparatively shorter to the 
first target, with short, blond hair, and was judged to be approximately 23 years old.    
Showups. Three target-absent and three target-present showups were 
constructed, one for each of the three perpetrators. The showups consisted of color 
photographs 4.39 x 5.89 cm in size. The targets were photographed on the same day 
as the stimulus event was filmed, but wore different clothing.  One innocent suspect 
was selected as a replacement for each target in the target-absent showups. The 
replacements were chosen based on similarity to the actual target, as established by a 
pilot study with N = 22 participants (age: M = 27.45, SD = 12.14). Specifically, 
replacements were rated as statistically similar to the perpetrator with regard to 
memorability, distinctiveness, and typicality (cf. Wickham, Morris & Fritz, 2000; 
Vokey & Read, 1992). Participants were also asked to judge the similarity of the 
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target faces paired with each of their possible replacements. This comparison score 
was used to match for similarity across the three target-replacement pairings, so that 
each of the three target-absent showups would be equally difficult for participants to 
judge. Results of the pilot study are available in supplementary material and can be 
found in Appendix F.  
Procedure. Participants arrived at the lab for individual testing sessions 
(Experiment 1) or received a Qualtrics (Provo, UT) link to complete the experiment 
online (Experiment 2). Participants were informed that the experiment would be 
administered using a self-paced computer task. After giving informed consent, 
participants were told that they would be shown a video and were instructed to pay 
close attention as they would be asked questions about it later. After watching the 
mock-crime video, participants completed a 20-30 min filler task by answering a 
series of questionnaires (Experiment 1 and 2) or by completing a combination of 
search tasks and word-generation games (Experiment 2). Next, participants were 
reminded that they had seen a film of three thieves stealing a bike, and were now 
considered eyewitnesses. They were instructed: You will be shown a series of three 
photographs. Each photograph is one suspect for each of the three bike thieves. For 
each photograph, please decide whether or not the person shown was one of the 
perpetrators. Once you make a decision, you will move on to the next photo. A 
subsequent screen displayed a one-time warning that the persons in the photographs 
may or may not be the actual perpetrators.  
 Participants were then shown a photo for one of the perpetrators (Suspect 1: 
present or absent). A forced-report question asked if the person shown was one of the 
perpetrators (yes or no), after which they were asked to indicate how certain they were 
in their decision (0-100%). The procedure was repeated for Suspects 2 and 3. 
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Although suspects are numbered here for convenience, presentation order of targets 
was counterbalanced; meaning Suspect 1 for the eyewitness could correspond to any 
of the three perpetrators. Following all identification decisions and confidence ratings, 
participants were shown the photos of those they had positively identified and asked 
to name the role each played in the crime. However, role assignment and confidence 
are outside of the scope of the current research and are therefore not addressed 
further. Finally, participants were thanked for their time and debriefed.  
Experiment 2 differs from Experiment 1 in two additional ways. In order to 
determine whether participants had watched the entire video, a still image of a white 
arrow and the text “This is a white arrow, please remember this arrow as you will be 
asked about it later” was added for the last 7 s of the video (after the target event). 
Following the filler task, participants were asked to name the shape and color 
presented at the end of the video. This section of the computer task was timed so that 
the task advanced automatically after 2:52 min regardless of whether or not the video 
was paused. Therefore, participants that could not correctly name the shape and color 
(n = 4) were assumed to have not completed the video and were removed from all 
analyses. A final question prompted participants to describe the environment in which 
they completed the experiment (e.g., time of day, location, presence of others). 
Results 
In Experiment 1, all 120 participants were retained for data analysis. In 
Experiment 2, seven participants were removed from data analysis for answering a 
control question incorrectly (4), not completing the filler task (2), or because Qualtrics 
recorded their experiment duration time as exceeding four hours and the participant 
did not respond to requests to elaborate (1), leaving 284 participants.  
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Descriptive statistics for choosing on showups. Across the three showup 
identification decisions in both Experiments 1 and 2, choosing rates were low, at 34-
42%. Overall, only 4-12% of participants chose on all three showups. Meanwhile, 15-
22% of participants rejected all decisions. Less than half of participants (26-47%) 
chose on at least two showups. See Table 2.1 for choosing and accuracy rates for each 
experiment. 
Experiment 1: Testing for sequential dependencies. In order to establish the 
relation of previous identification decisions and both previous and current target-
presence with current identification decisions, we performed separate binary logistic 
regressions for choosing on the second and third showup. For example, for choosing  
Table 2.1 
Experiments 1 and 2: Proportion (Frequency) of Choosing Across Showups and Overall  
 Choosing by showup  Overall Choosing 
 Showup 1 Showup 2 Showup 3  0 chosen 1 chosen 2 chosen 3 chosen 
Expt. 1     .15  (9) .38 (23) .35 (21) .12 (7) 
TP .53 (32) .53 (32) .52 (31)      
TA .25 (15) .23 (14) .27 (16)      
Overall .39 (47) .38 (46) .39 (47)      
Expt. 2     .22 (62) .43 (120) .30 (84) .04 (12) 
TP .54 (76) .43 (62)    .58 (82)      
TA .25 (36) .25 (35) .29 (39)      
Overall .41 (114) .34 (93) .42 (117)      
Note: Displayed under “Choosing by showup” are proportions of participants choosing on 
target-present and target-absent showups. Displayed under “Overall Choosing” are proportions 
of participants who chose on zero, one, two, or three showups.  TA denotes target-absent 
showups and TP denotes target-present showups. 
on the second showup, we entered previous target-presence (absent vs. present on 
Showup 1), current target-presence (absent vs. present on Showup 2) and previous 
choosing (yes vs. no on Showup 1) as predictors. For choosing on the third showup, 
we used previous target-presence, current target-presence (Showup 3), and previous 
choosing (yes vs. no on Showup 1 and Showup 2) as predictors. Because target-
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presence for the first and second showups did not vary in Experiment 1, target-
presence for Showups 1 and 2 were included as a single predictor.  
In the initial analyses for Showup 2, we included all main effects in the 
equation. In the initial analyses for Showup 3, we included all main effects and the 
current target-presence by previous response (selection vs. rejection) interaction. We 
then sequentially excluded the interaction if non-significant and any non-significant 
main effects by order of distance from the current decision. However, given our 
theoretical predictions, previous choosing was always included in the final model. 
Although we present the results descriptively here, relevant statistics can be found in 
Table 2.2.  
Choosing behavior on second showup. Only target-presence was a significant 
predictor in the final model. Participants were more likely to choose when the target 
was present. However, due to the fact that target-presence for Showups 1 and 2 did 
not vary within subjects, it is unclear if it is current target-presence, previous target-
presence, or both that are associated with choosing behavior for Showup 2.  
Choosing behavior on third showup. The current target-presence by previous 
choosing interaction was significant. Examination of simple effects revealed that only 
when the current trial was target-present, choosing on Showup 2 predicted choosing 
on Showup 3 such that participants who chose on the second showup were 5.88 times 
more likely to also choose on the third compared to participants who had rejected the 
second showup. In other words, 79% of those who chose on Showup 2 also chose on a 
target-present Showup 3, while only 39% of those who rejected Showup 2 
subsequently chose on a target-present Showup 3.  
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Table 2.2 
Experiments 1 and 2: Final Models of Logistic Regressions Predicting Choosing on Second 
and Third Showups Based on Previous Choosing and Target-Presence  
 
b SE Wald p 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower Odds  Upper 
Experiment 1 
Showup 2 
       
Choosing 1 -0.10 0.42 0.06 .813 0.40 0.91 2.06 
Target-Presence 1 and 2 1.35 0.42 10.41 < .001 1.70 3.87 8.79 
Constant -1.17 0.32 13.14 < .001  0.31  
Showup 3        
Choosing 2 -0.45 0.60 0.57 .451 0.20 0.64 2.07 
Choosing 1 0.23 0.42 0.32 .573 0.56 1.26 2.85 
Target-Presence 3 0.36 0.50 0.53 .469 0.54 1.44 3.81 
Choosing 2 × TP 3 2.23 0.89 6.31 .012 1.63 9.27 52.62 
Constant -0.91 0.40 5.08 .024  0.40  
Showup 3, reversed
a 
        
Choosing 2 1.77 0.65 7.47 .006 1.65 5.88 20.96 
Choosing 1 0.23 0.42 0.32 .573 0.56 1.26 2.85 
Target-Presence, reversed -0.36 0.50 0.53 .469 0.26 0.70 1.85 
Choosing 2 × TP 3 -2.23 0.89 6.31 .012 0.02 0.12 0.61 
Constant -0.55 0.37 3.21 .137  0.58  
Experiment 2 
Showup 2 
       
Choosing 1 -0.54 0.27 4.04 .044 0.34 0.58 0.99 
Target-Presence 2 0.87 0.26 11.22 .001 1.44 2.39 3.40 
Constant -0.92 0.21 18.70 < .001  0.40  
Showup 3        
Choosing 2 0.40 0.27 2.27 .132 0.89 1.50 2.52 
Choosing 1 -0.17 0.26 0.43 .512 0.50 0.84 1.41 
Target-Presence 3 1.28 0.26 24.90 < .001 2.17 3.59 5.93 
Constant -1.04 0.23 20.22 < .001  0.35  
Note: Variables were coded as follows. Choosing: non-choosing = 0, choosing = 1; target-
presence: TA = 0, TP = 1.  Experiment 1. Showup 2: R
2
 = .09 (Cox & Snell), .13 
(Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(2) = 11.71, p = .003; Showup 3: R2 = .14 (Cox & Snell), 18 
(Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(3) = 17.50, p = .002. In order to examine the target-presence by 
previous choosing interaction, the variable TP 3 was reverse-coded so that TA = 1, TP = 0. 
a
Showup 3, reversed represents the regression that was conducted using the reverse-coded 
target-presence variable and reported in results. Experiment 2. Showup 2: R
2
 = .05 (Cox & 
Snell), .07 (Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(2) = 15.10, p = .001; Showup 3: R2 = .10 (Cox & Snell), 
14 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(3) = 30.07, p < .001. 
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Experiment 2: Testing for sequential dependencies. Analyses for 
Experiment 2 were analogous to Experiment 1 with the exception that all initial 
models included the current target-presence by previous response interaction. 
Choosing behavior on the second showup. As expected, choosing on Showup 
1 was a significant predictor for choosing on Showup 2. However, current choosing 
contrasted previous choosing, so that participants were 1.72 times less likely to 
choose on the second showup if they had chosen on the previous one. In other words, 
72% who chose on Showup 1 subsequently rejected Showup 2. Meanwhile 62% of 
participants who rejected Showup 1 went on to reject Showup 2. The lack of 
significant interaction for current target-presence by previous choosing indicates that 
this sequential dependency was not affected by the current presence of the target. 
However, current target-presence was also a significant predictor for choosing. 
Choosing behavior on the third showup. For choosing on Showup 3, only 
current target-presence was a significant predictor. 
Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 were initial tests for sequential dependencies across 
multiple showup identification decisions in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes. 
We expected previous responses (choosing) and previous target-presence to be related 
to current decisions. While we did find some evidence for sequential dependencies in 
both experiments, effects were not consistent. In Experiment 1, when the current trial 
was target-present, participants who chose on the second showup were nearly six 
times more likely to also choose on the third showup compared to those who had 
rejected the second showup (assimilation). Although we did expect to find an 
interaction between current target-presence and previous choosing, the interaction 
operated counter to expectations that target-absent trials would be more likely to show 
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assimilation between current and previous choosing. By contrast, in Experiment 2, 
participants who chose on the first showup, were more than twice as likely to not 
choose on the second trial (contrast), regardless of target-presence. Taken together, 
results from both Experiments 1 and 2 provide inconsistent evidence for the expected 
sequential dependencies. This inconsistency is surprising given the theoretical overlap 
to fields that have robustly produced sequential dependencies, including perception, 
absolute identification, and, most pertinently, recognition.  
In recognition tests, Malmberg and Annis (2012), found sequential 
dependencies between previous and current responses: A hit on a previous trial 
increased the probability of a hit on a current trial, but previous hits and false-alarms 
also increased the probability of false-alarms on a current trial. In essence, 
participants were more likely to choose on a current trial if they had chosen on a 
previous one. This effect was replicated with a variety of paired stimuli (e.g., 
landscape photo pairs, non-word pairs), as well as with a single-item classic 
recognition test. While the current research retains similarities to these basic 
recognition paradigms, as well as other contexts in which sequential dependencies 
have robustly appeared (i.e., perception, categorization tasks; Holland & Lockhead, 
1968; Hsu & Yang, 2012), the eyewitness paradigm also presents differences that may 
explain the inconsistent results reported here. 
Consequently, we considered potentially important differences that may 
explain the inconsistent results reported here. First, our experiments focused on the 
recognition of faces, rather than images, words, or non-words. While sequential 
dependencies have been found in categorization for facial expression (Hsu & Yang, 
2012), they have not been tested specifically for face recognition. Some evidence in 
perceptual and recognition research gives us reason to suspect that individuals process 
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and remember faces differently than other non-face images (e.g., detecting minute 
changes in facial features, Diamond & Carey, 1986; capacity limits in face 
processing, Bindemann, Jenkins, & Burton, 2007). Given that sequential 
dependencies in recognition are thought to arise from mnemonic or perceptual 
processing, such differences in stimuli may be important.  
Second, the number of stimuli in our experiment differs greatly from a basic 
recognition paradigm. In a typical recognition experiment, participants are presented 
with long lists of words or images, given little time to study these items, and are then 
tested on those items along with never-before-seen items. Conversely, our experiment 
only included three perpetrators to study over the course of a 2.5 min mock-crime 
video. Although we cannot ignore the possibility that there are simply not enough 
stimuli being studied, and therefore participants are not uncertain enough to rely on 
previous responses, the maximum average participant accuracy rates of 65% do 
suggest that our filler task allowed for sufficient memory decay to induce uncertainty. 
Meanwhile, sequential dependencies in recognition are thought to be a result of 
interference from previous trials that affect mnemonic processing during testing. 
Therefore, it seems more likely that our results reveal a difference during testing 
rather than a difference during encoding.  
A third difference lies in the number of trials during the testing phases. While 
recognition experiments may have tens or hundreds of test trials, our participants 
encountered only three. Perhaps this is not a sufficient number of trials for sequential 
dependencies to arise. Sequential dependencies have been explained through 
accumulator models, which predict shifts over time based on criterion placement or 
accumulation starting points (e.g., selective attention, mapping and ballistic 
accumulation; SAMBA; Brown et al., 2008; Matthews & Stewart, 2009). The 
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SAMBA model, for example, posits that a participant classifying the loudness of a 
sound (i.e., soft vs. loud; Jones, Love, & Maddox, 2006) uses the sound on initial 
trials to generate a range between which the subsequent sounds are expected to fall. 
This range establishes how soft the participants can expect a soft sound to be and how 
loud they can expect a loud sound to be. When confronted with the task of classifying 
the sound on the current trial, the observer will compare the sound to the upper and 
lower range in relation to the loudness of the previous response. Their response will 
depend upon the strength of the evidence for each of these answers. When a soft 
response is given on the current trial, it is hypothesized that this biases the perception 
of the sound on the subsequent trial by temporarily reducing the strength of evidence 
needed to favor another soft response. Thus, assimilation arises from the decisional 
processes: because the soft response now has the advantage, the following trial is 
more likely to reach the threshold to be classified as soft. Contrast, however, arises 
from the perceptual processes: because observers are comparing the current sound to 
the previous one, any change louder or softer can lead to over- and underestimation of 
strength of that sound. In this model, assimilation and contrast both appear because 
the stronger effect (assimilation) eventually decays to give way to the weaker one 
(contrast; Brown et al., 2008). It is possible that such models require an adjustment 
period over multiple trials in order to calibrate the upper and lower range of 
perceptual (and in the case of recognition, mnemonic) processing. As a result, the 
small number of trials present in our experiment might be insufficient for sequential 
dependencies to arise.  
To address the issues outlined above, Experiment 3 used the recognition 
paradigm in an attempt to replicate and extend the work of Malmberg and Annis 
(2012, near-pairs condition) using three different categories of stimuli: photos of 
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faces, photos of landscapes (places) and words. Accordingly, these concerns were 
translated into three main goals: (1) to extend previous research by testing for 
sequential dependencies on overall responding in face recognition, (2) if found, to 
determine if these sequential dependencies translate to predictable choosing behavior, 
and (3) to examine whether the strength of these effects vary across the testing phase.  
We predicted sequential effects would arise across all three sets of stimuli. If 
sequential dependencies were observed for responses overall, we predicted that 
sequential effects would be stronger in the second half compared to the first half of 
testing blocks and thus also expect to be able to predict choosing behavior in late, but 
not early, test trials. Should sequential dependencies fail to appear for faces (cf. places 
and words), it would not only undermine response-interference as a theory for the 
source of the sequential effects in recognition, but also suggest that sequential 
dependencies are unlikely to be problematic in the eyewitness context. 
Experiment 3 
Participants and design 
One-hundred-fifty participants were recruited from online participation 
platforms. Five participants were excluded for the following reasons: failing two of 
the four control questions (1), failing to follow instructions (2), and taking a 20+ min 
break in the middle of the first testing block (2). Participants with other anomalous 
data (e.g., low activity during the filler task) were flagged; When exploratory analyses 
to examine hit rates, false-alarm rates, accuracy, and choosing behavior did not reveal 
any of these flagged participants to be outliers, their data were retained for all further 
analyses. The average age of the remaining 145 participants was 22 years (M = 22.14, 
SD = 6.49).  
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions to study paired 
stimuli of faces, places, or words. For each study-test block, participants viewed 18 
paired target stimuli during the learning phase and were tested on the 36 target stimuli 
and 36 fillers. Each participant took part in two study-test blocks. Participants were 
compensated with research participation credit if eligible, or otherwise not 
compensated. 
Method 
Materials. For each stimulus type (faces, places, words), a total of 288 
individual stimuli were selected. Of those, 144 were used as target stimuli, and the 
other 144 were used as lures during test. See Figure 2.1 for example stimuli pairs.  
Faces. Participants viewed paired male and female faces with neutral 
expressions that were selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & 
Wittenbrink, 2015). Faces that were particularly distinctive, (i.e., shaved eyebrow, 
facial piercing, unique hair) were removed. Half of the target face stimuli were 
presented during the learning phase as same-gender pairs and half as opposite-gender 
pairs.  
Landscape photos. Photographs of varied landscapes (e.g., sunsets, 
mountains, deserts, fields) were selected from the Places Scene Recognition 
Database (Zhou, Lapedriza, Xiao, Torralba, & Oliva, 2014). Photos with particularly 
distinctive features (e.g., color filter) were not selected. 
Words. One thousand nouns were randomly chosen from the 5,000 most 
frequently used words according to the Corpus of Contemporary American English 
(Davies, 2008). Words were piloted for recognition by seven non-native English 
speakers whose nationalities are representative of the student population from which 
the sample is drawn (two Germans, two Belgians, and three Dutch). These non-native 
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English speakers were asked to view the list of 890 nouns and remove those words 
that they did not recognize (i.e., would need to search for or translate). The stimulus 
pairs were randomly selected and paired from the remaining 813 nouns. 
Procedure. The procedure followed the procedure of Malmberg and Annis 
(2012; Experiment 1, near-pairs condition replications), with two exceptions. First, 
because the study was distributed online, a shape appeared at the end of each 
encoding block (block 1: blue star, block 2: black arrow), which were later used as 
control questions for attention. Second, due to availability of faces, participants 
studied only 36 total pairs (cf. 40 pairs in the original experiment) of the varying 
stimuli (faces, places, or words).  
Participants were provided a link for the computer task. Participants in the 
face condition, for example, studied 18 paired faces. Each pair was presented on 
screen for 2 s with a 0.1 s interstimulus interval. Following a 30 s distractor task (Pac-
Man), participants were presented with two control questions asking them to indicate 
the shape and color of the shape presented at the end of the encoding phase. 
Participants were then tested for their recognition of the previously-studied faces 
using the self-paced computer task. Participants in all conditions saw 36 target trials 
plus 36 filler trials of never-before-seen stimuli presented at random, with the 
constraint that half of the pairs were tested consecutively and the other half were 
randomized into positions at least seven trials away from their corresponding target 
trials. Following another 1 min distractor task, this procedure was repeated for a 
second study-test block. At the end of the experiment, a final question prompted 
participants to describe the environment in which they completed the experiment (i.e., 
time of day, location, presence of others). 
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Figure 2.1.  Experiment 3: Example stimuli pairs for faces (Panel A), places (Panel 
B), and words (Panel C).  
Results 
We focused on two types of analyses to address the three goals of the 
experiment. First, we conducted within-subjects tests on overall response patterns to 
replicate and extend those analyses conducted by Malmberg and Annis (2012). 
Accordingly, we conducted mixed Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) on conditional 
hit rates, false-alarm rates, and choosing rates given previous responses and stimulus 
type (faces, places, words). Because we were interested in how this effect might vary 
across the testing sessions, we conducted these same analyses on the conditional hit 
rates and false-alarm rates for the first half and second half of each of the two testing 
blocks. We refer to the first half of Block 1 as Section1, the second half as Section 2, 
and the first and second halves of Block 2 as Sections 3 and 4, respectively. 
 Second, we conducted between-subjects analyses in order to determine 
whether overall patterns would be reflected in individual choosing behavior. More 
specifically, we conducted logistic regressions analogous to those conducted in 
Experiments 1 and 2 to test whether we could predict choosing behavior on individual 
trials using target-presence and previous choosing as predictors. Although we present 
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the results descriptively here, relevant statistics for within-subjects analyses can be 
found in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Statistics for between-subjects analyses can be found in 
Table 2.5.   
Preparation of data and calculation of contingency rates. Prior to 
calculating hit rates, false-alarm rates, and choosing rates, trials with response times 
faster than 200 ms were removed. This is because 200 ms is the conservative 
threshold for recorded brain activity in response to human faces, as well as the earliest 
threshold for our ability to distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar faces (Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996; Caharel, Ramon & Rossion, 2014). Hit rates 
were calculated as the proportion of correct answers on target-present trials and false-
alarm rates were calculated as the proportion of incorrect answers on target-absent 
trials. Analyses used hit rates on the current trial (i) given that the previous trial (i-1) 
was a hit, miss, false-alarm or correct rejection. Therefore, separate hit rate 
contingencies were computed for each participant for (a) hits that followed a hit, HRhit 
= (H | i-1 = hit), (b) hits that followed a miss, HRmiss = (HR | i-1 = miss), (c) hits that 
followed a false-alarm and, (d)  hits that followed a correct rejection. Analogous 
false-alarm rates for each participant were computed given that the previous response 
was a hit, miss, false-alarm, or correct rejection (Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Choosing 
rates were calculated as overall proportion of choosing (respond yes vs. no) on target-
present and target-absent trials. 
Sequential effects as a function of stimulus type.  
Hit rate contingencies. We examined whether a hit on the current trial (i) was 
more or less likely given a hit, miss, false-alarm, or correct rejection on the previous 
trial (i-1), and whether this relationship differed for our three types of stimuli: faces, 
places, and words. Thus we conducted a mixed ANOVA with previous response 
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being the within-subjects factor, and type of stimulus being the between-subjects 
factor. There was a significant main effect of previous response. Planned contrasts 
indicated that a hit on the current trial was more likely if there was either a hit or false 
alarm compared to a correct rejection or miss on the previous trial. A hit on the 
current trial was also more likely if there was a correct rejection compared to a miss 
on the previous trial. The interaction of previous trial by type of stimulus was not 
significant. Thus, while we found sequential effects for hit rates, these effects did not 
differ significantly based on whether the stimuli were faces, places, or words. See 
Figure 2.2 (Panel A). 
 False-alarm rate contingencies. We next examined whether a false-alarm on 
the current trial (i) was more or less likely given a hit, miss, false-alarm, or correct 
rejection on the previous trial (i-1), and whether this relationship differed for our three 
sets of stimuli: faces, places, and words. We conducted a mixed ANOVA with 
previous response being the within-subjects factor, and stimulus type being the 
between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of previous response, 
indicating that a false-alarm on the current trial was more likely following a hit or 
false-alarm (cf. miss or correct rejection) on the previous trial (see Figure 2.2, Panel 
B).  There was no significant difference between hits vs. false-alarms or misses vs. 
correct rejections. The non-significant interaction of previous trial with stimulus 
category provided no evidence that these effects differed significantly according to 
stimulus type. 
Sequential effects as a function of section. There were no significant 
interactions for test section (Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4) with previous response for hits, 
misses, false-alarms, or correct rejections. There was a main effect of test section,  
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Table 2.3 
Experiment 3: Results for ANOVAs on Current Hit Rates, False-Alarm Rates, and Choosing Rates 
Given Previous Responses and Condition  
Note. The top panel displays results for mixed ANOVAs on hit rates, false-alarm rates, and choosing rates 
with previous response as the within-subjects factor and stimulus type (faces, places, and words) as the 
between-subjects condition. False-alarm and correct-rejection are abbreviated here as FA and CR, 
respectively. The interaction between previous response and stimulus category was significant only in 
analysis of choosing rates. Although sequential dependencies arose within all stimulus categories, the 
effect was greatest for places, followed by words, and then faces. 
 
Table 2.4 
Experiment 3: Results for ANOVAs on Current Hit Rates, False-Alarm Rates, and 
Choosing Rates Given Previous Responses and Testing Section  
 df F η
2
 p 
Test sections
a
: 1, 2, 3, and 4     
Hit Rate Contingencies     
Previous Response 3, 318 41.22 . 280 < .001 
Test Section 2.44, 259.02 8.63 .075 < .001 
Interaction 7.26, 770.03 0.47 .004 .860 
False-Alarm Rate 
Contingencies 
    
Previous Response 2.73, 305.63 4.85 .042 .004 
Test Section 2.72, 304.12 9.06 .075 < .001 
Interaction 7.77, 870 0.98 .009 .447 
Note. The top panel displays results for repeated-measures ANOVAs on hit rates, 
false-alarm rates, and choosing rates with previous response (hit, miss, false-alarm, 
correct rejection) and test section (1, 2, 3, 4) as the between-subjects factors. 
a
Sections 
are the first half of the first study-test block (Section 1), the second half of the first 
block (Section 2), and the first and second halves of the second block (Sections 3 and 
4).  
 df F η2 t d p 
Stimulus Type: Faces, Places, Words       
Hit Rate: Hit, Miss, FA,  CR       
Previous Response 2.25, 321.58 42.57 .229   < .001 
Stimulus Type    2, 143 9.00 .112   < .001 
Interaction 4.50, 321.58 0.70 .010   .611 
FA Rate:  Hit, Miss, FA,  CR       
Previous Response 2.47, 355.40 26.59 .156   < .001 
Stimulus Category 2, 144 9.67 .118   < .001 
Interaction 4.94, 355.40 0.67 .009   .646 
Choosing: Choose vs. Not       
Previous Choose 1 209.58 .593   < .001 
Stimulus Type 2 10.26 .125   < .001 
Interaction 2 7.42 .093   .001 
Error (within Groups) 144      
Follow-up contrasts for interaction       
Faces 46   6.64 1.02 < .001 
Places 49   9.76 1.39 < .001 
Words 50   9.13 1.30 < .001 
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Figure 2.2 Experiment 3: Hit rate and false-alarm rate contingencies. Panel A displays the 
probability of a hit on the current trial given the previous response (hit, miss, false-alarm, or 
correct rejection), collapsed across stimulus type (faces, places, words). Previous responses of hit 
and false-alarm do not significantly differ from each other, but all other comparisons are 
significant (ps < .001). Panel B displays the probability of a false-alarm on the current trial given 
the previous response, collapse across stimulus type. A false-alarm on the on the current trial is 
significantly more likely given a previous hit or false-alarm when compared to a previous miss or 
correct rejections (ps < .001). Error bars are with standard error. 
such that Sections 1 and 3 displayed higher hit rates and lower false-alarm rates than 
Sections 2 and 4.  Section 1 also displayed higher false-alarm rates than Section 3. 
Sequential effects in choosing. In these analyses, we ask a similar question in 
a different manner: overall, is choosing (saying yes) on the current trial, more or less 
likely if you chose or did not choose (said no) on the previous trial? We conducted 
mixed ANOVAs with previous choosing (choose vs. not choose) as the within-
subjects factor and stimulus type as the between-subjects factor. There was a 
significant main effect of previous choosing, and a significant interaction between 
previous choosing and stimulus type. Together, these results indicate that choosing on 
the current trial was more likely if the participant chose (cf. did not choose) on the 
previous trial and that this effect was weakest for face stimuli.  
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Predicting choosing on individual trials. Given that we successfully 
replicated analyses demonstrating sequential dependencies in overall recognition 
memory, including for faces, we subsequently tested whether those effects would 
translate to predictable behavior on individual trials over the course of the testing  
Table 2.5 
Experiment 3: Results of Logistic Regression Predicting Choosing on Second and 
Third Recognition Test Trials Based on Previous Choosing and Target-Presence 
 
b SE Wald p 
95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Lower Odds  Upper 
Section 1, trial 3        
Choosing 1 0.57 0.37 2.37 .124 0.86 1.76 3.62 
Choosing 2 0.41 0.36 1.28 .258 0.74 1.50 3.03 
TP 3 1.62 0.38 18.13 < .001 2.39 5.03 10.58 
Constant -0.97 0.36 7.41 .006  0.38  
Section 2, trial 73        
Choosing 71 0.18 0.38 0.22 .640 0.57 1.20 2.52 
Choosing 72 0.79 0.38 4.45 .035 1.06 2.21 4.62 
TP 73 0.98 0.38 6.68 .010 1.27 2.67 5.61 
Constant -1.58 0.38 17.04 < .001  0.21  
Section 3, trial 3        
Choosing 1 0.42 0.38 1.22 .269 0.72 1.52 3.20 
Choosing 2 -0.32 0.40 0.63 .428 0.33 0.73 1.60 
TP 3 -0.70 0.36 3.69 .055 0.24 0.50 1.01 
Constant 0.98 0.45 4.71 .030  2.67  
Section 4, trial 73        
Choosing 71 -0.55 0.38 2.12 .145 0.28 0.58 1.21 
Choosing 72 0.48 0.37 1.70 .193 0.79 1.61 3.31 
TP 73 -0.66 0.36 3.43 .064 0.26 0.52 1.04 
Constant 0.83 0.39 4.54 .033  2.30  
Note: Variables were coded as follows. Choosing: non-choosing = 0, choosing = 1; 
target-presence: TA = 0, TP = 1.  Section 1, Trial 3: R
2
 = .14 (Cox & Snell) .19 
(Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(3) = 22.50, p < .001; Section 2, Trial 73: R2 = .07 (Cox & 
Snell) .10 (Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(3) = 11.33, p = .010.  Section 3, Trial 3: R2 = .03 
(Cox & Snell) .05 (Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(3) = 4.98, p = .173; Section 4, Trial 73: 
R
2
 = .05 (Cox & Snell) .07 (Nagelkerke). Model χ 2(3) = 11.33, p = .050. 
sessions. Therefore, we chose the first three trials of each testing block and the three 
middle trials of each block (Block 1: trials 1-3 and 71-73; Block 2: trials 1-3 and 71-
73). These analyses are of particular interest because they apply analyses from 
Experiments 1 and 2 to a dataset in which sequential dependencies have already been 
detected. We consider first three trials of the first block a proxy for the three showup 
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identification decisions in Experiments 1 and 2. We chose to test the middle trials 
rather than later trials in order to avoid isolating groups of responses likely to display 
fatigue effects.  Analyses were analogous to Experiment 2 with one exception. Given 
that there was no current target-presence by previous choosing interaction in 
Experiment 2, this interaction was not included. 
Choosing on the previous trial predicted choosing on the current trial for only 
one of the four analyses, and current trial target-presence predicted choosing in only 
trials of Block 1. Thus, despite finding that, in general, hits and false-alarms were 
more common when participants chose on the previous trial, behavior on previous 
trials was not a useful predictor of choosing for these sets of individual trials.  
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 sought to replicate and extend previous work in sequential 
dependencies in recognition memory (Malmberg & Annis, 2012). Except for online 
data collection and the inclusion of additional questions to control for attention, the 
procedure followed the near-pairs condition in Malmberg and Annis’ (2012) 
Experiment 1. We expected that sequential dependencies would arise for recognition 
responses for all three types of stimuli, that these effects would be stronger in later 
portions of testing, and that this would be reflected in the capacity to predict current 
choosing from previous choosing in later, but not earlier, test trials.  
 As expected, the probability of a hit in the current trial (i) was higher if the 
previous response (i – 1) was also a hit compared to if the previous response was a 
miss. The probability of a false-alarm on the current trial was increased if it was 
preceded by either a hit or a false-alarm (compared to a miss or correct rejection). 
Noticeably, this pattern of results did not differ across category of stimuli, meaning 
we replicated Malmberg and Annis’ results using pictures of places and words, and 
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extended those results to include face recognition. Taken together, these results 
demonstrate that the probability of saying yes on the current trial increases any time it 
is preceded by a yes on the previous trial, a conclusion reflected in the analyses 
conducted on choosing behavior.  
 We also conducted analyses to determine whether the relationship of previous 
response reported above changed over the course of the testing session. Contrary to 
predictions, the effect of previous response did not vary as a function of test section. 
Although accuracy displayed fatigue effects across the sections (higher accuracy in 
the first half of each testing block compared to the second half), the strength of 
sequential dependencies remained constant throughout. Essentially, sequential 
dependencies did not change across the length of testing. 
 Lastly, we tested whether these overall effects of sequential dependencies 
would translate to predictable behavioral outcomes on specific trials. We found little 
support for the idea that choosing on a previous trial predicted choosing on the current 
trial. Rather, while sequential dependencies did arise in overall choosing behavior 
across the total 288 trials, and even the 72 trials comprising each half of the testing 
blocks, these effects did not reliably arise as predictable choosing behavior on 
individual trials.  
General Discussion 
 This line of research aimed to answer the question: in making a series of ostensibly 
independent showup identification decisions for different perpetrators, is the current 
decision of an eyewitness related to the previous one(s)? In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
addressed this question within the eyewitness identification paradigm. Participants 
watched a mock-crime video with three perpetrators and were subsequently asked to 
make three showup identification decisions, one suspect for each of the perpetrators. 
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Although we found some evidence for sequential dependencies in both experiments, 
the effect overall was not consistent. These unexpected results led us to question 
whether methodological differences between the recognition and eyewitness paradigm 
could explain the inconsistencies. In particular, we considered whether sequential 
dependencies would arise for recognition specifically for faces, and whether the 
number of trials tested influenced the ability to identify these dependencies. Thus, 
Experiment 3 replicated and extended Malmberg and Annis’ (2012) research for 
sequential dependencies in recognition decisions to test whether (1) sequential 
dependencies would also arise for face recognition, (2) these effects could predict 
choosing behavior on individual trials, and (3) the strength of the above effects varied 
across the testing session. This approach allowed us to conduct both within-subjects 
testing to replicate previously reported effects in recognition memory, and the 
between-subjects modeling applied in Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3 showed that 
sequential dependencies do arise overall for face recognition decisions, that the 
strength of these effects remains consistent across the testing session, but that these 
effects do not reliably predict choosing behavior for individual trials. These results 
and their implications for theory and practice are discussed in turn. 
Sequential dependencies arise for face recognition decisions 
In Experiment 3, we successfully replicated previous research, demonstrating 
that when participants make a series of yes/no recognition decisions, their responses 
are affected by the previous trial. A hit on the current trial was more likely given a hit 
or false-alarm (vs. miss or correct rejection) on the previous trial, and a false-alarm on 
the current trial was more likely given either a hit or false-alarm (vs. miss or correct 
rejection) on the previous trial. To confirm this, analyses on choosing behavior 
established that choosing begets choosing: if participants said yes (vs. no) on the 
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previous trial, the probability of saying yes on the current trial is increased. Notably, 
these effects were found for three types of stimuli, including images of faces. Indeed, 
in our analyses with hit rate and false-alarm rate contingencies, while the overall 
contingency rates varied depending upon the stimulus type, the relationship between 
previous and current response did not. Thus, this experiment adds to a growing list of 
decisions in which sequential dependencies arise, including detection of sound (Jones, 
et al., 2006), ratings of sweetness in wine taste-tests (Schifferstein & Frijters, 1992), 
and judgements of frequency in landscape recognition (Annis & Malmberg, 2013).  
Experiment 3 suggests that we can rule out the possibility that the inconsistent 
effects within Experiment 1 and 2’s eyewitness identification paradigm reflect the use 
of face stimuli rather than the words or landscapes used in previous research. By 
extension, this means that sequential dependencies could conceivably arise for 
someone making a series of yes/no decisions in person recognition settings, such as 
security personnel looking for banned football fans in a stadium or scanning the 
crowd for known-threats at political events. Indeed, this may be a useful setting in 
which to study sequential dependencies in applied recognition memory, and to 
consider in training security agents.  
Effects are consistent across testing 
Next, we tested whether the strength of sequential dependencies varied across 
the length of the testing session. Accumulator models used to explain sequential 
dependencies predict shifts over time based on variation in criterion placement or 
accumulation starting points (e.g., SAMBA; Brown et al., 2008; Matthews & Stewart, 
2009). We hypothesized that effects would be stronger in the second half of each 
testing session compared to the first half of each session. Indeed, Schifferstein and 
Kuiper (1997), go so far as to remove the first 20 “outlier” responses of their 
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experiment tasting aqueous solutions because high response variability is greatest in 
these initial trials. Contrary to expectations, the strength of sequential dependencies 
remained constant across the length of the testing session.  
In sum, our results established that sequential dependencies arise consistently 
within participants separately from individual differences in criteria. We could 
therefore be certain that our results replicated previous experiments on sequential 
dependencies as we transitioned to apply the regression models used in Experiments 1 
and 2.  
Sequential dependencies are not reflected as predictable choosing behavior 
We next tested whether these dependencies would also predict behavioral 
outcomes on the first three and middle three trials of each testing block. The first three 
trials of the first block are of greatest interest because they best represent the three 
showup identification trials in Experiments 1 and 2. Consistent with Experiments 1 
and 2, and despite detecting sequential dependencies in overall data, we were not able 
to detect sequential dependencies in individual trials. Given that the strength of 
sequential dependencies detected by within-subjects analyses did not vary across the 
testing session, it was not subsequently surprising to find that detecting sequential 
dependencies on individual trials did not differ. Critically, these results appear to be 
good news for the eyewitness context. We were originally concerned that multiple 
identification decisions may give rise to sequential dependencies, and thus affect the 
integrity of the identification decisions being made. However, this is not the case. If 
we cannot predict current recognition decisions from previous ones, then there is less 
reason to believe that dependencies are likely to be problematic for the multiple high-
stakes recognition decisions in the eyewitness identification context.  
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This is not to say that a series of identification decisions cannot possibly be 
related to each other. Indeed, sequential dependencies are only one way in which the 
assumption of independence may be violated between multiple decisions. Research 
demonstrates that confidence leaks across tasks, so that confidence in one’s 
performance of a previous task is carried forward into a different task, even if it is not 
cognitively related to the previous task (Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, D’Esposito, & 
Lau, 2015). Confidence ratings were outside the scope of the current research, but 
given the well-documented concerns of post-identification feedback effect (Bradfield 
& Wells, 1989), it is important to investigate how confidence ratings might carry 
forward in multiple identification decisions. In other words, though we have ruled out 
one possibility on the relationship between multiple identification decisions, there is 
more to be investigated. 
Conclusion 
Neither the use of faces nor differences in the number of trials could explain 
the contradictory results in Experiments 1 and 2 that we sought to resolve. However, 
the inability to use previous choosing behavior as a predictor for current choosing in 
Experiment 3, a data set that we know contains sequential dependencies, still serves to 
clarify our previous contradictions. We suspect that the discrepancy between 
detecting sequential dependencies in overall responses using within-subjects analyses 
and not on individual responses with regression models is an indication of weak 
effects. The within-subjects ANOVAs provide the statistical power to detect small 
effects, while the regression models do not. In this case, probabilities of choosing on 
current trials are heightened by previous choosing over hundreds of opportunities to 
choose or not to choose, but these effects do not translate to detectable behavioral 
outcomes of choosing on individual trials. In each of three experiments, it was 
54 
 
sometimes possible to predict current choosing from previous choosing, but not 
reliably so, and often not in the expected direction.  
In summary, sequential dependencies arise in face recognition, and though the 
accuracy across stimuli and section of testing session may vary, the basic relationship 
does not change. However, these effects did not translate to individual trials, and we 
therefore suggest that the integrity of identification and recognition decisions is not 
likely to be impacted by making the multiple decisions in a row. This is the first paper 
to systematically explore sequential dependencies in face recognition and particularly 
in eyewitness identification, contributing to the small, but vital, group of literature 
that aims to disentangle factors underlying the decreased performance in recognition 
for multiple faces. It thus contributes towards the eventual goal to offer procedural 
recommendations adapted to the difficulties present in the administration of 
identification procedures in the context of multiple perpetrator crimes.  
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Chapter 3: Face value: Testing the utility of contextual face cues for face 
recognition 
Abstract 
The presence of multiple faces at encoding increases memorial demand, but may also 
provide a naturally-occurring contextual cue to support recognition for faces at test. 
Across two experiments, we sought to replicate previously-reported enhancing effects 
in cued face recognition, to investigate mechanisms underlying those effects, and to 
determine whether such effects extended to encoding conditions involving more than 
two faces. In Experiment 4, participants studied sets of individual faces, pairs of 
faces, or groups of four faces. At test, participants in the single-face condition were 
tested only on those individual faces without cues. Participants in the two and four-
face conditions were tested using no cues, correct cues (a face previously studied with 
the target test face), or incorrect cues (a never-before-seen face). In Experiment 5, 
participants additionally completed a rating task to promote associative encoding. Hit 
rates were not affected by either cue type or face encoding condition, but cuing of any 
kind (correct or incorrect) appeared to provide a protective buffer to reduce false-
alarm rates in the two- and four-face conditions through increased sensitivity, but 
mostly reduced response bias. Our findings provide some evidence that cued 
recognition techniques could be useful to reduce false recognition, but the 
inconsistency also warrants further exploration to fully understand underlying 
mechanisms. 
Experiments 4 and 5 are presented together in Chapter3 because these experiments are 
being prepared for publication together. 
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Introduction 
The recognition and identification of an unfamiliar face is a difficult task.  This task 
becomes even more challenging as the number of unfamiliar faces to be remembered 
increases. Indeed, accuracy rates for face recognition and identification drop when 
there are multiple faces to study, even when participants are only tested on one of 
those faces (e.g., Clifford & Hollin, 1981). Although divided attention at encoding 
may play a role in this effect (e.g., Bindemann, Jenkins & Burton, 2007), this does not 
entirely account for the multiple-face recognition disadvantage. Accuracy decreases 
even when participants have unlimited time to encode the presented faces (e.g., they 
are instructed to move on to the identification only once they feel confident they will 
remember all of the to-be-encoded faces) and when divided attention is controlled for 
(Bindemann, Sanford, Gillatt, Avetisyan, & Megreya, 2012). The persistence of the 
multiple-face disadvantage
7
 suggests that the drop in accuracy is caused, at least in 
part, by an increase in memorial demand when attempting to hold two faces in 
memory for any period of time (Bindemann et al., 2012).  
Interestingly, the factor that makes multiple-face recognition so challenging 
may actually provide a solution to support memory for multiple faces. The presence 
of multiple faces increases memorial demand, but also provides a naturally-occurring 
contextual cue that may promote recognition. Early experiments demonstrated the 
benefits of cues on face recognition when faces were studied as pairs (e.g., Watkins, 
Ho, & Tulving, 1976); When participants studied pairs of faces, and were later tested 
on only one of those faces, their accuracy in recognizing that target faces was 
improved if it was also presented with the other face of the pair. More recent 
experiments have attempted to investigate the benefits of cuing in the context of 
                                                 
7
 This term is adapted from Bindemann et al.’s (2012) terminology in which they label a two-
face disadvantage due to the fact that they tested one vs. two faces. 
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eyewitness identification for multiple perpetrator crimes with underwhelming results 
(e.g., Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). However, there is a paucity of contemporary research 
systematically examining cued face recognition effects in applied contexts. We sought 
to replicate previously-reported enhancing effects in cued face recognition, to 
investigate the mechanisms underlying those effects, and to determine whether such 
effects could extend to include more than two faces, as many crimes involve more 
than two perpetrators. To this end, we compared the traditional cued encoding 
condition in which participants study paired faces, with two additional encoding 
conditions: a control condition where participants encoded single faces and another 
experimental condition where participants encoded groups of four faces.  
Cued recognition and faces 
Memory researchers have long known that context matters for retrieval. 
Contextual cues are often implemented to help individuals recall seemingly-forgotten 
details in episodic memory (encoding specificity principle; Thomson & Tulving, 
1970), including to facilitate eyewitness recall during investigative interviews 
(context reinstatement; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Hannon, 1986). It has been 
hypothesized that these cues work because the retrieval of a memory is dependent 
upon the way it was stored, and an item in episodic memory is, by nature, nested 
within our experience of the relevant event (Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Polyn, 
Norman, & Kahana, 2009). Thus, episodic memory is not only tied to temporal 
markers (when an event occurred), but can also be integrated with memory traces for 
the context of the event. According to the Context Maintenance Retrieval Model, we 
naturally recall items in semantic clusters (i.e., related words like book, hardcover, 
paperback, bestseller) as a result of our long-standing associations between items in 
our experience, but we also have a tendency to recall items in temporal and source 
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clusters as a result of the associations we form during study phase between items 
(Polyn et al., 2009). A contextual cue at retrieval takes advantage of the associative 
nature of memory whereby, for example, peripheral details of the environment can 
cue additional pathways for the retrieval of critical details. 
Thomson and Tulving (1970) experimentally demonstrated the utility of 
context for memory retrieval when they had participants memorize pairs of words: a 
target word and a word that was semantically unrelated (e.g., ocean and piano). 
During the testing phase, the previously-studied, semantically-unrelated pair word 
(weak cue) or a semantically-related, but previously-unstudied word (strong cue) was 
presented in order to elicit the target word. If the target word is “ocean”, a strong cue 
might be “land”, while the weak cue might be “piano”. Results showed that 
participants were better able to recall the target word if it was presented along with 
the weak cue (i.e., the cue with which it was originally encoded), compared to the 
strong cue, suggesting that the context of encoding the target word mattered more 
than the strength of the semantic association.  
Contextual cues also benefit recognition memory, including when recognizing 
pictures (Palmer, 1975) and faces (e.g., Watkins et al., 1976). In the field of face 
recognition, a variety of external contexts have been shown to enhance recognition for 
target faces, including backgrounds, descriptions, clothing, and other faces (see 
Davies, 1988 for a review). In the latter category, Winograd and Rivers-Bulkeley 
(1977) asked participants to memorize pairs of faces during the study-phase—one of 
which served as the target-face while the other served as the cue. During the test-
phase, participants were presented with a target face alongside either a face they had 
previously studied (correct cue), a face that had not been previously studied 
(incorrect cue), or no cue at all. In this forced-choice paradigm, recognition 
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performance for target faces was enhanced by the presentation of correct cue faces 
and impaired by incorrect cue faces, while performance with no cues fell in-between. 
Similarly, Watkins and colleagues (1976) demonstrated reduced hit rates for face 
recognition when the incorrect cues were previously-studied faces that had been 
paired with another face during study. In other words, simply swapping context, as 
opposed to introducing new context, also affected face recognition performance.  
However, although the above experiments found an enhancing effect of using 
correct cues, other research has not (e.g. Bower & Karlin, 1974) and while Kan, 
Giovanello, Schnyer, Makris, and Verfaellie
 
(2007) found that incorrect cuing 
undermined hit rates, they found no benefit for correct cues (cf. no cues). A number of 
issues relating to encoding and recognition may underpin these discrepant results. 
First, the context must be strongly encoded in association with the target for 
recognition. If the participant did not pay attention to the contextual information, or 
did not link it with the target information, then presenting the cue at test will not 
improve recognition (Peris, 1985, as cited in Davies, 1988). Second, it appears that 
context is useful as a recognition memory cue only when other, stronger cues are 
lacking (Davies, 1988). Some theories of recognition hold that recognition is 
comprised of two mechanisms (e.g., Mandler, 1980; Peris & Tiberghien, 1984). The 
first is the perceptual system that is automatically activated and produces fast answers 
that hinge on the feeling of familiarity. The second is the cognitive system, which is 
activated when the first does not immediately provide an answer. The second system 
is slower and searches for external information, like context, to aid the response. This 
process is also captured in the rationale of the outshining hypothesis, which contends 
that we use the most relevant cues available to recognize faces. When our memory 
trace is strong, that memory outshines the utility of environmental context (Smith & 
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Vela, 2001). However, for weak memory traces, such as when there was suboptimal 
encoding or longer retention intervals, context may support memory to improve 
recognition performance (Mandler, Pearlstone, & Koopmans, 1969). 
Cued recognition presents an interesting means of enhancing face recognition, 
a concept that may prove useful to the applied fields of eyewitness identification or 
wanted-persons recognition. The second face in a two-perpetrator crime provides a 
naturally-occurring contextual cue for the eyewitness, and one that is particularly 
relevant for humans. Given our natural tendency to orient attention towards other 
human faces, a second face may increase the chance of incidental associative 
encoding (Di Giorgio, Turati, Altoè, & Simion, 2012; Langton, Law, Burton, & 
Schweinberger, 2008). Thus, face cues may support eyewitnesses of a multiple 
perpetrator crime while viewing a suspect lineup. This is not an entirely novel idea; 
At least two published experiments (Hobson & Wilcock, 2011; Wells & Pozzulo, 
2006) and one unpublished dissertation (Dempsey, 2012) have attempted to apply 
face cuing to support eyewitness memory and adapt identification procedures in the 
context of multiple-perpetrator crimes. However, none of these attempts provided 
convincing evidence that this method of cuing memory could aid lineup identification 
decisions, and it is of interest to understand why this might be. The current research 
aims to understand the disconnect between a theoretically intriguing mnemonic device 
and the poorly-understood difficulties in applying such a device; particularly by 
replicating previous work, extending it to explore boundary conditions, and orienting 
the effects. These goals are explored further below. 
Previous experiments showing inconsistent effects of face cues also expose 
concerns for the replicability of a cued face recognition effect. Relevant experiments 
were mostly conducted in the 1970’s, and it is only decades later that we are now 
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interested in applying this research to an entirely new context in which the studies 
were not designed to apply (i.e., eyewitness identification). This means that the 
original studies may have made decisions that were incongruent with the eyewitness 
context, or not in line with our contemporary methodological standards. For one, the 
relevant research report methodologies with confounding variables that would now be 
controlled for, which raises issues for replicability. For example, Winograd and 
Rivers-Bulkeley (1977) specifically paired male-female pairs according to overt 
compatibility, with particular care to maintain similar ages between them. Further, 
participants rated perceived compatibility of the couples, further enhancing the 
romantic link between the pairs. It is possible that this likeness between the pairings 
provided contextual information for correct and incorrect cuing. A participant, for 
example, might correctly recognize a target face of a genial, 20-year-old white male 
paired with a genial, 20-year-old white female because the pairing enhances 
recognition. It might also be because the nature of the pairing gives the participant a 
hint as to the correct answer given prior knowledge that the two faces presented are an 
intuitively compatible couple. By extension, a participant might be worse at 
recognizing that same male when paired with an older, more-serious looking female 
because the participant knows they are not a compatible couple. Likewise, previous 
experiments using face pairs did not randomize the left-right orientation of those pairs 
such that if the target face was on the right side of the screen during the encoding 
phase, it was also presented on the right side during test (Watkins Ho & Tulving, 
1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977).  It may be that the boost in hit rates is 
sensitive to this spatial context as well as contextual cuing. The recent movement in 
psychological sciences to replicate previous effects stems in part from a realization 
that the field now has updated knowledge on methodological issues like sample sizes, 
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randomization, and experimenter influence that change the way we conduct 
experiments (i.e., Simons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Given the intriguing 
theoretical rational for the effects, but inconsistent results obtained, the current 
research aimed to replicate the cued recognition effect.  
Furthermore, we sought to place the cued face recognition effects in context 
by comparing them to traditional recognition memory, whereby single faces are 
encoded and single faces are tested; for simplicity, we refer to this as “orienting” the 
effects of cuing because we aim to understand how memory tested in cued recognition 
paradigm compares to memory tested in the traditional, non-cued recognition 
paradigm. In the cued face recognition paradigm (where test faces are presented with 
the same cue face as at encoding, a different cue face, or no cue face), the correct cues 
may be considered equivalent to the weak cues of Thomson and Tulving (1970), 
meaning that they are contextually associated as a result of being presented together at 
encoding. Thus, when researchers have demonstrated an increase in hits for these 
correct face cues (cf. incorrect or no cue faces), it is taken as confirmation that 
reconstructing encoding context enhances face recognition. However, the incorrect 
cues in face recognition cannot be considered a proxy for the strong cues, since 
unfamiliar faces do not have semantic associations. Instead, the incorrect cues test 
whether change of context undermines recognition compared to the consistent context 
of the correct cues, or the absence of any contextual cue. Yet, while the no-cue 
condition is intended to act as a control group, it represents a change of context 
because the absence of context in itself is a deviation from the original. Given that hit 
rates in incorrect and no-cue conditions sometimes, but not always, differ 
significantly, it is unclear whether previously-reported effects reflect a benefit of 
correct cuing, a detriment of incorrect cuing, or both.  
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Existing research also exposes questions regarding the potential boundary 
conditions for such an effect. For example, do any beneficial context effects vary 
according to the number of additional faces to be encoded? Research on cued face 
recognition to date has held encoding conditions constant while manipulating the 
conditions at retrieval (e.g., Watkins et al., 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 
1977). However, pairing two faces at encoding represents the minimum number of 
faces individuals might encode when attempting to implement cued face recognition. 
Limiting our consideration to pairs of faces fails to reflect the variability in group 
sizes that individuals encounter every day, and it is unclear if the benefits identified in 
previous work extend to conditions in which participants need to encode more stimuli. 
In other words, if these effects replicate, can they also be useful in situations with 
more than just two faces? Although encoding additional faces may provide contextual 
cues to aid subsequent recognition, cognitive load is likely to increase with each 
additional face requiring encoding. As this load increases, the resources needed to 
successfully encode the target face and to develop the associations required to support 
subsequent cued-recognition may be reduced.  
These applied and theoretical considerations converge into three questions for 
the current research: (1) do previously-reported effects of contextual cuing replicate 
with contemporary methodology? (2) if so, do these effects reflect a benefit of correct 
cuing, a detriment of incorrect cuing, or both? and (3) how do cuing effects vary as a 
function of the number of cues to be encoded? 
Experiment 4 was a first attempt to establish to what extent correct cuing is 
beneficial or compensating for increased cognitive demand, and also whether this 
effect endures when cognitive load is increased by viewing multiple (i.e., more than 
two) faces at once. We expected to replicate previous effects of cued face recognition 
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in the two-face condition, and that those effects would extend to the four-face 
condition, though to a lesser extent.  
The current research 
Replication and orientation of previous effects. In Experiment 4, we sought 
to replicate previously-reported effects of cued face recognition with pairs of faces 
while isolating the effects of cued recognition from other influences such as the 
context effects of placement, or intuitive responses based on overt compatibility of 
couples (see Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977). Therefore, the current research 
randomized orientation, meaning that faces encoded on the right side of the screen 
were not necessarily later tested on the right side of the screen. We also randomly 
paired or grouped photographs of male faces selected from a large database (cf. 
Watkins et al., 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 1977).  
Next, we sought to orient the effects of cued recognition, and therefore to 
understand how memory tested in cued recognition paradigm compares to memory 
tested in the traditional, non-cued recognition paradigm. In particular, we aim to 
explore whether previously-reported effects reflect a benefit of correct cuing, a 
detriment of incorrect cuing, or both. To accommodate this, the current research 
included a new control condition in which participants study faces presented 
individually at encoding and tested without cues, rather than in groups of two or four 
(see Figure 3.1 for example stimuli and Figure 3.2 for graphic representation of 
encoding-test phases). This control condition allowed us to examine the impact of 
number of faces at encoding. It may be that recognition rates without cues are 
equivalent across single-face and multiple-face encoding conditions. Thus, any 
benefit of correct cuing, for example, would be an enhancement over general face 
recognition. By contrast, if the no-cue condition varies between the single-face and 
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multiple-face conditions, then any benefit of correct cuing would be compensation for 
increased difficulties. 
Extension of cued recognition. We also tested a potential boundary condition 
for this cuing effect. We would expect more faces at encoding to increase cognitive 
load and potentially interfere with effective encoding. Thus, the current research 
investigated whether the effects of cued face recognition could be extended to 
encoding groups of more than two faces. For example, if four faces are studied 
together, can one of those faces effectively serve as a cue for another?  
There are several reasons why cuing with four-face stimuli may not be as 
effective as with two-face stimuli. First, there is the potential for generalized deficits 
in memory with the increased cognitive load associated with having more faces (e.g., 
four vs. two) to encode. Cuing in this case may be helpful, but with a general trend for 
four-face condition to have decreased accuracy. Or cuing could be less effective 
because there is diminished memory to support. Second, when faces are always 
presented at study as pairs, a correct cue also represents a complete cue. However, if 
four faces are presented during encoding and only one face is used to cue the 
recognition of the target face, this may represent a partial cue. Therefore, providing 
only one of the set of the associated cues at test may show a weaker effect. Third, 
there is the potential that associations between multiple (i.e., more than two) faces 
may not be encoded equally, and therefore may not be equally effective at retrieval. 
While two faces viewed side-by-side provide only one association that can be formed 
at encoding, four faces provide multiple associations that can be formed with varying 
strengths. Thus, the face chosen by experimenters to be a contextual cue may not be 
the one that was most strongly associated with the target at encoding. By contrast, it 
may be that each face is one of several possible cues, meaning that any of the faces 
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would be sufficient to enhance recognition.  To be clear, we do not test for the 
differences between these three concerns, though we raise them as three ways in 
which cued face recognition may not extend effectively when simultaneously 
encoding more than two faces.  
In comparing effects across conditions with only single faces and groups of 
four faces, there were two major methodological concerns. First, we considered how 
increasing the number of faces on a given trial would impact the allocation of 
attention at encoding. Bindemann and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that given 
multiple stimuli, participants generally allocate their attention evenly between the 
stimuli. Participants did not know which of the two faces would be tested afterwards, 
but it is unsurprising that identification performance was positively correlated with 
the amount of time spent studying the appropriate target face. Thus, the amount of 
attention devoted to any individual stimuli would be reduced if encoding duration 
remains constant but the number of to-be-encoded stimuli increases. We attenuated 
this concern by providing comparative encoding durations per face, rather than per 
trial. Participants in all conditions were allotted 2 s per face, even if those faces are 
presented in pairs or as a group. Thus, the exposure duration for single-face, two-face 
and four-face trials were 2, 4, and 8 s, respectively. 
Second, in order to compare the single-, two- and four-face conditions, we 
needed participants to complete the same number of test trials. However, this presents 
a problem at encoding. A participant that studies 36 trials of individual faces in the 
encoding phase will generally be tested on 72 trials of individual faces (half old, half 
new faces) in the test phase. Participants in the paired-face and four-face conditions 
should therefore also confront 72 test trials that vary old and new faces. However, to 
test for cued face recognition, the 72 target faces at test require extra faces at encoding 
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to be used as cues. The natural solution to this is to hold constant the number of 
encoding trials so that all conditions study 36 trials at encoding. Yet 36 trials in a 
paired-face condition and a four-face condition consequently mean that a participant 
studies 72 faces and 144 faces at encoding, presenting extreme differences in memory 
load. In short, if we hold constant the number of test trials, we cannot also control for 
both the number of encoding trials and the total number of faces studied. Our solution 
was to create testing blocks so that participants only every studied 36 faces in each 
block: 36 individual faces, 18 paired faces, and 9 groups of four faces. They were then 
tested on 72, 36, and 18 old and new faces, respectively. The two- and four-face 
conditions repeated this study-test cycle until they had also completed 72 test trials, 
meaning the two-face condition had two study-test blocks and the four-face condition 
had four study-test blocks. Breaks in between the blocks were included in order to 
compensate for the memory load induced by viewing more faces. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was a first attempt to establish to what extent correct cuing is beneficial 
or compensating for increased cognitive demand, and also whether this effect endures 
when cognitive load is increased by viewing multiple (i.e., more than two) faces at 
once.  
Method 
Participants. Of 81 university student participants, three failed to follow 
instructions and were excluded from data analysis. The remaining 78 participants (60 
women, 18 men) were between the ages of 18 and 29 (M = 21.99, SD = 2.05). 
Participants were compensated with either participation credit or a 5€ voucher. 
Design. We used a 3(encoding group size: single face, two faces, four faces) x 
3(cue type: no cue, correct cue, incorrect cue) x 2(test face status: old, new) mixed 
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design, with encoding group size as the between-subjects factor. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three between-subjects conditions. Cue type (no cue, 
correct cue, and incorrect cue) were randomly ordered and target faces were 
determined at random. Two versions of the experiment were created in which the 
order of trials for all conditions was changed, and in the two- and four-face 
conditions, different target faces and cue faces were selected.  
Materials. 
Face stimuli. For the experiment, 204 photographs of male faces were used 
from a database of faces at Flinders University (Adelaide, Australia), the 
Psychological Image Collection at Stirling (pics.stir.ac.uk), and the AR Face Database 
(Martinez & Benavente, 1998). Of those, 36 faces were used as target faces and the 
remaining 168 faces were used as face cues, filler faces during encoding, or filler 
faces during test. Faces with features that were highly distinctive (e.g., piercings, 
unique haircuts, facial hair) were removed. All photographs were in full color with a 
resolution of 300 x 300 pixels. They were presented on a computer screen with a 
resolution of 1366 x 768 pixels using Microsoft PowerPoint 2010. In the single-face 
condition, faces were placed in the center of the screen. In the two-face condition, two 
faces were places side by side. In the four-face condition, the faces were presented in 
a 2 x 2 matrix. To create the multiple faces conditions, the faces were randomly 
grouped into pairs (two-face condition) or groups of four faces (four-face condition). 
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Figure 3.1. Example encoding stimuli using images from AR Face database. 
Procedure. At encoding, participants were asked to memorize a number of 
faces. Between the encoding and testing phases, participants performed a short 
arithmetic task for 30 s. At test, participants were instructed to judge a test face, which 
was indicated to the participant by a green square around the face, as either being old  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Experiments 4 and 5: Procedure for encoding and testing. 
Participants studied single faces, pairs of faces, or groups of four faces 
during the encoding phase. Participants in the single-face condition were 
only tested on individual faces (i.e., no-cue trials). Participants in the two-
face and four-face condition were tested on trials with no cue and trials 
with either a correct cue or incorrect cue.  Here, we demonstrate in 
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conditions when, during the test phase, both the target face is present and 
the cue face is correct. However, participants were also tested on target 
faces that were absent and with cues that were incorrect. Color coding is 
used to demonstrate how cues and targets were chosen, but pariticpants did 
not know which faces during the encoding phase would be used as targets 
or cues. During the test phase, a box indicated the target face participants 
should report whether or not they recognized. Targets and cues were 
chosen at random from the left or right position of the encoding phase, but 
were always presented on the right and left, respectively, during the test 
phase. 
(seen at encoding) or new (not seen before). If the participant indicated an ‘old’ 
response, they were also asked to indicate their confidence on a scale from 1 (not at 
all confident) to 7 (very confident)
8
. In each condition, only one of the faces presented 
during the encoding phase was used as a target face at test. Participants in the single-
face condition completed one study-test block, consisting of 36 single face stimuli 
during the encoding phase, and 72 single face trials at test (including the 36 study 
faces as targets and 36 previously unseen faces; these are referred to as old and new 
faces, respectively). Since the two-face and four-face conditions contained more faces 
per encoding trial, multiple blocks with fewer encoding trials were used to guarantee 
that all participants were exposed to the same number of faces during each encoding 
phase for each condition. Thus, participants in the single-face conditions viewed 36 
encoding trials of single faces; the two-face condition viewed 18 encoding trials of 
face pairs; the four-face condition viewed 9 encoding trials of groups of four faces.  
Single-face condition. During the encoding phase, participants viewed 36 
individual photos of faces. Each face (all target faces) was shown for a duration of 2 s, 
followed by an inter stimulus interval (ISI) of 500 ms before the next face appeared. 
During the testing phase, participants completed 72 single face trials. Presence of the 
test face was manipulated so that half of the trials were old, and half were new.  
Two-face condition. During the encoding phase, participants viewed 18 pairs 
of faces. Each pair (consisting of one target face and one cue face) was shown for 4 s 
                                                 
8
 Note that due to error in collection, confidence data were only recorded for choosers. 
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(allowing 2 s per face) with an ISI of 500 ms. No information was provided to 
participants on which face of the two faces they would be tested, but participants were 
told to focus on both faces equally during encoding. During the testing phase, 
participants completed 36 trials. Of these trials, 12 trials were presented with no cue, 
12 trials were presented with a correct cue (a face seen during the encoding phase), 
and 12 trials were presented with an incorrect cue (a never-before seen face). Presence 
of the target face was manipulated so that half of the trials were old, and half were 
new. The target face was randomly selected from the pairs of faces, so it could be 
either a face that was studied on the left or the right side of the screen. At test, the face 
was always shown on the right side of the screen during test and always demarcated 
by a green square. This process was repeated to create two study-test blocks. 
Four-face condition. This condition involved four blocks of trials. During the 
encoding phase, the participants viewed nine groups of four faces. Each stimulus 
group (consisting of one target face and three cue faces) was shown for 8 s (allowing 
2 s per face) with an ISI of 500 ms. Again, we did not tell participants which face 
would be the test face, but told participants to focus on all faces equally during 
encoding. During the testing phase, participants completed 18 trials. Of these trials, 
six trials were presented with no cue, six trials were presented with a correct cue, and 
six trials were presented with an incorrect cue. Presence of the target face was 
manipulated so that half of the trials were old, and half were new. The target face was 
randomly selected from the groups of faces, so it could be either a face that was 
studied on the top or bottom left or the top or bottom right side of the matrix of four 
faces. However, the face was always shown on the right side of the screen during test 
and always demarcated by a green square. This process was completed four times. 
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Results 
Data were screened for outliers and normality prior to analysis. Shapiro-Wilk 
tests were used to assess normality for each of the conditions. When normality was 
violated, both nonparametric (Kruskal Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U) and standard 
inferential tests (one-way Analyses of Variance [ANOVAs] and t-test) were 
conducted on hit rates and false-alarm rates. Results did not differ as a result of test, 
therefore ANOVAs and t-tests are reported throughout. Where relevant, we conducted 
Bayesian analyses to determine whether the data provided evidence of equivalence 
using JASP (2017) software. We use Jarosz and Wiley’s (2014) interpretations of 
Bayes Factors as evidence for the alternative hypothesis, in which they report 
descriptive thresholds provided by Jeffreys (1961) and Raftery (1995) work in Bayes 
models. Approximate cut-offs are as follows: 1-3 constitutes anecdotal/weak 
evidence, 3-10 is positive/substantial evidence; 10-20 is strong/very strong evidence; 
20+ is very strong/decisive. Descriptive statistics of hit and false-alarm rates as a 
function of cue type are reported in Table 3.1 and descriptive statistics of sensitivity 
and response bias can be found in Table 3.2. Inferential statistics are not reported in 
the text, but are available in Tables 3.3-3.5, and Figure 3.3.  
Hit rates were defined as the probability of a correct response given that the 
stimulus (S) is present (i.e., the trial shows an old face; H = P(“old”) | Spresent). The hit 
rate was calculated here by dividing the number of correct “old” responses (hit) on 
present trials by the total number of present trials. The false-alarm rate was the 
probability of an incorrect response given that the stimulus (S) is absent (i.e., the trial 
shows a new face; FA = P(“old”) | Sabsent). The FA rate was calculated here by 
dividing the number of incorrect “old” responses on absent trials by the total number 
of absent trials.  
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In order to examine the no-cue condition, we tested hit rates and false-alarm 
rates across all face conditions (single-, two-, four-face). Because the single-face 
condition does not have correct- and incorrect-cues, only the two- and four-face 
groups were considered when comparing these cue-types.  
Orienting the effect of cuing. First we tested whether previously-reported 
effects reflect a benefit of correct cuing, a detriment of incorrect cuing, or both. To 
address this, we tested the effect of group size in the no-cue conditions on hit and 
false-alarm rates, using one-way ANOVAs. This allows us to understand the initial 
differences in how number of faces at encoding impacts recognition performance. 
For hit rates, there were no differences between groups, meaning that there 
was no evidence of any difference between the single-, two-, or four-face encoding 
conditions when no cue was presented during test (see Table 3.3 for ANOVA results). 
For false-alarm rates, there were no significant differences between groups, meaning 
there was no evidence of any difference for false-alarm rates between the face  
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Table 3.1 
Experiments 4 and 5: Mean Hit Rates and False-Alarm Rates (95% CI) by Cue Type and Face Encoding Condition  
 Hit rates by cue type   False-alarm rates by cue type 
 Correct Incorrect None Overall  Correct Incorrect None Overall 
No. faces encoded          
Experiment 4          
Single-face - - .70 (.65-.74) .70 (65-.74)  - - .19 (.15-.23) .19 (.15-.23) 
Two-face .71 (.64-.78) .72 (.64-.80)  .71 (.64-.78) .71 (.66-.77)  .25 (.19-.30) .23 (.16-.30) .25 (.19-.32) .24 (.19-.30) 
Four-face .72 (.67-.78) .74 (.68-.80) .76 (.71-.81) .74 (.70-.78)  .14 (.10-.19) .18 (.12-.23) .26 (.21-.31) .19 (.15-.24) 
Experiment 5          
Single-face - - .77 (.72-.82) .77 (.72-.81)  - - .15 (.11-.18) .15 (.11-.18) 
Two-face .72 (.66-.78) .70 (.66-.74) .71 (.66-.76) .71 (.68-.74)  .19 (.14-.24) .14 (.10-.18) .23 (.16-.30) .19 (.15-.23) 
Four-face .72 (.66-.79) .73 (.64-.81) .74 (.68-.80) .73 (.67-.79)  .15 (.09-.20) .21 (.16-.25) .25 (.20-.31) .20 (.17-.24) 
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Table 3.2 
Experiments 4 and 5: Mean Sensitivity and Response Bias Rates (95% CI) by Cue Type and Face Encoding Condition  
 
 Sensitivity by cue type (d’)  Response bias by cue type (c) 
 Correct Incorrect None Overall  Correct Incorrect None Overall 
No. faces encoded          
Experiment 4          
Single-face - - 1.47 (1.31-1.63) 1.47 (1.31-1.63)  - - 0.19 (0.07-0.30) 0.19 (0.07-0.30) 
Two-face 1.24 (0.98-1.49) 1.29 (1.00-1.58) 1.22 (0.90-1.55) 1.40 (1.20-1.60)  0.07 (-0.08-0.23) 0.06 (-0.16-0.28) -0.02 (-0.10-0.07) 0.07 (-0.09-0.23) 
Four-face 1.68 (1.36-2.00) 1.56 (1.30-1.82) 1.36 (1.11-1.61) 1.60 (1.37-1.83)  0.19 (0.08-0.29) 0.13 (-0.04-0.29) -0.02 (-0.10-0.07) 0.10 (-0.01-0.21) 
Experiment 5          
Single-face - - 1.94 (1.67-2.20) 1.94 (1.67-2.20)  - - 0.17 (0.03-0.31) 0.17 (0.03-0.31) 
Two-face 1.50 (1.26-1.74) 1.57 (1.39-1.76) 1.10 (0.85-1.35) 1.54 (1.36-1.71)  0.11 (-0.04-0.25) 0.24 (0.13-0.34) 0.03 (-0.13-0.19) 0.20 (0.09-0.30) 
Four-face 1.61 (1.36-1.86) 1.44 (1.16-1.72) 1.26 (1.05-1.47) 1.54 (1.35-1.73)  0.23 (0.06-0.40) 0.09 (-0.05-0.23) -0.02 (-0.17-0.13) 0.14 (0.00-0.27) 
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encoding conditions when no cue was presented during test (see Table 3.3 for 
ANOVA results). 
While Bayesian analyses did not provide evidence to support the alternative 
hypothesis (i.e., there are differences between face encoding conditions on hits or 
false-alarms), neither did they provide compelling evidence to support the null (i.e., 
there are no differences between face encoding conditions on hits or false-alarms). 
Indeed, Bayes Factors for the null hypothesis for both hit rate and false-alarm do not 
exceed 2.45, which is considered anecdotal or weak evidence at best (Jarosz & Wiley, 
2014). Therefore, the results of the no-cue condition remain unclear and cannot 
support statements about orienting the effects of cuing. See Table 3.4 for inferential 
statistics of Bayesian analyses. 
Replicating and extending effects of cued face recognition. Next, we asked 
whether we could replicate previous effects of cued face recognition, and whether 
these effects vary as a function of the number of faces to be encoded. Therefore, we 
conducted 2 (encoding condition: two-face, four-face) x 3 (cue type: no, correct, 
incorrect) mixed ANOVAs on hit rates and false-alarm rates with cue type as the 
within-subjects variable. As per previous experiments, we expected that correct cues 
would enhance hit rates compared to no cues and incorrect cues. Although we also 
expected to see false-alarm rates rise with correct cues (cf. no cues or incorrect cues), 
we did not expect these to eliminate the enhancing effects of correct cuing for 
recognition.  
Hit rates. First, we compared hit rates between the two- and four-face 
conditions given both correct and incorrect contextual cues (see Table 3.3). There 
were no significant main effects of cue type and face encoding condition on hit rates; 
the interaction was also non-significant. Thus, we found no evidence that the number 
of faces at encoding nor the type of cue presented at test affected participant hit rates. 
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Bayes analyses (see Table 3.4) provide strong support for the null hypothesis, with the 
model including both main effects and the interaction have a Bayes factor of 233.55. 
This gives us confidence to suggest that hit rates do not change in our experiment 
regardless of encoding or testing conditions. Thus, encoding conditions that control 
for divided attention and testing conditions that attempt to cue participants do not 
impact true recognition of previously-studied old faces.  
False-alarm rates. Next, we compared false-alarm rates between the two- and 
four-face conditions given both correct and incorrect contextual cues (see Table 3.3). 
There was a significant main effect of cue that was modified by a significant 
interaction between face encoding condition and cue. We conducted simple main 
effects analyses to examine this interaction. Comparing face encoding conditions, 
participants in the two-face condition had significantly more false-alarms when a 
correct cue was shown compared to participants in four-face condition. There were no 
other differences between the two- and four-face conditions with varying cues. 
However, these effects should be interpreted cautiously. While we report the results of 
the interaction because of the significant p-value, Bayesian analyses provide weaker 
support for the interaction (BF10 
9
= 2.81; see Table 3.4).  
Sensitivity and response bias. We computed signal detection statistics to test 
for effects on sensitivity and response bias (d’ and c, respectively). In the current 
research, sensitivity is the capacity to discriminate between old and new faces, while 
response bias is the tendency to respond old or new regardless of whether the face is 
actually old   
                                                 
9
 For ease of interpretation, BF10 is used to designate the Bayes factor as evidence in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis and BF01 is used to designate the Bayes factor as evidence in favor 
of the null hypothesis.  
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Table 3.3 
Experiments 4 and 5: Results for ANOVAs and t-tests Comparing Hit Rates and False-Alarm Rates 
Across Cue Types and Face Encoding Condition  
 df F η2 t d p 
Experiment 4       
Orienting the effect of cuing       
One-way ANOVAs (No. faces; 1, 2, 4)       
HR 2, 75 1.69 .043   .191 
FAR 2, 75 1.81 .046   .171 
Replicate and extend cuing effects       
Mixed ANOVAs 2 (No. faces: 2v4)  x 3 (cue type)       
HR       
Cue 2, 100 0.27 .005   .762 
No. Faces (2v4) 1, 50 0.61 .012   .439 
Interaction 2, 100 0.41 .008   .666 
FAR       
Cue 2, 100 4.74 .087   .011 
No. Faces (2v4) 1, 50 2.26 .043   .139 
Interaction 2, 100 3.23 .061   .044 
Follow-up FAR interaction: simple main effects       
Independent sample t-tests  (No. faces: 2v4)       
No Cue 50   0.15 .04 .881 
Correct 50   2.80 .78 .007 
Incorrect 50   1.21 .33 .234 
Experiment 5       
Orienting the effect of cuing       
One-way ANOVAs (No. faces; 1, 2, 4)       
HR 2, 74 1.10 .029   .337 
FAR 2, 74 3.95 .096   .023 
Follow-up analysis for  main effect of cue (FAR)       
Tukey post hoc       
1v2      .024 
1v4      .105 
2v4      .799 
Replicate and extend cuing effects       
Mixed ANOVAs 2 (No. faces: 2v4)  x 3 (cue type)       
HR       
Cue 2, 98 0.10 .002   .904 
No. Faces (2v4) 1, 49 0.35 .007   .556 
Interaction 2, 98 0.18 .004   .833 
FAR       
Cue 1.78, 87.12 5.89 .107   .005 
No. Faces (2v4) 1, 49 .316 .006   .577 
Interaction 1.78, 87.12 2.96 .057   .063 
Follow-up analysis for main effect of cue (FAR)       
Planned contrasts adjusted for Bonferroni       
No v. correct      .034 
No v. incorrect      .009 
Correct v. incorrect      1.00 
Note. T-tests are two-tailed. Experiment 4: Participants in the two-face condition had 
significantly more false-alarms when a correct cue was presented in comparison to the four-
face condition. Experiment 5: For the no-cue condition. Participants in the single-face group 
had fewer false-alarms compared to participants in the four-face group. Across the two- and 
four-face conditions, the no-cue trials produced the highest false-alarms compared to the 
correct-cue trials and the incorrect cue trials .  
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Table 3.4 
Experiments 4 and 5: Results for Bayesian ANOVAs Comparing Hit Rates (HR) and False-Alarm 
Rates (FAR) Across Cue Types and Face Encoding Condition  
Models P(M)  P(M|data)  BF M BF 10 (BF01)  % error  
Experiment 4           
Orient the effects of cuing            
One-way ANOVAs (No. faces; 1, 2, 4)           
HR           
Null model   0.50   0.71  2.45   1.000     
No. Faces  0.50   0.29  0.41   0.41 (2.45)    0.01   
FAR           
Null model   0.50   0.69  2.24   1.000     
No. Faces (1, 2, 4)  0.50   0.31  0.45   0.45 (2.24)   0.01   
Replicate and extend effects of cuing           
Mixed ANOVAs 2 (No. faces: 2v4)  x 3 (cue type)           
HR           
Null model  
 
0.20  
 
0.68  8.51  
 
1.00  
   
Cue  
 
0.20  
 
0.06  0.23  
 
0.08 (12.36)  
 
0.80  
 
No. Faces (2v4)  
 
0.20  
 
0.24  1.27  
 
0.35 (2.82)  
 
1.27 
 
Cue + 2v4  
 
0.20  
 
0.02  0.08  
 
0.03 (32.99)  
 
2.91  
 
Cue + 2v4 + Cue✻2v4  
 
0.20  
 
< 0.01  0.01  
 
.004 (233.55)  
 
1.72  
 
FAR           
Null model   0.20   0.11  0.48   1.00     
Cue   0.20   0.30  1.72   2. 83 (0.35)   0.80   
No. Faces (2v4)  0.20   0.08  0.32   0.70 (1.42)   0.80   
Cue + 2v4   0.20   0.22  1.13   2.07(0.48)   2.35  
Cue + 2v4 + Cue✻2v4   0.20   0.30  1.68   2.81 (0.36)   2.12  
Experiment 5           
Orient the effects of cuing           
One-way ANOVAs (No. faces; 1, 2, 4)           
HR           
Null model   0.50  0.79 3.80  1.00    
No. Faces (1, 2, 4)  0.50  0.21 0.26  0.26 (3.80)  0.03  
FAR           
Null model  0.50  0.31 0.44  1.00    
No. Faces (1, 2, 4)  0.50  0.70 2.28  2.28 (0.44)  0.01  
Replicate and extend effects of cuing           
Mixed ANOVAs 2 (No. faces: 2v4)  x 3 (cue type)           
HR           
Null model    0.20   0.71  9.90   1.000     
Cue   0.20   0.05  0.21   0.07 (14.23)   0.83   
No. Faces (2v4)  0.20   0.22  1.12   0.31 (3.25)   1.02   
Cue + 2v4   0.20   0.02  0.07   0.02 (43.48)   5.84   
Cue + 2v4 + Cue✻2v4   0.20   < 0.01  < 0.01   
< 0.01 
(353.33)  
 2.62   
FAR            
Null model  0.20   0.07  0.30   1.000     
Cue   0.20   0.58  5.50   8.21 (0.12)   0.96  
No. Faces (2v4)  0.20   0.02  0.08   0.27 (3.75)   1.14   
Cue + 2v4   0.20   0.15  0.72   2.16 (0.46)   1.00   
Cue + 2v4 + Cue✻2v4   0.20   0.18  0.87   2.54 (0.39)   1.24   
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Note. HR and FAR represent hit rates and false-alarm rates, respectively. BF10 refers to evidence in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis. In parentheses, BF01 refers to evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (BF01 = 1/ 
BF10). 
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Table 3.5 
Experiments 4 and 5: Results for T-tests and ANOVAs Comparing Sensitivity and Response Bias as a 
Factor of Face Encoding Condition or Cue Type  
 
df 
  
t d p 
 
F η2 BF10 (BF01) 
Experiment 4        
Two vs. four-face conditions        
Sensitivity (d’) 50   1.54  .131 0.55 (1.83) 
Response Bias (c) 50   0.62  .541 0.30 (3.39) 
Cue type (no, correct, incorrect cue)        
d’ 2, 60 0.74 .024   .482 0.18 (5.71) 
c  1.60, 47.98 2.17 .067   .135 0.53 (1.87) 
Experiment 5        
Two vs. four-face conditions        
Sensitivity (d’) 48   0.06 .018 .949 0.28 (3.53) 
Response Bias (c) 48   0.71 .200 .484 0.35 (2.88) 
Cue type (no, correct, incorrect cue)        
d’ 2, 54 3.23 .107   .047 1.38 (0.72) 
c  2, 54 4.32 .138   .018 3.11 (0.32) 
Note. We computed signal detection statistics to test for effects on sensitivity and response bias (d’ and c, 
respectively). We used t-tests to compare across the two-face and four-face conditions. We used repeated 
measures ANOVA’s across the no, correct, and incorrect cue conditions. The single-face condition was 
excluded due to the difference in cue types. Experiment 5: Sensitivity changed as a result of cue type such 
that participants had significantly lower sensitivity on no-cue trials compared to incorrect cues. Response 
bias changed as a result of cue type such that participants had significantly more positive response bias on 
no-cue trials compared to correct or incorrect cues. 
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or new (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). We used t-tests to compare sensitivity and 
response bias across the two-face and four-face conditions. Again, the single-face 
condition was excluded due to the difference in cue types. There were no significant 
differences between groups, BF10s < 0.55, but there was sufficient evidence to support 
the null hypothesis for response bias (BF01 = 3.39). We used one-way ANOVAs to 
compare sensitivity and response bias separately across cue type (no, correct, 
incorrect cues). There were also no significant differences between groups BF10s < 
0.53, though there was sufficient evidence to support the null hypothesis for 
sensitivity, BF01 = 5.71.  
Discussion 
In Experiment 4, we sought to replicate and extend previous research on cued 
face recognition (i.e., Watkins, Ho, & Tulving, 1976; Winograd & Rivers-Bulkeley, 
1977). While previous research investigating cued face recognition has previously 
used only pairs of faces at encoding, we aimed to test the limits of this effect by 
adding two conditions (single-face control, four-face condition) to the encoding-
phase. Specifically, the single-face condition was added to establish baseline 
differences in studying one vs. multiple faces, thus orienting the effects of cuing. The 
four-face condition was added to determine whether the effect would also arise in 
situations in which people encode more than two faces at a time.  At test, participants 
in the single-face condition were shown individual faces that had either been 
previously studied (old) or had never been studied before (new). Participants in the 
two-face or four-face encoding conditions were shown either a target face alone (no 
cue), or a target face presented alongside a correct or incorrect cue face.  
As expected, there were no differences in hits or false-alarm rates for test faces 
presented without a cue regardless of whether participants studied, one, two, or four 
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faces at encoding. This is in line with previous research demonstrating equivalent 
accuracy rates when controlling for divided attention (Bindemann et al., 2012). 
Contrary to expectations, however, hit rates did not benefit from the provision of 
correct cues at test, and were not diminished by incorrect cues at test. In fact, 
Bayesian analyses provide strong support for the null hypothesis— that cuing would 
have no impact on hit rates. This is an interesting finding and may suggest that true 
recognition is not influenced by the manipulations that we presented when divided 
control and memory load are controlled for.  
Unlike hit rates, false-alarm rates did show some differences between face 
encoding conditions and cue type. Participants in the two-face condition produced 
more false-alarms than participants in the four-face conditions only when a correct 
cue was shown. However, we view these results with some caution given the weaker 
evidence emerging from the Bayesian analyses.  
Experiment 5 
The results of Experiment 4 are puzzling given previous research in cued face 
recognition, but contribute to a field that has historically displayed mixed results 
dependent upon methodology (Davies, 1988). One explanation that may account for 
our results is that the association between the grouped faces during encoding was not 
strong enough. In our experiment, participants were simply instructed to study faces, 
and while pairs or groups of faces appeared simultaneously on the screen during the 
study phase, there was no interactive component to encourage participants to encode 
those faces together. Cuing relies on associative encoding, and presenting items 
together does not necessarily encourage associative links. Peris (1985; as cited in 
Davies 1988) demonstrated this contingency when he asked participants to encode 
photographs of people holding tools with posters in the background in order to 
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explore differences between interactive vs. independent encoding. Most relevant for 
the current research, he also tracked participant eye-movements during encoding. 
When participants were later asked to make identification decisions of the people, 
either the posters or the tool was manipulated to be used as contextual cues. It was 
expected that the interactive cues (i.e., tools) would enhance recognition accuracy of 
the person holding them while the independent cues (i.e., posters) would not. By 
contrast, results showed it did not matter which of these context cues was presented: 
accuracy was affected by the context change as long as the participant had fixated on 
that particular context (i.e., tool or poster).    
We may need to purposefully encourage participants to develop some 
connection between the presented faces. Winograd and Rivers-Bulkeley (1977) called 
this process ‘unitization’, which they implemented in their research by asking 
participants to rate compatibility between couples (male and female target faces) 
shown on the screen. We did not consider this an appropriate manipulation to include 
because of our additional conditions. This was in part because of the stimulus 
materials (i.e., we used only male faces) and in part because of the difficulty of asking 
participants to rate romantic compatibility between four targets in the four-face 
condition. Furthermore, there is no direct proxy for romantic compatibility for only 
one face in the single-face condition. Thus, in repeating the above experiment, we 
included a judgment task encouraging participants to consider the (fabricated) 
relationship between first impressions of and the memorability of guilty defendants’ 
faces and sentencing length. In this task, each pair or group of faces presented on 
screen during the study phase were described as presenting perpetrators of a multi-
perpetrator crime, who had been convicted by a jury and sentenced to equivalent 
prison terms. We asked participants to use their initial impressions of the faces 
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together to estimate how many years the pair or group had been sentenced to prison.  
We considered this a suitable alternative as a manipulation because criminals that 
commit a crime together are seen as a very closely-linked, or highly entitative, group 
(Likel et al., 2000). Furthermore, because participants must get an impression of all 
faces in order to estimate a single sentencing length, we expected it would necessitate 
participants to consider the individual stimuli as a group, and thus actively engage in 
unitized or associative encoding.  
Experiment 5 is a replication of Experiment 4 with an added manipulation for 
associative encoding, thus the hypotheses were the same as for Experiment 4.  
Method 
Participants. Seventy-eight university students (61 women, 17 men) 
participated in the current experiment. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 
43 (M = 22.28, SD = 4.13). Participants were compensated with either participation 
credit or a 7.50€ voucher. 
Materials. The photographs, pairings, and presentation orientation, for 
Experiment 5 were the same as for Experiment 4.  
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 5 was the same as Experiment 4, 
with one exception. Participants were told that the experiment was to test the 
supposed relationship between initial impressions of defendant criminality, the 
memorability of their faces, and the number of years a single convicted defendant or a 
group of convicted defendants were sentenced to prison. After each stimulus was 
presented during the encoding stage, participants were asked to rate on a Likert scale 
how many years (4-10) the person(s) presented had been sentenced to prison by the 
judge. For example, in the four-face condition, participants were instructed, “All 
members of the pair were sentenced to the same number of years in prison. If you 
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mark the number ‘4’, it means that the person on the top left was sentenced to 4 years 
in prison, and the person on the top right, the bottom left, and the bottom right were 
each sentenced to 4 years in prison.” While the encoding phase automatically 
advanced after 2 s per face, the ISI was self-paced, and participants could press the 
spacebar on the keyboard to advance to the next stimulus for all conditions. 
This manipulation was chosen as an alternative to relationship compatibility 
ratings of couples used by Winograd and Rivers-Bulkeley (1977) to unitize faces 
during encoding. However, this instruction could be plausibly applied to the single-
face and four-face conditions as well as the two-face condition. 
Results 
Data were screened for outliers and normality prior to analysis. One outlier 
was removed from the four-face condition for a high false-alarm rate, which was 
nearly twice the next-highest false-alarm rate in the four-face condition (.69 vs .36). 
Shapiro-Wilk tests were used to assess normality for each of the conditions. When 
normality was violated, both nonparametric (Kruskal Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U) 
and standard inferential tests (one-way ANOVA and t-test) were conducted on hit 
rates and false-alarm rates. Results did not differ as a result of test, therefore 
ANOVAs and t-tests are reported throughout. Bayes analyses were also conducted 
and reported. See Table 3.1 for hit and false-alarm rates according to cue type. Again, 
results are reported descriptively and inferential statistics can be found in Tables 3.1-
3.4, and Figure 3.3.  
Orienting the effect of cuing. Again, we first sought to determine whether 
previously-reported effects reflect a benefit of correct cuing, a detriment of incorrect 
cuing, or both. We therefore examined hit rates and false-alarm rates in the no-cue 
trials across single-face, two-face, and four-face encoding conditions using one-way 
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ANOVAs (see Table 3.3). This allows us to understand the initial differences between 
the three conditions altering the number of faces and acts as an anchor around which 
we can understand the resulting effects of cuing. 
 
Figure 3.3. Experiment 5: False-alarm rates as a function of cue type and face 
encoding condition. The single-face condition had significantly fewer false-
alarms compared to the four-face condition. In the two- and four-face condition, 
participants produced more false-alarms when no cue was presented compared 
to when a correct or incorrect cue was presented.  
For hits, there were no differences between groups, meaning that there was no 
evidence that hit rates differed across face encoding conditions when no cue was 
presented during test. Bayesian analyses showed moderate support for the null 
hypothesis (BF10 = 3.80; see Table 3.4). For false-alarms, there was a significant 
difference between face encoding conditions, though Bayesian analyses provide only 
weak or anecdotal support (BF10 = 2.28; see Table 3.4). The single-face condition had 
significantly fewer false-alarms compared to the four-face condition. The false-alarm 
rate for the two-face condition fell in the middle, and was neither significantly greater 
than the single-face and nor significantly smaller than the four-face condition.  
In summary, contrary to expectations but in line with Experiment 4, hit rates 
in the no-cue condition did not differ across the number of faces. Unlike in 
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Experiment 4, false-alarm rates in the no-cue condition did vary as a function of the 
number of faces, producing a positive linear relationship: the more faces presented at 
encoding, the higher the false-alarm rate. While Bayesian analyses provide only weak 
support for this difference, there is at least a descriptive trend that the four-face 
condition, and, to some extent, the two-face condition, began at a disadvantage 
compared to a participant viewing the same number of individual faces. It is with this 
baseline that we move on to consider the effects of cuing. 
Replicating and extending effects of cued face recognition. We again 
examined whether we could replicate previous effects of cued face recognition, and 
whether these effects would vary as a function of the number of faces to be encoded. 
We compared hit rates, and separately compared false-alarm rates, between the two- 
and four-face conditions given contextual cues using a 2 (condition: two-face, four-
face) x 3 (cue type: correct, incorrect) mixed ANOVA (see Table 3.3).  
For hit rates, there was no significant interaction between condition and cue 
type, and the main effects of cue type and face encoding condition were not 
significant. Thus, neither the number of faces at encoding nor the type of cue 
presented at test impacted participant hit rates. Bayes analyses provide strong support 
for the null hypothesis (BF10 = 353.33; see Table 3.4). For false-alarm rates, the 
interaction between face encoding condition and cue type was not significant. 
However, the main effect of cue type was significant and Bayes analyses provide 
positive or substantial evidence to support this (BF10 = 8.21). Collapsing across 
encoding face condition, participants produced more false-alarms when no cue was 
presented compared to when a correct cue was presented or when an incorrect cue 
was presented. There was no significant difference between the incorrect cue 
condition and the correct cue condition. The main effect of face encoding condition 
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was not significant and Bayes analyses provide positive to substantial evidence in 
favor of the null (BF01 = 3.75; see Table 3.4).  
Contrary to hypotheses, but again in line with Experiment 4, hit rates were not 
affected by the number of faces or cue type. However, false-alarm rates were 
impacted by cue type, such that correct and incorrect cues reduced the false-alarm rate 
in comparison to when no cue was provided. In considering orienting the effect of 
cuing, both multi-face encoding groups were at a slight disadvantage compared to the 
single-face group within the no-cue trials. In some cases, cuing reduced false-alarm 
rates as low as the single-face group on no-cue trials (see Table 3.1 for comparisons). 
This suggests that contextual cues, regardless of veracity, might provide a protective 
buffer to false-alarm rates. 
Sensitivity and response bias. Again, we computed signal detection statistics 
to test for effects on sensitivity and response bias (d’ and c, respectively; see Table 
3.5). We used t-tests to compare sensitivity and response bias across the two- and 
four-face conditions, and repeated measures ANOVAs to compare sensitivity and 
response bias across the no, correct, and incorrect cue conditions.  Neither sensitivity 
nor response bias changed as a result of number of faces (BF10s < 0.35).  Sensitivity 
did change as a result of cue type such that participants had lower sensitivity (i.e., 
were less able to discriminate old from new faces) on no-cue trials compared to 
correct or incorrect cue trials. However, Bayesian evidence constitutes anecdotal or 
weak evidence for this (BF10 = 1.38). Response bias also changed as a result of cue 
type (BF10 = 3.11). Participants had a negative response bias on no-cue trials (i.e., 
were more likely to be biased to respond old) compared to trials with correct and 
incorrect cues. Thus, contextual cues, whether correct or incorrect, appeared to 
increase sensitivity and reduce response bias. 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 5 was a replication of Experiment 4, but with the addition of a 
rating task to strengthen the associative encoding of the multiple faces. Consistent 
with Experiment 4, hit rates (correct responses to target-present trials) did not change 
as a function of number of faces or cue type. In fact, hit rates for Experiment 5 are 
remarkably similar to those in Experiment 4 (see Table 3.1). This suggests that the 
manipulation for associative encoding did not impact true recognition for previously-
studied faces or the possible utility of cuing.  
However, false-alarm rates did show a marked departure from the previous 
experiment. When no cue was presented during testing, false-alarm rates in the four-
face condition were significantly higher than in the single-face condition, and false-
alarm rates in the two-face condition fell between the two. As opposed to Experiment 
4, false-alarm rates in the multi-face conditions were higher when no cue was 
presented compared to when a correct or incorrect cue was presented with a target 
face. Furthermore, response bias was reduced any time a cue was presented in 
comparison to no cue. This is contrary to previous work in cued recognition, where 
correct cues often raise the false-alarm rate (see Davies, 1988). In our case, providing 
context, regardless of whether that context was correct or incorrect, appeared to 
provide a protective buffer against an otherwise higher bias to say that a face was old. 
This protective quality helped to bring false-alarm rates down nearly to the rate of 
false-alarms in the single-face condition. 
General Discussion 
Previous research has shown that when faces are studied in pairs, one of those faces 
can be used to cue the recognition of the other. Across two experiments, we sought to 
answer the following three questions in this cued face recognition domain: (1) do 
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previously-reported effects replicate with updated methodology? (2) if so, do these 
effects reflect a benefit of correct cuing, a detriment of incorrect cuing, or both? and 
(3) how do cuing effects vary as a function of the number of cues to be encoded? 
Experiment 4 provided little evidence with which to answer these questions in either 
direction, and it is only in Experiment 5, when we added a manipulation to enhance 
unitization or associative encoding, that effects arose. While we include Experiment 4 
as demonstration of the inconsistency of cued recognition effects and as a caution 
while interpreting the findings of Experiment 5, we focus primarily on the results of 
Experiment 5 in this discussion.  
Orienting cuing effects  
First we attempt to orient the effect of using face cues to enhance face 
recognition. Given that context reduced false-alarm rates (thus increasing recognition 
accuracy), we wondered if this is a result of the benefit of providing context (cf. 
single faces have no context), or whether it is beneficial only as a means to 
compensate for having encoded more faces at once. Therefore we first considered the 
no-cue trials across the three face groups. Results are mixed. Contrary to hypotheses, 
false-alarm rates in Experiment 5 statistically differed between groups on the no-cue 
trials. However, Bayes analyses provide only anecdotal/weak support for this finding. 
These conflicting results mean it is again difficult to draw strong conclusions from 
our data. There are a few reasons we may have obtained these weak differences 
between groups in Experiment 5 but not Experiment 4, and these are discussed in 
turn.  
First, it is possible that this difference between groups could be a result of the 
varying cue types at testing (i.e., the single-face condition was only ever tested with 
no cues). However, this explanation seems unlikely given that we did not see this 
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same pattern in Experiment 4, and because false-alarms were higher for the four-face 
condition, even though the two-and four-face conditions experienced similar testing 
conditions. Second, although we attempted to control for divided attention by 
providing 2 s of encoding time per face, it may be that the associative encoding 
manipulation affected the allocation of attention when participants were encouraged 
to engage in unitization. We did not track eye movements, but it is possible, for 
example, that participants split their time evenly between pairs of faces, but not 
groups of four faces. However, we would expect such differences in encoding to 
impact the hit rate, which it did not. Third, it may be that the difference in overall set-
sizes of the face stimuli (the combined total number of faces studied across all blocks) 
affected the false-alarm rates between groups. While participants studied a total of 36 
faces within a single study-test block, participants in the two- and four-face conditions 
completed two and four test blocks, respectively. Therefore, participants in the four-
face group were required to remember the most number of faces overall (36 faces 
multiplied by 4 blocks). Increasing set-sizes does decrease recognition accuracy (see 
Nortje, Tredoux, & Vredeveldt, in press), but we expected the 5 min break between 
each test-study block to specifically compensate for this additional memorial demand. 
Furthermore, if set-size was problematic across conditions, we would have also 
expected to see this difference in Experiment 4 with accuracy decreasing as the 
number of faces increased. This was not the case; Not only was there little change in 
accuracy across face encoding conditions in Experiment 4, the only difference showed 
an increase in false-alarms for the two-face condition rather than the four-face 
condition. Fourth, it could be a combination of any of these issues which created this 
statistically significant, but negligible difference.  
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A limitation of this study was that it was not possible to control for difference 
in cuing, set size, and encoding group size all at once. Therefore, it may be more 
valuable to compare recognition rates when each of these variables is held constant in 
turn. For example, when participants study single, pairs, and groups of four faces, but 
are only ever presented with the no-cue trials. This would be a logical next step for 
future research in order to understand the benefits of cued recognition. What we can 
say is that something about encoding groups of four faces in our experiment was more 
difficult for participants than encoding single faces or pairs of faces, even when they 
encoded the same number of faces in a study-test block. However, this difference was 
also minimal, with very little support from Bayesian analyses. Therefore, when 
participants were given contextual cues, the benefits of cuing appear to be a 
compensation for what was a slightly more difficult task of seeing multiple faces at 
once.  
Replication of cued face recognition effects  
Next, we consider whether we managed to replicate previous effects in cued 
face recognition. The two-face condition mimicked the original research in cued face 
recognition, but our methodology differed in two important ways. First, we 
randomized the left-right placement of the target faces between study and test, such 
that placement effects could not exert an influence on participant responses. Second, 
we randomized pairing of faces so that likeness between the faces (i.e., age, 
impression of personality, etc.) could not provide clues to correct answers. Following 
cued recognition and the encoding specificity principles (Thomson & Tulving, 1970), 
we expected to see hit rates increase when a correct cue was presented compared to 
either an incorrect cue or no cue at all. However, this was not the case. Hit rates were 
not affected by cuing, but false-alarm rates decreased in response to correct and 
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incorrect cuing. In line with these results, we also found that sensitivity (in this case, 
the capacity to distinguish an old from a new face) increased and response bias 
decreased when any context was shown, whether it was correct or incorrect context.  
It is interesting to note that the failure to increase hit rates arises in an 
experiment when face context is isolated from the possibility of placement context 
and intuitive impressions of couples belonging together. Admittedly, taking advantage 
of first impression instincts regarding romantic compatibility, as Winograd and 
Rivers-Bulkeley (1977) did, may offer an ecologically valid means of grouping faces; 
This is because we make social judgments about groups that may in turn affect our 
ability to recognize individual members within them (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; 
McGuire & Pezdek, 2016). However, the encoding specificity principle asserts that 
contextual information is more important than semantic information in cuing 
(Thomson & Tulving, 1970). Thus, if contextual cuing is useful for face recognition, 
randomized groupings of faces should not theoretically reduce the effect of correct 
cuing as long as the faces are encoded as context. Thus we would expect to still see 
increased hit rates as a result of correct cuing, and reduced hit rates as a result of 
incorrect cuing or no cuing. By contrast, our hit rates were not impacted. While we 
still saw an enhancement of accuracy as a result of cuing, it was a result of reduced 
false-alarm rates instead. Thus, cuing did not enhance the true recognition of an old 
face, but did enhance the ability to reject a new face that was not previously studied. 
Cued recognition studies typically find that correct cues increase false-alarm 
rates, but not enough to outweigh the benefits of cuing context (see Davies, 1988). 
However, our results diverge from previous patterns of contextual cuing, such that 
false-alarm rates actually decreased as a result of cuing. We should note that it is not 
unusual for a manipulation in memory research to affect hits and false-alarms to 
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different degrees; For example, context reinstatement in eyewitness identification 
research often inflates the false-alarm rate rather than the hit rate (Shapiro & Penrod, 
1986). However, the current research is closely aligned to the previous experiments in 
cued face recognition. This raises the question why, within the same field of cued 
recognition research, cues of faces would not present previously-reported risks of 
increasing false-alarms and why it would conversely reduce the false recognition of 
new faces. Because both correct and incorrect context reduced the false-alarm rate, 
and because sensitivity was minimally affected by cue type, it would be difficult to 
argue that memory was enhanced as a result of cuing. However, response bias did 
become more conservative any time context was present, meaning that participants 
needed more evidence to say that a face was old. This was reflected in the reduced 
false-alarm rate. However, it is not clear why this response bias became more 
conservative. One possible reason could be that the presence of a cue with a target, 
whether correct or incorrect, signaled a different task than the presence of a target 
alone. Should participants become more suspicious of trials with cues, they may need 
more evidence to response old than new.  
Extending cuing effects to more than two faces  
Lastly we consider whether such cuing effects extend to contexts in which 
more than two faces are encoded at the same time. While the four-face condition 
appeared to be at a slight disadvantage compared to the two-face group when no cue 
was presented, contextual cuing was equally useful in both groups to reduce the false-
alarm rate. Signal detection analyses provided further support for this notion, showing 
that neither sensitivity nor response bias differed between the two- and four-face 
groups. Thus, cuing was shown to be effective for both pairs of two and groups of 
four faces.  
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Limitations 
 It is important to consider our results within the limitation that we used 
identical images at study and test. Some researchers justifiably argue that this ignores 
the natural variability across representations of a face (see Burton, 2013). Because 
recognition for unfamiliar faces is fragile to even minute deviations, including, 
lighting, hair-style, image hue, expression, and focal point of the camera (e.g., 
Jenkins, White, Van Montfort, & Burton, 2011), it is likely that using the same 
photographs at study and test results in an easier task and, thus, overestimates 
eyewitness memory performance for person recognition (Bruce, 1982). Although it is 
true that this method does not provide the most realistic test of cued face recognition, 
there is little reason to assume this approach undermines the results presented here. 
Research in face recognition using the same images at encoding and test phases has 
produced similar patterns of results to those tested in the eyewitness paradigm where 
the faces are always different between the two phases (i.e., confidence-accuracy 
calibration: Sauer, Brewer, & Weber, 2008; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010, 
Weber & Brewer, 2004). Interestingly, our results are also in line with Wells and 
Pozzulo’s (2006) test of the novel two-person serial lineup against the traditional 
simultaneous and sequential lineup procedures: while there were no differences in 
lineup procedure for accurate identification decisions for target-present lineups, the 
two-person serial lineup consistently produced fewer false-identifications in target-
absent lineups. Although our task provides a basis for testing associative memory of 
faces, future research should include a more realistic task (i.e., video-to-photo 
recognition) to be able to generalize to the more complex real world task of face 
recognition.  
Conclusion 
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Across two experiments, we sought to replicate previous work that has 
demonstrated the benefits of cued face recognition for paired faces, to understand 
those findings in comparison to straightforward single-face recognition, and then 
extend those findings to situations in which participants study more than two faces. 
We failed to replicate previous research in cued face recognition with face pairs in the 
sense that the hit rate for true recognition did not increase when correct cues were 
available. However, we found that any cue (correct or incorrect) could reduce the 
false-alarm rate and that these effects extend to those studying groups of four faces, as 
long as the associative encoding was engaged. Furthermore, we demonstrated that 
cuing likely compensates for the more-difficult task of studying multiple faces at once 
(cf. single faces), even when divided attention and memory load are controlled for, 
and that this occurs by reducing response bias. However, the inconsistent effects 
reported between Experiments 4 and 5 warrant caution in the utility of such an effect 
in the applied setting for which this research has recently been adopted (i.e., 
Dempsey, 2012; Hobson & Wilcock, 2011; Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). In order to apply 
cued face recognition techniques to eyewitness identification procedures, future work 
should extend such findings in experimental settings that are incrementally closer to 
the eyewitness identification context, such as using video-to-picture methodology, 
and using fewer trials (cf. recognition paradigm). 
Our results confirm the utility of using other faces as contextual cues to 
enhance recognition accuracy. However, our work suggests that accuracy is enhanced 
(1) by a decrease in false recognition rather than an increase in true recognition 
(decreased false-alarm rate), and (2) a result of a shift in response bias rather than 
memorial enhancement. This research was the first replication of original cued face 
recognition findings using contemporary methodological procedures (i.e., 
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randomization of face groups and left-right placement), as well as novel research on 
extending such cued effects to situations in which there are more target faces 
presented at the same time.  
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Chapter 4: Thesis General Discussion 
This programme of doctoral research explored underlying issues in memory and 
decision-making that impact eyewitness identification in the context of multiple 
perpetrator crimes. In particular, the research focused on two factors: the associations 
between multiple decisions and the associations between memories for multiple faces. 
Across five empirical studies and one exploratory survey, this thesis reviewed police 
practice in three EU countries in the context of multiple suspect identification 
(Chapter 1: Police Survey), tested the independence of multiple identification 
decisions made successively (Chapter 2: Experiments 1, 2 and 3), and examined the 
purported utility of contextual face cues for recognizing the faces of multiple 
perpetrators (Chapter 3: Experiments 4 and 5). A key aim of the research was to 
examine concerns in current eyewitness identification procedures for multiple 
perpetrators. In particular, to explore those factors relevant to previously-unsuccessful 
attempts to create novel identification procedures adapted to the context of multiple 
perpetrator crimes. In this discussion, an overview of the key findings are presented, 
followed by theoretical implications for memory and decision-making, and practical 
implications for researchers in the subject of multiple perpetrator identification and 
for police in the field. This is followed by an examination of the limitations of the 
research presented here, and suggestions for future research.  
Summary of findings 
The thesis started with a survey-based review of police practices in three EU 
countries: Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The survey was conducted to (a) 
inform our understanding of the prevalence and characteristics of multiple perpetrator 
crimes from the perspective of law enforcement agencies, (b) to discern how agencies 
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in various countries conduct identification procedures with multiple perpetrators, and 
(c) to gain insight into how law enforcement agents and eyewitnesses experience the 
identification process in the context of such crimes. Results highlighted the practices 
that are similar between countries as a result of established regulations (i.e., using 
mostly photographic, sequential lineups), and practices that vary between and within 
countries in the absence of specific protocols to follow (i.e., whether to put multiple 
suspects in the same or in different lineups). For the purpose of this thesis, three 
findings from this survey are particularly relevant. First, there are very few 
regulations concerning multiple perpetrator crimes, both for a country that required 
certification for officers to conduct identification tests (NL), and for the countries that 
did not (SWE, BEL). Second, in the absence of such rules, officers appear to apply a 
set of similar common-sense extensions of procedures they use for single-perpetrator 
lineups. For example, most officers avoided telling eyewitnesses which of the 
multiple perpetrators the suspect lineup was created for, even though there is no rule 
that expressly forbids this practice. Further, while most officers in the three countries 
created separate lineups for each suspect of the multiple perpetrator crime, a 
percentage instead favoured placing all suspects in the same lineup. Third, reported 
practices make it clear that the association between multiple, separate decisions (i.e., 
making multiple identification decisions), and the association between the multiple 
memories of faces (i.e., multiple suspects corresponding to different perpetrators in 
the same lineup) are critical avenues for future research.  
The second chapter of the thesis focused on the association between multiple, 
separate recognition decisions. Previous work in recognition memory has 
demonstrated that decisions, although ostensibly separate, are not independent 
(Malmberg & Annis, 2012). In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested the relationship 
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between previous identification decisions and current choosing behavior in the 
context of the multiple showup identification decisions for a multiple perpetrator 
crime using a mock-eyewitness paradigm. Across experiments, evidence for 
sequential dependencies for choosing behavior was inconsistent: We could sometimes 
predict choosing from previous choosing patterns and sometimes not. Experiment 3 
examined whether methodological differences between the recognition and 
eyewitness paradigms used in previous research on sequential dependencies could 
account for the inconsistent findings presented in Experiments 1 and 2.  Experiment 3 
therefore sought to replicate previous recognition research in sequential dependencies 
using word and landscape stimuli, to extend these effects to face stimuli, and to 
examine whether the strength of these sequential dependencies changed as a result of 
the number of test trials (i.e., beginning vs. middle of experiment). Sequential 
dependencies were detected in recognition decisions over many trials, including 
recognition for faces: Overall, the probability of a yes response on the current 
recognition trial increased if the response on the previous recognition trial was also 
yes (vs. no). Although the expected dependencies arose across the many trials, these 
effects did not mean that the outcome of any individual trial could be reliably 
predicted by the previous one. Given that sequential dependencies did not notably 
impact observed choosing behavior for any individual trial, it is unlikely sequential 
dependencies would have a substantial impact on applied identification procedures or 
eyewitness choosing patterns across the multiple lineups decisions. 
The third chapter of this thesis focused on the association between memories 
for multiple faces seen at the same time. Experiments 4 and 5 examined the purported 
utility of associative memory for recognizing the faces of multiple perpetrators, 
investigated the mechanisms underlying those effects, and sought to determine 
102 
 
whether such effects could include more than two faces. These experiments attempted 
to replicate previous experiments that paired to-be-encoded faces, and then tested 
whether recognition performance was enhanced when test faces were paired with the 
correct face cue (the second face of the encoded pair), an incorrect face cue (a never-
before-seen face), or no cue was presented next to the test face. We compared this 
replication group to two new groups with fewer faces (single faces) and more faces 
(groups of four faces) presented during study. The correct recognition of previously-
studied faces (hits) was not affected by face cuing. However, face cuing of any kind 
(correct or incorrect cuing) appeared to provide a protective buffer to reduce the rate 
of false recognition of never-before-seen faces (false-alarms), regardless of whether 
there were two faces or four faces at study. This appeared to be a result of reduced 
response bias.  
Theoretical implications 
This research was the first to test face recognition decisions for sequential 
dependencies, which have been consistently reported for a wide variety of tasks, 
including emotion categorization and wine taste perception (Hsu & Yang, 2013; 
Schifferstein & Frijters, 1992). Experiment 3 showed for the first time that sequential 
dependencies can arise for recognition of images of faces. Although recognition 
accuracy for faces was lower compared to words and landscape images, sequential 
dependencies arose in similar patterns as for other stimuli. This is particularly 
interesting because there are many instances exposing how we encode faces 
differently compared to other stimuli. In contrast to encoding of objects, for example, 
it is difficult (if not impossible) for us to encode multiple faces at the same time. 
Rather, it is likely that we suppress the processing of one face in favor of devoting our 
attentional resources on the other face (Bindemann, Jenkins, & Burton, 2007). Yet 
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despite such differences in encoding, faces are subject to the same recognition 
dependency patterns over many recognition decisions. This is perhaps less surprising 
when we consider that most recent models explaining the patterns of sequential 
dependencies posit interference at the level of perception during testing, not encoding. 
Thus, it is unlikely to matter how an item was encoded, as long as the item was 
encoded. And if such models are correct, cognitive processes would be affected as 
memory is accessed during testing, whether that memory is of items, landscapes, or 
faces. In summary, while it is more difficult to remember faces, it is one more 
category of stimuli for which sequential dependencies arise across multiple decisions. 
Therefore, we could hypothesize that other tasks to measure sequential dependency 
patterns would likely produce similar results when using faces.  
 This research was also the first to examine sequential dependencies in the field 
of eyewitness identification, specifically for multiple perpetrator crimes. However, at 
the time of writing, there has been one other recent study that considers the effect of 
making multiple lineup decisions, although not within the theoretical framework of 
sequential effects (Mansour, Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2017). Mansour and colleagues 
(2017) asked whether multiple-trial experiments are appropriate for eyewitness 
research; in particular they focused on whether accuracy, choosing, and confidence 
rates changed over the course of eyewitness trials. Participants watched 24 videos and 
made 24 lineup identification decisions on target-present and target-absent trials. 
They found that the number of trials had no effect or a trivial effect on accuracy, 
choosing, or confidence. This is in line with our results from Experiments 1 and 2 on 
making multiple showup identification decisions, for which we found little capacity to 
predict choosing behavior based on previous choosing. Furthermore, in Experiment 3, 
we found sequential effects for face recognition overall, but still could not predict 
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choosing behavior on individual trials. Combined, these results suggest that sequential 
effects in themselves are not likely to greatly impact making multiple identification 
decisions in a row in an eyewitness context. 
Meanwhile, this research was also the first to test the effects of cued face 
recognition against non-cued face recognition by having the traditional paired face 
condition to compare with single-face condition. It was also the first to test cued 
recognition memory when more than two faces were present at encoding. Our 
research suggests that cuing may help to overcome the multiple face disadvantage, at 
least in reducing response bias apparently inflating the false-alarm rate.  However, it 
is also important to note that the cuing effect was small and only effective if the faces 
are encoded as a meaningful group. Importantly, these effects are present also when 
more than two faces are present at encoding, meaning that cuing effects may be able 
to be extended to more complex scenarios. This finding is particularly important to 
consider given that many crimes are committed by more than two perpetrators, and 
therefore research should take larger groups of stimuli (i.e., faces) into consideration 
in constructing and exploring theoretical models for memory and decision-making. 
The presented experiments in sequential dependencies and cued face recognition were 
similar in that they produced unexpected results. The predicted effects did not show 
up or, if they did, they presented in unexpected ways: The robust effects of sequential 
dependencies did not arise in the eyewitness paradigm for multiple identification 
decisions and the cued face recognition effects did not arise in the first attempt. While 
the cued recognition effects did present in the second attempt when a manipulation 
was added to increase the strength of associative encoding, even these effects were 
contrary to expectations; Unlike previous work with cued face recognition, contextual 
face cues in the presented experiment affected false-alarm rather than hit rates. These 
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surprising results suggest a number of moderators may be at play, including strength 
of associative encoding. Current theoretical perspectives need to be expanded through 
research better elucidating the boundary conditions and moderators of these core 
effects. 
Practical implications 
The research presented in this thesis is in many ways an attempt to act as 
counter-weight to common sense. Psychology is often believed to be a common-sense 
science; indeed, in cases when judges bar eyewitness memory experts from testifying, 
they often rule that the psychologist cannot offer information outside of general 
common sense (e.g., State v. Coley, 2000). While common sense is a useful heuristic 
in daily life, it does not always lead to accurate beliefs. And while holding inaccurate 
common-sense beliefs is not desirable, there are rarely dire consequences in daily life 
for holding them. What does it matter, for example, if people believe that reading by a 
dim light ruins eyesight despite no empirical evidence; or if they think that vision 
involves emitting rays of energy at some point before or during the perception 
process? And while insomniacs may count sheep to fall asleep, they are not at risk for 
anything more serious than wasting time (Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 
2010). However, the justice system is a field where common sense beliefs are applied 
by police officers, lawyers, judges, and jurors throughout investigations and trials. All 
of these legal decision-makers holding common sense beliefs about eyewitness 
memory have the capacity to make life-changing decisions for victims, witnesses, 
suspects, and perpetrators. Unfortunately, many of these beliefs are in conflict with 
empirical evidence. For example, only 41% of surveyed jury-eligible Americans 
believe that lineup instructions can impact the accuracy of an identification and only 
50% know that eyewitness confidence in that identification is highly susceptible to 
106 
 
outside influences (compared to 98% and 95% of memory experts, respectively; 
Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006). We find similar 
disagreements between lay people and experts regarding how the presence of a 
weapon impacts encoding and how race plays a role in identification (Houston, Hope, 
Memon, & Read, 2013). This is precisely because there are many aspects of memory 
that are not common sense.  
Although it is important to acknowledge some research seeks to isolate the 
underlying mechanisms of multiple face disadvantage of identification and 
recognition—including determining whether eyewitnesses mix up face features 
between the perpetrators (i.e., Megreya & Bindemann, 2012), or whether the 
disadvantage stems from memorial capacity, or number of comparisons (Bindemann 
et al., 2012)—most research in multiple perpetrator identification tests common-sense 
solutions to identification procedures. Lineups for multiple perpetrators have been 
presented in different orders and with new instructions (i.e., Hobson & Wilcock, 
2011), they have been tested using techniques attempting to control for relative vs. 
absolute judgments (i.e., Dempsey & Pozzulo, 2008; 2013), and combined lineups to 
present suspects and fillers for both perpetrators at once (i.e., Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). 
This research tests common-sense solutions for a problem that is not well understood. 
Therefore, results for these solutions do not provide answers for why they benefit 
identification accuracy or, more often, why they fail to do so. The a-theoretical nature 
of such investigations limits the generality of their findings, and such results are 
therefore difficult to build upon in future research.  
Meanwhile, the most useful research explores the problem of the multiple face 
disadvantage and tests which variables do or do not contribute to it. In doing so, this 
research systematically works its way through a checklist of variables to find those 
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variables we should consider when creating novel lineup techniques or protocols. For 
example, the current thesis tested for sequential dependencies to determine whether 
decision-making on multiple lineups is impacted simply because of the task of making 
multiple decisions. Given that these sequential dependencies for recognition did not 
translate to predictable observable behavior, it is not fruitful for the field of 
eyewitness identification to find solutions for a variable that does not appear to be 
problematic in the first place. An example of a common-sense solution would have 
been to provide instructions that specifically addressed the idea that the multiple 
lineups are not connected; if these instructions improved identification accuracy, we 
would not have known if they were compensating for sequential dependencies or, for 
example, moving criterion-placement by making respondent more conservative 
overall; if the instructions had not improved accuracy, we would not have known if 
they did not appropriately address sequential dependencies or if sequential 
dependencies were not an issue that needed addressing. By contrast, once we identify 
and understand the variables that contribute to the multiple face disadvantage, we can 
test for solutions that might compensate the disadvantages posed by these variables. 
For example, in this thesis I chose to explore cued face recognition in order to address 
the previously-tested variable of increased memorial demand (Bindemann et al., 
2012). Based on the results provided in Chapter 3, it seems that providing any context 
of the other suspect may help recognition accuracy. While this work requires 
replication and further tests particularly to elucidate why this inhibits false-alarms but 
does not improve hit rates, it is a solution that may be worth the time and resources to 
pursue.  
The fact that we did not replicate cuing effects serves as a caution to research 
building on older studies that have not been more-recently replicated or more 
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thoroughly-explored. For example, Dempsey (2014), and Wells and Pozzulo (2006) 
have applied cuing theory to create two different, novel identification procedures to 
enhance memory for the multiple perpetrators. One presented the face of only the 
second suspect next to the entire lineup for the first suspect (Dempsey, 2014); the 
other presented both lineups for both suspects at the same time, although in a 
sequential-presentation style (Wells & Pozzulo, 2006). In neither case did cuing 
improve identification accuracy for the eyewitnesses, and results did not provide clues 
for why. However, there are two important considerations in mining older theoretical 
work for newer applied solutions. First, cued face recognition is one example of 
research that is conducted for one purpose and is later used for another. In early 
manuscripts of cued face recognition, there is no indication that the authors 
anticipated that their results would be applied in a practical context such as 
eyewitness identification. The experiments were designed to test associative memory, 
not to provide a solution for reduced eyewitness memory in the context of multiple 
perpetrators.  This is certainly not to say that solutions for new problems cannot stem 
from older research. Rather, that it is important to consider how methodological 
choices pertinent to the original aims might affect the generality of findings to new 
domains. 
For example, in the Watkins and colleagues (1976) and Winograd and Rivers-
Bulkley’s (1977) experiments, incorrect face cues were created by mis-matching pairs 
of faces, or having participants circle the pairs of faces that correctly matched. This is 
an entirely different task compared to separating old faces from new ones. Also, in the 
typical recognition paradigm, participants view hundreds of faces and are tested on 
hundreds of trials in order to determine overall trends in memory. Even if the cued 
recognition effect is successful in such a paradigm, it is possible that the effects are 
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too small to consistently arise when participants are only memorizing a few faces and 
only tested on a few trials. While the experiments presented in this thesis were 
designed to explore the underlying mechanisms of the cued face recognition effect, 
and to extend this to situations beyond pairs of faces, this research line still requires 
several intermediary steps before we can determine whether it has practical value as a 
solution to multiple perpetrator lineups or to explain the results when we do apply it.  
For example, does this effect replicate when using videos of targets instead of 
photographs during encoding? Does the enhancing effect of context cues for 
recognition consistently arise when participants encode and are tested on very few 
faces? These are questions that need to be answered before applying them to lineup 
solutions. 
Second, the original experiments on cued recognition with face cues were 
conducted in the 1970’s, and have only now been revisited in the last decade as the 
field of multiple perpetrator identification and multiple person recognition have 
gained some interest. However, the field of psychology has since experienced a 
methodological and statistical revolution in the face of a replication crisis (e.g., 
Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). In other words, we now understand that 
some classic effects in psychology may be false positive findings— artifacts of an 
accumulation of issues like hiding null findings in the file drawer, reporting only 
significant variables, conducting experiments with small sample sizes, failing to 
protect against experimenter influence, and failing to adhere to stopping-rules in data 
collection. Because research cannot take for granted that phenomenon will replicate 
and generalize, experimenters need to be more programmatic in replicating key 
phenomenon, and then systematically extending these effects across stimulus types or 
moderating influences. This is a lesson learned in this own dissertation, first in 
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Chapter 2, when it became clear it was necessary to step back into the recognition 
paradigm to understand the boundaries of effects of sequential dependencies (i.e., 
whether they would arise for face stimuli and to what extent), and again in Chapter 3, 
when the expected cued recognition effects did not replicate. In both cases, it became 
particularly important to replicate and understand original effects along with 
extensions of those effects, for which both lines of research require even further 
investigation. 
 Police officials and legal decision-makers are the end-users of accumulated 
research on multiple perpetrator identifications, and therefore particularly important to 
consider in applied value of such research. To date, police have been using common-
sense adaptations to create and administer multiple perpetrator identification 
procedures. These decisions are sometimes at odds with each other, such as many 
officers’ decisions to create separate lineups for the multiple suspects, or some 
officer’s decisions to create one lineup with multiple suspects. On the one hand, 
putting multiple suspects in the lineup goes against the common-sense extension of 
the golden-standard for single-suspect lineups, a standard that is in place because it is 
considered imperative to decrease the probability of misidentifying an innocent 
suspect. On the other hand, it is not immediately obvious by common sense that such 
rules should apply when multiple suspects relate to different people (i.e., a man and a 
woman of a crime). These are reasonable decisions given that there are unlikely to be 
guidelines specific to multiple perpetrator crimes and that there is little applied 
understanding of the difficulties that might arise for either lineup technique. 
Unfortunately, the research field is not yet ready to provide practical advice to 
police officers or policy makers regarding the best methods for testing identification 
for multiple perpetrator crimes. For one, it appears that there is no obvious harm in 
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placing suspects for the different perpetrators in separate lineups, since sequential 
dependencies have no substantial effect when eyewitnesses make multiple decisions. 
Nevertheless, sequential dependencies are not the only way decisions can be linked. 
For example, people appear to naturally engage in probability matching in order to 
maximize optimal responding (see Vulkan, 2000). In other words, they use an 
expectation of base rates to inform current decisions. An example of this is when 
students, knowing that teachers tend to vary position of correct responses on multiple-
choice tests, become suspicious after circling too many A’s. This may be an 
interesting avenue to explore in making multiple recognition decisions. Furthermore, 
there is still the question of how Alan Crotzer, the case presented in the beginning of 
this thesis, was misidentified and wrongly convicted when the two other perpetrators 
were correctly identified.  Just as confidence leaks from one task to another, it could 
be that confidence in police competency could increase when an eyewitness correctly 
recognizes the first perpetrator, thus giving them the expectation that police likely 
also got the next guy. Additionally, our results for cued face recognition suggest it 
may be advantageous to have the multiple suspects related to different perpetrators in 
the same lineup, since context may help to reduce the possibility of falsely identifying 
an innocent suspect. However, our results would need to both be replicated in a 
recognition paradigm and subsequently tested in the eyewitness identification 
paradigm while controlling that one of the suspects might get picked by chance before 
we can recommend such an action. Given the dearth of understanding in eyewitness 
memory and identification for multiple perpetrators, it would be irresponsible to 
supply advice to police as to the correct applied protocols. At the moment, we can 
only provide a greater understanding surrounding the protocol decisions already being 
made. 
112 
 
Methodological considerations and future directions 
This thesis takes a multi-faceted approach to consider eyewitness recognition 
and identification for multiple perpetrator crimes with studies that investigate police 
practice, memory, and decision-making. This approach allows us to initiate research 
in a wide range of research areas. For example, we examined eyewitness decision-
making for showup identifications and recognition decisions. Although we conclude 
that sequential dependencies themselves are not significantly problematic in the field 
of eyewitness identification, there are other ways in which decisions could be linked. 
For example, future research should explore whether expectations play a role, such as 
eyewitness expectations for police competence, and whether suspicion can moderate 
that effect. For example, the post-identification feedback effect is a robust effect in 
which feedback from an experimenter or authority figure artificially increases 
confidence for an identification decision, regardless of the actual accuracy of the 
eyewitness. However, inducing suspicion about the trustworthiness of the source of 
feedback helps to eliminate the effects of feedback (Neuschatz, et al., 2007). 
Specifically, when an experimenter escorting the participant to a location change 
revealed that the study was being funded by the Tennessee District Attorney’s office 
in an attempt to prove the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, and that the 
experimenter was telling everyone that they had picked the perpetrator from the 
lineup, participants did not show the typical confidence inflation from the confirming 
feedback. In such a case, if an eyewitness believes police to be competent and the first 
lineup they recognize a perpetrator, do they carry those expectations forward to 
assume the next lineups will also have a perpetrator? Does this change if eyewitnesses 
are induced to be suspicious to rely on this heuristic? Another context in which 
decisions might be linked is when more than one suspect is presented in the lineup; In 
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such a case, eyewitnesses must make decisions for multiple suspects at the same time. 
On the other side of this topic, it is important to consider how sequential dependencies 
may impact applied jobs that involve making a large number of recognition decisions. 
For example, officials at football matches on the lookout for banned hooligans, or 
border control officers matching people to their passport photos. While all member 
states of the European Union report violence with football matches, the highest rates 
of football-related violence have historically been seen in England, Italy, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium, with at least 10% of supporters classified as “violent” 
(Carnibella, et al., 1996). As recent as 2014, the European commission has supported 
attempts to coordinate football leagues and security services to prevent or contain 
violence at these matches (European Commission, 2014). Spotters may be given 
books of fans that have been banned from the game, and a larger number of low- to 
high-risk fans attending the game to identify. With stadiums of tens of thousands of 
spectators, these spotters scan the crowd, making a high frequency of rapid 
recognition decisions. As some regions train specialized teams (i.e., Rotterdam police 
force) to aid recognition, it may be of interest to understand how sequential 
dependencies may influence their accuracy across these decisions.  
This dissertation also contains experiments designed to examine the link 
between eyewitness memories by testing cued face recognition. Two studies 
attempted to replicate and extend previous works on cued face recognition in which a 
single-face condition was compared to the two- and four-face conditions on those 
trials that did not use a face cue. The single-face condition was considered a control in 
order to determine baseline differences in recognition accuracy between the three 
groups. However, participants in both multiple face conditions also encountered other 
trials that included correct and incorrect cues, and therefore their testing condition 
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differs from that of the single-face condition. This difference was minimal because 
although it was statistically significant, there was very weak support for this 
difference from Bayesian analyses. Furthermore, this difference did not arise in the 
first experiment, where testing conditions were the same. However, given that this did 
arise in the second experiment, it may be a valuable comparison for participants to be 
presented with only no-cue trials, thus keeping testing conditions constant. This 
would be a logical next step for future research in order to understand the benefits of 
cued recognition. Another future direction for this field is the aforementioned 
incremental steps to conduct cued recognition research with videos of faces, and with 
very few trials, and, lastly, within the eyewitness paradigm for cued face research. 
One difficulty encountered in Experiment 5 within the cued-recognition 
paradigm was the need to purposefully encourage participants to create a meaningful 
connection between the presented faces when studying pairs of faces or groups of four 
faces. Winograd and Rivers-Bulkeley (1977) called this process ‘unitization’, which 
they implemented in their research by asking participants to rate compatibility 
between couples (male and female target faces) shown on the screen. This would not 
be an appropriate manipulation to include because of our additional conditions. This 
was in part because of the stimulus materials (i.e., we used only male faces) and in 
part because of the difficulty of asking participants to rate romantic compatibility 
between four targets in the four-face condition. Furthermore, there is no direct proxy 
for romantic compatibility for only one face in the single-face condition. Thus, in 
repeating Experiment 4, Experiment 5 included a judgment task aimed to encourage 
participants to consider the (fabricated) relationship between first impressions of and 
the memorability of guilty defendants’ faces and sentencing length. In this task, each 
pair or group of faces presented on screen during the study phase were described as 
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presenting perpetrators of a multi-perpetrator crime, who had been convicted by a jury 
and sentenced to equivalent prison terms. Participants were asked to use their initial 
impressions of the faces together to estimate how many years the pair or group had 
been sentenced to prison. This was considered an appropriate manipulation because 
criminals that commit a crime together are seen as a very closely-linked, also known 
as highly entitative, group (Lickel et al., 2000). Furthermore, because participants 
were asked to use their impression of all of the faces in order to estimate a single 
sentencing length, it was expected this judgment would actively engage in unitized or 
associative encoding.  
However, without eye-tracking equipment, it is not possible to know for 
certain that participants attended to all available faces when making this judgment. It 
is possible, for example, that they only used one of the faces to determine sentence 
length for the whole group. If this is the case, the faces themselves would not be 
integrated in memory as associated items and cuing would not be useful to enhance 
access to memory. This might explain why cuing did not improve participant hit rates, 
for example. Nevertheless, given that Experiment 5 was a direct replication of 
Experiment 4 except for the addition of this judgment task, this explanation is difficult 
to reconcile with the change in false-alarm rates between experiments. It is unclear 
how a judgment task at encoding would lead to a shift of response bias at test when 
cues are employed. 
A limitation of the current experiments in face recognition (Experiments 3, 4 
and 5) is that images of faces were used at both study and test. Unlike in the 
eyewitness paradigm (Experiments 1 and 2), where participants viewed a video of 
perpetrators and then were asked to make identification decisions from photographs 
of suspects, participants in the recognition paradigm studied photographs of 
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individuals and were later tested on the same photographs. Some researchers argue 
that this methodology is problematic for our understanding of face recognition, 
because participants may be matching images rather than recognizing faces (see 
Burton, 2013). The critique is that using images of faces at study and test is ignoring 
natural variability across representations of a face, meaning that research is measuring 
the recognition of face images rather than the recognition of people. This is a 
reasonable assertion: To recognize someone, we should be able to see them from 
different angles, in different lighting, and know who they are. For example, the 
musician Bob Dylan is easily recognizable to his fans across thousands of 
photographs at different ages, in different poses, with different background and 
perspective and clothing and facial expressions. Recognition for familiar faces, like 
those of family members, friends, celebrities, is robust across these temporal and 
contextual changes, but recognition for unfamiliar faces is conversely fragile to even 
minute deviations, including, but by no means limited to, lighting, hair-style, image 
hue, expression, and focal point of the camera (see Burton, 2013). This 
methodological issue is pervasive in recognition and identification research. For the 
current thesis, the large numbers of face images required to test the hypotheses 
mitigated against the compilation of a bespoke face database.  Further, given 
differences in available databases that prevent combining faces from different sources 
(i.e., decisions regarding stimulus, cropping, background, camera angle and distance; 
equipment such as lighting, cameras, and lenses), it was difficult to obtain the number 
of faces needed for such experiments (i.e., more than 250 photos in each Experiments 
3, 4 and 5, 3) when decisions to control other influencing variables (i.e., gender, age, 
race) further restrict options for faces. Although it is true that this method does not 
provide the most realistic test of cued face recognition, there is little reason to assume 
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this approach undermines the results presented here. Research in face recognition 
using the same images at encoding and test phases has produced similar patterns of 
results to those tested in the eyewitness paradigm where the faces are always different 
between the two phases (i.e., confidence-accuracy calibration: Sauer, Brewer, & 
Weber, 2008; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010, Weber & Brewer, 2004).  
Importantly,  the current approach is used as a starting point, which should 
certainly expand to replicate with realistic variation that more closely resembles real 
life face recognition. 
Even with a multifaceted approach, this dissertation only touched on a few of 
the many research opportunities present in the field of multiple perpetrator 
identification. It is important, for example, to explore factors of the encoding event, 
such as how attention is distributed among members of a group of perpetrators, how 
salience of the perpetrator (i.e., central vs. peripheral perpetrators) impacts which 
members are remembered, and the degree of similarity between perpetrators (i.e., 
gang members that look alike). Another is to explore those factors at test that are 
unique to multiple perpetrator recognition and identification, such as whether the 
multiple suspects should be placed in the same lineup or whether eyewitnesses should 
be instructed to search for specific suspects (i.e., this lineup is for the man that held 
the gun). We began tapping into only some questions in decision-making, memory, 
and practice that are relevant to eyewitnesses of multiple perpetrator crimes, but there 
are more variables at encoding, retention, and recall/recognition that are both unique 
and inherent to multiple perpetrator crimes. 
Conclusion 
In five experiments and one survey, this thesis examined underlying issues in 
memory and decision-making that impact eyewitness identification in the context of 
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multiple perpetrator crimes. This thesis explored a range of topics related to the 
recognition and identification of multiple perpetrators in three areas: practice, 
memory, and decision-making. A survey of police methods provided an initial picture 
of how they approach identification procedures for multiple perpetrator crimes, how 
lineups are constructed and presented, what kind of instructions are given, and 
problems that they experience in conducting such procedures. Responses made clear 
that there are few regulations for identification procedures specifically for multiple 
perpetrator crimes and that police vary in their decisions on how to create and 
administer lineups, decisions that should be tested and advised upon by empirical 
research. The presented research in sequential dependencies for identification 
decisions demonstrated that there is little concern for the integrity of identification 
and recognition decisions to be impacted by making the multiple decisions in a row. 
Lastly, the presented research showed that cued face recognition may be a useful 
technique to use, and a promising avenue for future research.  
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Sauerland’s supervision. Below are the letters of favorable opinion for the police survey 
and the research lines under which the experiments were conducted.  
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Ethical Approval for Police Survey 
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Ethical Approval for Research Line “Study on Eyewitnesses Decision Processes”10 
 
 
  
                                                 
10
 This research line was originally granted in 2009 and used for Experiment 1. In 
2015, it was amended to include non-Maastricht populations, including residents of 
the U.K. and the U.S. and was used for Experiments 2.  
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Ethical Approval from the University of Portsmouth  
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Ethical Approval for Research Line “Eyewitness identification research line”11 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This research line was granted in 2016 and was used for Experiments 3, 4, and 5 
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Appendix B - Police Survey Questions 
 
 
Page 1 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 Other 
Age? 
How many years of experience in conducting eyewitness identification procedures do you have? 
What is your job role?  
Jurisdiction? 
 
Page 2 
THE CRIMINAL OFFENCES
12
 
  
Crimes performed by multiple perpetrators referring to crimes involving two or more people are 
involved in the commission of the offense (for example, four people who all attack a victim or an 
accomplice who distracts the victim, while the other bag of the victim grabs.) 
 
An identification of multiple defendants refers to an identification procedure performed for a person 
suspected of involvement in a crime carried out by multiple perpetrators. One or more suspects for each 
of the unknown perpetrators who actually committed the crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Questions are marked to differentiate between the original questions from Hobson et al.’s 
(2012) original survey, and questions that have been altered or added.  
a  denotes original, unchanged questions 
b  denotes original, but adapted questions 
c  denotes new questions added to the survey for this thesis  
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1
a
) Of the crimes have you dealt in the last 12 months, what 
proportion involved multiple suspect showings? (Please select the box that applies) 
 
 
 
2
a
) How many suspects are typically involved in the multiple perpetrator 
cases you have dealt with? (Please select the box for the category that applies most often)  
 
 
 
 
 
3
a
) In the past 12 months, what types of crimes have you dealt with that 
typically involve multiple perpetrators? (For each category, please estimate how many 
cases in the past 12 months you have encountered each involving multiple perpetrators. For listed 
crimes you have not encountered involving multiple perpetrators, enter 0) 
 
 
 
Page 3 
CURRENT PROCEDURES 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Scenario 1: Two men (A and B) robbed a bank. An employee witnessed the 
robbery. Two suspects are arrested, both suspected for being perpetrator 
A. The suspects are called suspect A1 and suspect A2. You are preparing an 
identification line up.  
 
4a
c
) Choose the option that resembles what you would do in this case. 
   
 The eyewitness sees one line up, only for suspect A1 or only 
for suspect A2, not both 
 The eyewitness sees two line ups, one for suspect A1 and one 
for suspect A2 
 The eyewitness sees one lineup, with both suspects A1 and A2 
in the same lineup 
 
4b
c
) In your work with multiple perpetrator crimes, Scenario 1 
occurs: 
 Never 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Page 4 
 
Scenario 2: Two men (A and B) robbed a bank. An employee 
witnessed the robbery. Two suspects are arrested, one suspect 
for perpetrator A and one suspect for perpetrator B. The suspects are 
called suspect A1 and suspect B1. You are preparing an identification 
line up.  
 
5a
c
) Choose the option that resembles what you would do in this case. 
 The eyewitness sees one line up, only for suspect A or for 
suspect B, not both 
 The eyewitness gets to see two line ups, one for suspect A and 
one for suspect B  
 The eyewitness gets to see one lineup, with both suspects A 
and B in the same lineup 
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5b
c
) In your work with multiple perpetrator crimes, Scenario 2 
occurs: 
 Never 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Page 5 
CURRENT PROCEDURES 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
6
b
) In what manner do you present the parades to witnesses in a multiple 
suspect identification? Select all the options that apply 
 
Lineups: 
 Live lineup (in person) 
 Photo lineup 
 Video lineup 
 
 
Choose the format of lineups: 
 simultaneous presentation 
 sequential prsentation 
 other 
 
Show-ups 
 Live (in person) 
 Photo show-up 
 Video show-up 
 
7
c
) Are there any procedural requirements or guidelines in place for multiple 
suspect identifications? (This may include any national or jurisdictional guidelines, written 
procedures outlined by the law enforcement agency, or training material used for new 
officers. Such guidelines may include instructions for live lineups vs photo-arrays or video lineups, 
number of fillers, selection of fillers, and number of suspects presented at one time. Please provide 
as much detail as possible.) 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Page 6 
CURRENT PROCEDURES 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
8
c
) How do you organize the identification presentations for eyewitnesses in 
the case of a multiple-perpetrator crime?  
 A witness will only see the lineups when all suspects / photos / videos are available 
for the identification procedure 
 The witness sees an identification presentation when a suspect / photo / video 
becomes  available  
 Other  
 
 
9
b
) What instructions do you give to a witness for multiple perpetrator 
identifications? (Please provide details of instructions given, and at what point during the 
identification process these instructions are given and if they differ from single-suspect 
procedures) 
 
 
 
 
 
10
a
) Do you ask the witness to look for a specific suspect? (e.g., identify the one 
who was driving the car) 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Page 7 
CURRENT PROCEDURES 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
11
a
) Do you ask the witness to describe the role of the suspect they are 
identifying? 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Page 8 
CURRENT PROCEDURES 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
 
12
c
) Do you record all eyewitness identification decisions in a crime with 
multiple perpetrators? (Please provide details regarding in what circumstances and how 
decisions are 
recorded) 
 
 
13
c
) Do you record confidence for all suspect identifications for multiple 
suspect identifications? 
 
 
 
144 
 
14
c
)  Who is responsible for constructing the lineups? Is the same person 
responsible for all suspect lineups in a given case involving multiple 
perpetrators?  
 
 
 
Page 9 
ISSUES WITH CURRENT PRACTICE 
All questions are referring specifically to the context of multiple suspect identifications unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
15
a
) Do you, as someone who administers identifications, experience any 
problems with multiple suspect identifications? (Please describe in as much detail as 
possible) 
 
 
16
a
) Do you think witnesses experience any problems with multiple suspect 
identifications? (Please describe in as much detail as possible) 
 
 
 
Page 10 
PERCEPTIONS OF EYEWITNESSES 
17
c
) How do you think eyewitnesses of a multiple perpetrator crime perform 
in identifications compared to eyewitnesses of a single perpetrator 
crime? Generally eyewitnesses to crimes committed by multiple perpetrators 
are _____ compared with eyewitnesses to crimes committed by a single 
perpetrator. 
 Worse 
 As good as 
 Better 
 
18
c
) In your opinion, how useful is a witness for you if they identify one, but 
not all of the suspects presented? 
 
 
 
Page 11 
YOUR SUGGESTIONS 
 
19
b
) Do you have any ideas of how multiple suspect identifications could be 
improved from the point of view of the police? 
 
  
145 
 
Appendix C - Recruitment E-mail for Police Survey 
 
Dear (name), 
 
I am a PhD researcher Maastricht University (NL), and the University of Portsmouth 
(UK). I am contacting you because you have previously expressed interest in 
completing a survey regarding eyewitness identification procedures for multiple-
perpetrator crimes. The purpose of the research is to understand how police handle 
multi-perpetrator identifications in practice and to determine what, if any, issues arise 
in such situations. 
 
I appreciate your interest in completing the questionnaire and I am e-mailing to 
provide you with the link here: 
 
www.link.com  
 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions or concerns you may have.  
 
Lastly, if you have other colleagues who conduct identification procedures and might 
be interested in completing this questionnaire, we appreciate you forwarding the link 
to them as well.  The survey is available in Dutch, English, and Swedish. 
 
Best regards, 
Nina Tupper 
 
To contacts to distribute survey: 
Dear (insert name here), 
 
My name is Nina Tupper, I am a PhD researcher for the House of Legal Psychology- 
a collaboration between the universities of Maastricht (NL), Portsmouth (UK), and 
Gothenberg (SWE). My research focuses on eyewitness identification procedures in 
crimes involving multiple perpetrators and I am currently conducting an international 
police survey to understand how police handle multi-perpetrator identifications in 
practice and to determine what, if any, issues arise in such situations. 
  
To give you an idea of our aims and our target-participants, the introduction to the 
survey is below this email. The study is an online questionnaire, so the link could be 
easily distributed to anyone willing to take the survey, and is available in English, 
Dutch, and Swedish.  
 
I am contacting to see if you would be able to help me distribute this survey or point 
me towards a contact with someone who could. I am happy to provide a list of 
questions if you need more information. Thank you very much for your time and I 
look forward to discussing this further with you. 
 
Kind regards, 
Nina Tupper 
  
International Police Survey: 
Our aim: 
146 
 
The purpose of this survey is to inform our understanding of the prevalence and 
characteristics of multiple perpetrator crimes from the perspective of law 
enforcement agencies. We further seek to gain insight regarding how agencies in 
various countries conduct identification procedures (e.g., lineups, photo-arrays, 
showups) with multiple perpetrators and how law enforcement agents and 
eyewitnesses experience the process. 
 
Who should complete this survey: 
This survey is intended for law enforcement agents with experience in 
administering identification procedures. In particular, we are looking for those 
in the department who are assigned the particular role of identification officer 
(or the equivalent) or, alternatively, the agents with the most expertise in lineup 
administration. 
 
The survey: 
The survey consists of four main sections to address the aims outlined above. 
Specifically, the sections ask for a) your estimation of both proportion of crimes 
you have dealt with and type of crimes you have dealt with that involve multiple 
perpetrators, b) the current procedures for multiple identifications, c) problems 
experienced while administering such identification procedures and d) your 
experiences in your interactions with eyewitnesses viewing such lineups. There is 
also space at the end for you suggestions regarding if/how to adjust or change 
current procedures. We appreciate as much detail as you are able to provide, 
including any examples from your own experience or the experiences of others 
administering identification procedures. 
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Appendix D - Information Sheet and Consent Form for Police Survey 
 
International Police Survey – Identification of Multiple Perpetrators 
 
Hello and thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
  
Our aim: 
The purpose of this survey is to inform our understanding of the prevalence and 
characteristics of multiple perpetrator crimes from the perspective of law enforcement 
agencies. We further seek to gain insight regarding how agencies in various countries 
conduct identification procedures (e.g., lineups, photo-arrays, showups) with multiple 
perpetrators and how law enforcement agents and eyewitnesses experience the 
process.  
  
Who should complete this survey: 
This survey is intended for law enforcement agents with experience in administering 
identification procedures. In particular, we are looking for those in the department 
who are assigned the particular role of identification officer (or the equivalent) or, 
alternatively, the agents with the most expertise in lineup administration. 
  
The survey: 
The survey consists of four main sections to address the aims outlined above. 
Specifically, the sections ask for a) your estimation of both proportion of crimes you 
have dealt with and type of crimes you have dealt with that involve multiple 
perpetrators, b) the current procedures for multiple identifications, c) problems 
experienced while administering such identification procedures and d) your 
experiences in your interactions with eyewitnesses viewing such lineups.  
  
Confidentiality: 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may terminate your participation 
at any time. The findings of the study will be interpreted and reported on a group 
basis without reference to key individual information. All information about 
individuals will be held in confidence. 
  
We sincerely appreciate your time and valuable input! 
  
Clicking the button to continue indicates that you agree to these conditions and 
are ready to begin the survey>>> 
 
If you have questions and/or comments on this research, please contact the researcher, 
Nina Tupper, or her supervisors: 
Nina Tupper (nina.tupper@maastrichtuniversity.nl) 
Maastricht University and the University of Portsmouth 
 
 
Dr. Melanie Sauerland (melanie.sauerland@maastrichtuniversity.nl) 
Maastricht University 
 
Prof. Lorraine Hope (lorraine.hope@port.ac.uk) 
University of Portsmouth  
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Appendix E - Debriefing for Police Survey 
 
Thank you for completing this survey on eyewitness identification in the context of 
multi-perpetrator crimes. The purpose of this survey is to inform our understanding of 
the prevalence and characteristics of multiple perpetrator crimes from the perspective 
of law enforcement agencies. We further seek to gain insight regarding how agencies 
in various countries conduct identification procedures (e.g., lineups, photo-arrays, 
show-ups) with multiple perpetrators and how law enforcement agents and 
eyewitnesses experience the process. 
  
Thank you for your participation, your time is very much appreciated. 
If you have any questions, complaints, or concerns about this research, or if you 
would like a copy of the results of this research, you may contact the researcher, Nina 
Tupper, or her supervisors. 
Nina Tupper (nina.tupper@maastrichtuniversity.nl) 
Maastricht University and the University of Portsmouth 
 
Dr. Melanie Sauerland (melanie.sauerland@maastrichtuniversity.nl) 
Maastricht University 
 
Prof. Lorraine Hope (lorraine.hope@port.ac.uk) 
University of Portsmouth 
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Appendix F - Supplementary Material 
 
Table A.1 
Chapter 2, Pilot Study: Mean (standard deviation) Age, Distinctiveness, Memorability, Typicality and 
Similarity Values for Target Faces and Corresponding Innocent Suspect 
 Perpetrator 1 
 
M (SD) 
Innocent 
Suspect 1 
M (SD) 
Perpetrator 2 
 
M (SD) 
Innocent 
Suspect 2 
M (SD) 
Perpetrator 3 
 
M (SD) 
Innocent 
Suspect 3 
M (SD) 
Age 23.45 (1.47) 22.91 (2.76) 22 (2.05) 23.27 (2.76) 25.14 (1.64) 22.73 (2.41) 
Distinctiveness 2.95 (1.00) 2.82 (1.22) 3.14 (0.94) 2.86 (0.99) 3.77 (0.97) 3.45 (1.06) 
Memorability 3.00 (1.07) 2.59 (1.14) 2.00 (1.16) 2.73 (0.83) 3.50 (1.01) 3.27 (0.99) 
Typicality 1.72 (0.98) 1.72 (1.12) 1.86 (1.08) 1.64 (1.29) 2.00 (1.02) 2.05 (1.09) 
Similarity 2.81 (0.80) 2.45 (0.96) 2.45 (0.91) 
Note:  Participants were shown each of the photographs (targets and replacements) individually and 
were asked to estimate age and to rate distinctiveness and memorability on a five-point scale from 1 
(not at all distinctive/memorable) to 5 (extremely distinctive/memorable) and to rate deviation from 
typicality (How much would this face have to be modified to look completely typical/average?) on a 
scale from 0 (no modification) to 5. Participants indicated how similar they considered the two faces on 
a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 5 (very similar). Innocent suspects were rated as statistically non-
different to the perpetrator for the following three factors: memorability, distinctiveness, and deviation 
from typicality. Innocent suspects 2 and 3 significantly differed in age from their respective 
perpetrators: Suspect 2: t(21) = 2.73, p = .013; Suspect 3: t(21) = -6.41, p < .001. Perpetrators and their 
corresponding innocent suspects were also rated for similarity. These tests revealed no significant 
differences between pairs; ps ≥ .162.  
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Table A.2 
Chapter 2, Experiment 3: Hit Rates (standard error) Given Previous 
Response as a Function of Stimulus and Testing Section  
 Hit Rate  FA Rate 
 Hit Miss  Hit Miss FA CR 
Stimulus        
  Face .58 (.02) .45 (.03)  .37 (.14) .28 (.16) .36 (.16) .28 (.12) 
   Place .53 (.02) .42 (.02)  .27 (.14) .23 (.14) .30 (.18) .22 (.10) 
    Words .66 (.02) .51 (.02)  .25 (.15) .18 (.13) .26 (.17) .20 (.12) 
Section        
1 .65 (.02) .59 (.02)  .31 (.02) .26 (.02) .31 (.02) .28 (.02) 
2 .50 (.02) .45 (.02)  .27 (.02) .21 (.02) .26 (.02) .27 (.02) 
3 .61 (.02) .54 (.02)  .32 (.02) .26 (.02) .31 (.02) .27 (.01) 
4 .51 (.02) .42 (.02)  .26 (.02) .27 (.02) .29 (.03) .22 (.02) 
Note. We examined whether the strength of sequential dependencies changed over 
the course of the testing session by breaking the two testing blocks into a total of 
four sections: the first half of the first block (Section 1), the second half of the first 
block (Section 2), and the first and second halves of the second block (Sections 3 
and 4).  
 
